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ABSTRACT
Poland's post--war pattern of foreign trade has been 
mainly determined by the political factor, Its Incorporation 
Into the Sovlet--Bloc and strict adherence to the fundamental 
Marxist Ideology. Following Soviet experiences the Polish 
government established a highly centralized economic system 
of control In order to manage the system. With respect to 
foreign trade It found Its Immediate reflection In the es- 
tabllshment of state monopoly of foreign trade and almost 
exclusive reliance on comprehensive economic planning In 
carrying out the foreign trade activity. In the first post—  
war decade the performance of the foreign trade apparatus 
was strongly affected by a very pronounced drive toward 
autarchy and considerable neglect of the sector of foreign 
trade.
From the point of view of the planning technique ma­
terial balancing ruled supreme and caused almost complete 
negligence of profitability considerations In carrying out 
the foreign trade activity.
As a result of political changes which took place in 
the mid 1950's, the degree of centralization of decision 
making on the economy wide scale to some extent decreased.
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The doctrinal thaw which followed brought the recognition of 
foreign trade as a vital sector of the economy. In effect, 
foreign trade policies have been modified In order to over- 
come t h e ,autarchlal tendencies. Material balancing went 
under the heavy attack of critics and the problems of foreign 
trade profitability began to focus attention on both; economic 
theoreticans and foreign trade practioners. However,as 
Bloc experience Indicate, the absence of the automatic market 
mechanism makes It extremely difficult to find the satisfactory 
profitability criteria and the Investigations in this field 
are still in the initial stage. On the other hand the en­
thusiastic drive towards reforms had only a very short life 
and soon has been counteracted by the conservative course 
taken by the political authority.
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INTRODUCTION
In a centrally planned economy resources are 
allocated chiefly not by a market mechanism but by a 
system of commands and directives radiating from the 
decision making centre. Economic planning and adminis­
trative organization are introduced in order to transmit 
directives downward, send up the information on which to 
base further commands upward, coordinate the process of 
decision making and evaluate the performance of the hi­
erarchical structure. Foreign trade,as any other sector 
of the 'command economy' is subjected to the discipline \ 
of central planning and operates within its own organi­
zational structure. '
The purpose of this study is to examine the basic 
aspects of foreign trade in the Folish economy.
I shall attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the 
process of planning and of the institutional framework of 
the system as these two problems lie at the core of the 
centrally planned economy and mainly determine its 
operation and performance.
Poland's foreign trade,as it operates today^is the 
outcome of the complex process of shifts and adjustments 
made over the whole post-war period. Most of these 
changes were originated by political factor and reflected 
changes in the ruling ideology. Some of them were 
introduced for economic reasons. Because of the still 
changing nature of the system considerable attention will
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
be given to the economic discussions on the underlying 
principles of centrally planned economy and reforms which 
were introduced in order to improve its performance.
Chapter 1 examines briefly the characteristic 
features of the centrally planned economy. The key 
topics are: the role of Marxist ideology, models of the
centrally planned economy and the concept of economic 
planning.
Chapter 11 focusses on the administrative organiza­
tion and schemes of control managing the system of foreign 
trade.
Chapter 111 deals with the fundamental strategy of 
planning. It contains the analysis of the process of 
plan construction and coordination with the brief evalua­
tion of the adopted planning procedures and techniques.
Chapters IV and V present a summary view on the 
roles of exchange and price-setting problems, in foreign 
trade. To some extent they are designated to prepare 
grounds for the following discussion on reforms in the 
system of foreign trade. Special attention is devoted 
to the problem of effectiveness of foreign trade. Inten­
sive research in this field undertaken by all countries 
of the Soviet-bloc seems to indicate that effectiveness 
is going to be their new criterion for trade. The 
analysis of the working principles and operation of the 
foreign trade system in the centrally planned economy is 
supplemented by the cross-section view on Poland's foreign 
trade activity. The last chapter presents an empirical. . .•
study of Poland's pattern of trade.
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BASIC CONCEPTS:
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I GENERAL MODEL OP THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY AND THE ROLE 
OF FOREIGN TRADE.
Defining a socialist economy K. Marx stressed 
nationalization of the means of production as its most 
distinguished feature. It v/as a logical consequence of 
.his economic doctrine devised primarily for examining 
social relations of production which lay behind the market 
and not the market mechanism as such.^ Therefore, his 
theory is a rather unsatisfactory tool when dealing 
with problems of national allocation of resources and it 
seems it was never designated for such purposes, at least 
not by Marx himself. However,Soviet economic theory^ 
seems to misinterpret this point, taking every possible
As M. B. Bober explains; "to Marx economics is 
prominently a study at class exploitation in a given 
society and its evolution to the new, higher social 
order, and the object of the economics at capitalism 
specifically is the investigation at the principles 
governing the exploitation at the proletariat."
M. B. Bober, Marx and Economic Calculation. AER 
Volume 36, June 1946.
^  The designations; "Soviet-economic theory" "economic 
theory of the Bloc countries" will be used inter­
changeably to mean not only the economic doctrine in 
the Soviet Union but also in the countries of the so- 
called Soviet Bloc. In the light of recent political 
events especially the breakthrough which took place in 
Albania and Mainland China, the term "Soviet Bloc 
countries" is somewhat inaccurate as the ideological, 
political and economical unity of the group of countries 
formally accepting Soviet leadership seems to be very 
questionable. It will be used here to mean the countries 
organized into the "Council of Mutual Economic Assis­
tance (CEMA) and including; Bulgaria, Csechoslovakia, 
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Soviet Union and Rumania.
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effort to apply the Marxian labor theory of value as a 
normative principle of valuation.^ The essential part 
of this theory v/as the form of ownership. On this base 
Marx formulated the principles of class exploitation.
The theory contains a certain measure of internal logical 
consistency in explaining social relations of production-, 
but beyond that it contributes nothing to our understand­
ing of the economic process. In the outcome, Marx proved 
himself incapable of fashioning any tools with which it 
would be possible to tackle the problem of rational 
allocation of scarce resources in the economy. Under 
socialism the form of ownership changes and according to 
the logic of this theory there should be no exploitationj 
yet resources remain as scarce as they are under any 
other economic system. How should allocation of 
resources be rationally devised? As expressed by seve­
ral economists, the form of ownership so heavily stressed 
by the Soviet theory, based on Marxian teaching, is not 
really relevant to economic evaluation.
For more detailed discussion see: M. B. Bober, op, cit,
and K. Spulber. The Soviet Economy, New York, W. ?/. 
Norton and Company", 1962, p. 231.
^  N. Spulber, op, cit., p. 193»
Grossman writes; "We have had an ample opportunity 
to learn in the last couple of decades (that) the mode 
of ownership alone does not relentlessly prescribe the 
organizational structure of the economy or predetermi­
nate its functional efficiency."
G. Grossman, Introduction in G. Grossman ed. Value and 
Plan: Economic Calculation and Organization in EasTern 
Europe. Cali for ni aT Uni v e r s i t y Press, 196C)Y' pV 3".
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The socialist economy, like any other, continues to 
strive to achieve rational allocation of resources in 
relation to its given ends. The basic difference lies 
only in the method of pursuing that objective. Market 
economy employs the price mechanism as the chief device to 
achieve rational allocation of scarce resources in 
conformity with human wants.. The hierarchy of needs with 
the availabilities of supply are synchronized by lateral 
communication links between consumers and producers, and 
thus the decision making on an economy wide scale is 
decentralized,^
In a socialist economy market mechanism is to a 
considerable extent replaced by a system of commands (dir-
XXactives, targets) issued by the top political authority. 
The central authority sets up the hierarchy of needs and 
strives to allocate resources in accordance with these 
needs. The consumer can either be permitted or prohibited 
the freedom of choice as the central authority does not 
necessarily take into account the actual or presumed 
preferences of consumers. Characterizing this type of
XX
Ibid, p. 7.
It should be noted that market mechanism, while extre­
mely limited in scope, still plays some role in a 
socialist economy. Production and trade is concentrated 
in the hands of the state and operated by a system of 
commands but there is still a free market for consumer' 
goods, freedom of choice of occupation and also ine­
quality of rewards.
See, N. Spulber, op. cit., p. 193.
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economy G. Grossman writes;
"A command economy requires a vertical 
communication system to transmit direc­
tives downward through a chain of command 
and to send up information on which to base 
further commands and to evaluate the 
. performance of subordinates. The fidelity 
of transmission of commands from higher 
level, the reliability and timeliness of the 
upward flowing information determine the 
efficiency of the hierarchical organization."^ 
Economic planning was brought up to serve as a device of 
channelling these commands through the administrative 
ladder, to secure the consistency between directives 
and;to some extent to help in their formulation by fur­
nishing the centre with information to issue commands. 
The extent to which economic planning is utilized and 
its role in the allocation of the resources depends
XX 'mainly on the adopted "model" of command economy.
Several models are practically or theoretically 
possible. We are concerned here with only one group
X Ibid, p. 4.
The word "model" has a different meaning here from 
that used in econometrics. It represents a politico- 
economic set-up as determined by the aims and ideology 
of the central political authority of the state.
See; P. J. Wiles, The Political Economy of Communism 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, l9b2, p.
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of models labeled by P.I.D Wiles as "allocation models"^. 
These models differ from each other with respect to the 
system of allocation of scarce resources. On the very 
extreme, in this classification there is the model of 
"perfect command economy" or the so called "war commu­
nism" - where all the resources are allocated centrally 
in physical terms. Very similar in character is the 
model labeled by N. Spulber as "pure administrative 
socialism" and defined as;
"a fully centralized system in which there are 
no markets for commodities or services and in 
which the CPA (Central Planning Authority) 
allocates, on the basis of comprehensive plan, 
labour and capital goods to the producing 
units and consumer h- goods to the population.
Depending on the criterion applied it is possible to 
distinguish several types of "models of the command 
economy." In Wiles'classification there are 3 main 
groups of models; ownership models characterized 
by various types of ownership to which economy may 
be subjected; distribution models concerned with 
the manner of distribution of goods produced in the 
economy and allocation models.
For the extensive analysis see op. cit.. Chapter, 1,
4, 9.
The model of "War Communism" originally regarded by 
Bolshevik ideology as the ideal pattern of the system 
of social justice and mostly associated with the 
names of tv/o Russian Communists.:Lenin and-,Kritsmann 
was for a short period of time (1918-21) applied in 
Soviet Russia but completely failed in practice and 
had to be abandoned. See, P.I. D, Wiles "Rationality, 
Market Decentralization and the Territorial Principle 
in G. Grossman Value and Plan, p. 188, and also his 
"The Political Economy of Communism, p. 29.
N. Spulber, The Soviet Economy, p. 194.
XX
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6On the other extreme in Spulber's classification there 
is "pure market socialism" defined as a "fully decentra­
lized system in v/hich there are markets for all types of 
commodities and only investment activities are indirectly 
controlled by the C.P.A.^
The system currently adopted in economic practice 
in Soviet-bloc countries approximates P. Wiles* model of 
"centralized economy" where "the decisions as to inter­
mediate resource allocations are centralized in a planning 
office, but the choice of consumers and workers and of 
public bodies that allocate land and capital are taken on 
purely market-free principles."^
Of course, even in this model the degree of centra­
lization of decision making may vary considerably and 
depends on:
1) the extent to which the commands channeled down from 
the centre contain the detailed production and plan targets ^
2) the proportion of total production and trade which 
these plan goals cover,
^ Ibid.
This is "roughly speaking" the Yugoslav model and .essen­
tially very close to the system usually referred to in 
economic literature as "■ Lange-Lerner model". As 
P. Wiles remarks it is a loose thinking to speak of 
the "Lange-Lerner model". In Lange prices are centra­
lly fixed only outputs are decentralized and there is 
in theory no competition. In Lerner prices are decent­
ralized and there is a competition between the state- 
owned enterprises. See P. I. D. Wiles,"Rationality, 
Market, Decentralization and the Territorial Principle,"
p. 210.
^  Ibid, p. 188.
L. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, Cambridge 
Mass. The MIT Pre8s'%~1363T"pT^l'. ''
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3) the degree of autonomy of enterprises in solving 
problems and conflicts arising from their economic acti­
vity.
The degree of concentration of decision making on the 
highest administrative level has always been very high.
In the last decade the possibility of introduction of 
some elements of the market to the economy in order to 
make the system more flexible and operational has been 
widely discussed in the economic literature of the Bloc. 
The problem was considered very seriously in Poland 
after the so called "Polish October of 1956"^ and some 
steps have been taken to decentralize the decision making
X
"Polish October" is a name - given to the peaceful 
revolution which brought W. Gomulka to power in 
October 1956. New Political leadership which 
arose under his _ auspices was determined to be more 
independent of ^oviet political and economical 
guidance and supervision. The idealogical thaw 
which followed created a favourable environment 
for a nation-wide discussion on the merits and 
demerits of the' existing political' and economic system, 
In the course of these discussions the "Polish 
model of the economy" and the "Polish route to 
socialism" were determined.
For the review of the discussion see;
M. Montias, Central Planning in Poland,
New Haven and London, Yale UniversiTy7ress, 1962.
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8wide s c a l e T h e  counter reforms which followed the 
decentralization drive practically abolished the effect 
of these reforms and revised the old highly centralized 
model of the economy.
It is not hard to explain why the new movement towards 
a more flexible economic system was so slow and proceeded 
with extreme caution. Decentralization requires the 
transfer of a considerable degree of decision making to 
lov/er levels of the administrative ladder, thus v/eakening
X
1956 1957
1406 768
1411 1150
578 230
On November 28, 1956 the Sejm passed a statute reor­
ganizing the State Commission of Economic Planning 
transferring it into a Planning Commission attached 
to the Council of Ministers. The number of centrally 
determined targets has been seriously cut down, and its 
staff has been reduced from 1800 to 900 employees.
The number of centrally determined targets:
Specific production targets 
Centrally rationed commodities 
Technical Coefficients
Source; U, N. Economic Commission for Europe 
I  Economic Survey of Europe in 1956. p. 39. cited also by:
ï'ril. 'lohtias, .banning in Poland, p. 298.
The decentralizatl'on pFo'ce’ss~Kad' not gone too far, as 
since mid-1958 several counter reforms have been intro­
duced to erase the "mistakes" of "soft planning" and 
recentralize the economy, the essence of these changes 
and the reasoning underlying it are summarized in the 
statement of Polish economist B. Mine who concluded that 
"the attempt to reform our economic system, baptized as 
the "new model", had basically ended in failure. This 
had to be the case...since this attempt was built on neo­
marginal rather than on Marxist grounds."
B. Mine, W.sprawie zmian w zarzadzaniu gospodarka narodowa 
On Changes in the management of the national economy,
Zycie Gospodarcze,no. 8, 1959, cited by I. M. Montias, 
Central Planning on Poland, p. 320.
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the economic power of the centre. This is unacceptable 
and too dangerous to the ruling regime.^ Besides this, 
serious hinderance comes from the side of the "fundamen­
talist Marxism" that Soviet economics rigidly adopted 
for its theoretical bearings about the "anarchy of market 
economy" and the advantages of order and harmonization 
which central planning secures for the economy. Even if 
a decade-long experience in planning does not confirm 
this statement, Soviet regime would not admit that Marx 
could be wrong at this point.
Soviet-type economy is administered by .a series of 
economic plans v/here the National Economic Plan is of 
primary importance. It contains a definite set of tasks 
which must be accomplished and which are binding as law 
for the society as a whole. The nation-wide economic plan 
usually covers all important sectors of the economy.
Besides this, each sector has its own plan which is an 
integral part of the national economic plan. Foreign 
trade apparatus, like all other sectors of the economy is 
administrated by foreign trade plan.^^
The degree of detail of the foreign trade plan can 
vary within a wide range depending mainly on the adopted 
model of the economy, its position in the economy and the 
situation in the balance of payments of the country.
Under the conditions of "pure market socialism" the central
See G. Grossman. Introduction to "Value and Plan", p. 10,
30C The foreign trade is defined by law as an integral part 
of the over-all economic plan. Z. Kamecki, J. Soldaczuk, 
W. Sierpinski, Miedzynarodowe stosunki (Ekonomiczne.) 
(International Economic Relations), Warsaw, P.W'.'e". Ï964, 
xx%PP. 497-499.
Ibid.
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foreign trade authority would set up the general line of 
foreign trade policy specifying only general tasks (volume 
of trade within very broad commodity groups or geogra­
phical direction) to be achieved by trading enterprises. 
Foreign trade enterprises would have a complete freedom 
of choice of the means for accomplishing these tasks. In 
the "purely administrative model" the role of foreign 
trade enterprises is limited to the "blind" performing 
of directives prescribed by the central foreign trade 
authority. This means that the central authority not only 
sets up the tasks to be achieved but also imperatively 
indicates the means for their achievement.
Particularly, in the case of foreign trade the 
"market model" has several advantages, as compared with 
the administrative one. First of all, it is much more 
flexible and enables the fast adjustments of foreign trade 
policy and performance to the continuously changing 
conditions in the world market. It stimulates the activity 
of enterprises involved and arouses interest in management 
for a good performance. On the other hand the "adminis­
trative" model has very severe shortcomings. It is very 
rigid, routinized and generally unresponsive to changes 
and trends prevailing in the world market. In this model, 
enterprises engaged in the conduct of foreign trade 
activity have no incentive for better performance and 
their activity is limited to achieving the targets preset 
by the plan. The foreign trade authority having no direct 
contact with the world market very often acts in a way, 
which under the given circumstances is by no means "ration­
al" and profitable, and concentrates mainly on bureau-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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cratic administrating of the subordinated enterprises 
instead of policy making. Therefore, the superiority 
of the market model seems to be unquestionable. In this 
respect, the Soviet policy makers are eager to point out 
several obstacles considerably limiting the practical 
applicability of the "market model".^
A. The first constraint to the application of market 
model, they argue, is imposed by the situation in the 
country's balance of payments. The greater the deficit 
in the balance of international payments, the more 
justified and reasonable it is that the concentration 
of the key-decision-making concerning the policy and 
performance is in the hands of one authority. As a 
consequence the system of commands is applied as a device 
for carrying out foreign trade deals.
B. The model of foreign trade has to fit the general 
model of the economy. In other words, the adoption of 
the market model of foreign trade depends to a great 
extent on the role which the market forces play in the 
operation of all the branches of the economy.
C. The main difficulty is caused by the lack of any 
adequate criteria for estimating the effectiveness of 
foreign trade operations from the point of view of the 
economy as a whole. The existing formal criteria for 
decision making in foreign trade such as profits or mate­
rial intensity indicators have many such severe short­
comings which make them useless for the purposes of 
decision making.
X
XX
Ibid, pp. 499-502.
For more detailed elaboration on this point see 
Chapter' 7.
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In Poland, since the first post-war period of reconstruc­
tion of the economy until the late '50's the model of 
foreign trade was based mainly on commands and directives. 
Several reasons were responsible for that. First of all, 
there was the difficult economic situation of the country 
which had been seriously ruined by war. The efforts of 
the state were centered on capturing the full control of 
the very limited resources of the economy, its financial 
means and devoting them to the reconstruction of the 
country. Political factors, and especially the incorpo­
ration of Poland into the sphere of Soviet political and 
economic influences, was very important. Besides this, 
there were several other factors playing a considerable 
role, such as;
a) underestimating the role of economic calculation - 
a direct effect of the vigorous adopting of the 
Soviet economic doctrine,
b) lack of experience in applying economic incentives 
instead of commands ,
c) underestimating the role of foreign trade and a 
i quite pronounced drive towards autarchy.^
The ideological thaw which followed the Polish coup 
d'etat of October 1956, the nation-wide discussion on 
the presupposed merits and demerits of the adopted 
economic system and the very enthusiastic drive towards 
reforms had a very short life, and in the long-run brought 
surprisingly little change. Very soon the communist
X
For the discussion on autarchy in Soviet-bloc see, 
U. N. Economic Survey of Europe. 1955, pp. 198-247.
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order had been reestablished and the conservative course
taken by Gomulka began to stand in sharp contrast with
recent trends in other East European countries
which proved to be much more reform-inclined, A new
very cautious Polish attitude towards reforms seems to
be caused mainly by a political factor.
As expressed by A. Brzeski
"The fact that the nation which was in the 
avant-garde of the reform movement is now 
lagging is the result of a paradox of power; 
the present rulers of Poland feel too strong 
to yield to popular demand for a drastic reorgani­
zation of the economy but too. v/eaktto. maintain 
the status quo....
A regime that feels secure...may take the risk 
of. experimentation, Stalin, Tito, Novotny,
Nadar and Ulbricht, may all have been in this 
position at the time of the reforms but 
Goipulka was not. In 1956-57 he was in control of 
the apparat but the masses were in a mood for 
revolution. More recently, the party itself 
has been torn by violent struggles and,besides, 
there is always the Church. Not to rock the
boat may seem the best policy in such circumstances."
To sum up, the economic effect of the reforms which were
introduced in the years following the October coup-d'etat
was far from being significant. The degree of central­
ization of decision making has been to some extent 
reduced. However, the role of commands and directives 
in foreign trade policy formulation is still enormous 
with only a marginal range left for the play of economic 
stimulants and incentives.
X
A. Brzeski, Economic Reform in Poland, The Cautious 
Avant-Garde. The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Business. Vol. 1 humb'er 3, Autumn T9"6T^
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V/liat is worth mentioning here, is the considerable change 
of reasoning underlying the formulation of these commands. 
They are less vigorously based on a crude physical 
targeting by a system of "material balances" with a 
relatively wider range left for economic calculations 
and profitability considerations.
In Soviet planning practice each centrally allocated 
product, had a separate "balance sheet" called a 
"material balance".
On one side of the "material balance" all planned 
sources of supply of the product in question was 
listed and on the other side all planned uses of the 
product. The planning process was confined mainly 
to bring both sides of the account into balance.
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II ECONOMIC PLANNING
"A plan represents a comprehensive set of accounts 
linking a series of output, investment and consump­
tion targets with the projected factor, commodity 
and money flows to assure their attainment... the 
accounts are balanced sheets with one side of the 
account shov/ing resources and the other side their 
distribution." x
The central plan defines the basic macro economic propor­
tions, rates and directions, such as the rate of growth 
of a national product and its composition, the distribu­
tion of a national product to its various uses, the rate 
and components of capital formation and the size and 
composition of public and private consumption.
It identifies also the specific means and measures for 
carrying the plan into effect.
Since the plan of foreign trade is an integral part 
of the over-all economic plan, this serves as the basic 
device to bring the two sides of accounts into balance.
The procedure of achieving this is not complicated.
After deducting the total domestic supply of raw materials, 
finished and intermediate goods, machinery and equipment, 
which will be available in a given planning period from 
the total domestic demand presupposed by the plan, 
planners arrive at the amount of necessary imports. On 
the other hand, total available surplus of commodities 
of various kinds, confronted with the existing export
^ Quotation from N. Spulber, "The Economics of Communist 
Eastern Europe; op. cit., p. 282.
15
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possibilities and import requirements form the foundation 
for the export plan.
The import and export plans are established by 
commodities or commodity groups in form of balanced 
sheets expressed in terms of values to be realized in 
foreign exchange in order to secure the required balance 
of international payments. The other set of balanced 
accounts representing all exports on one side and all 
imports on the other side of an account is drawn up in 
terms of value at, domestic prices and for a number of 
so-called "key commodities" subject to central allocation 
in quantitative terms. Besides, this import and export 
plan is broken down according to market areas or partner 
countries in order to balance foreign payments with each 
market or country separately. Taking into consideration 
the period of time which is covered by the given plan one 
can distinguish the following kinds of economic plans^^
a) perspective plan 
b; long-run plans 
c; annual plans
XX
In practice this is not always the case. Usually import 
requirements surpass considerably the available export 
supply, and adjustments must be made either by cutting 
import demand or increasing exports by cutting supply 
for domestic markets of commodities which can be 
exported.
S. Hatt, E. Szyrnanski'.., M. V/olski, System planowania 
in Polsce, (The System of Planning Tn"p61am77 Warsaw
P.W.n". 1964, pp. 87-94. Z. Madej, Punkcjonowanie gospo-
darki narodowej, (Functioning of National Economy; in 
Polityka • gospodarcza Polski Ludowe.j.Vol. 2, p. 53.
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d; Quarterly and monthly plans.
Perspective plan , can be defined as the general outline of 
the development of the economy for a period of 15-20 years, 
It determines the rate of growth of the economy, levels 
of national income in successive years; and the rate of 
growth and composition of investment outlays. The plan 
establishes also the general lines of development of all 
sectors of the economy. By the very fact that it covers 
such a long period of time it defines production and 
trade targets in general terms only, leaving more detailed 
targets to be filled in by long-run and annual plans.
As far as foreign trade is concerned it expresses the 
preferences of the state in shaping the future pattern of 
foreign trade in respect to the desired volume and 
composition of foreign trade turnovers.^
The first rolisii perspective plan has been elaborated 
for the period of 1961-1980. Besides the basic objec­
tive of achieving the maximal possible rate of growth 
of the economy it formulated the following goals 
1; the considerable increase in the standard of living 
which by 1975 should reach the present level of 
consumption standards of advanced countries of 
1 Western Europe
'2) Solving of the very severe housing problem
3) considerably higher rates of growth of exports and 
of imports and the repaying of foreign debts.
See .J.M . Montias, Central Planning in Poland pp. 154-159. 
^Iso K, Secomski, Problemy planowania perspectywicznego 
(Problems of Perspective Planning) in "Polityka gospodarcza 
Polski Ludowej Vol 2.M. Rakowski, Zagadniènia ■ plahowani'a 
wi'e 1 dlëThiego w Polsce Ludowg, (PrôïïTems~oî”Xong-run 
Planning in People^s Poland), Warsaw, P.W.C. 1955, M. 
Eklecki, Plan perspektywiczny na lata 1961-1975 (The 
Perspective Plan for the Years 1961-75J Nov/e Drogi, No.8 
(1958).
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A perspective plan determining in general terms the prin­
cipal directions of the development of the economy serves 
as a basis for the elaboration of subsequent five-year plane 
It is the task of the five-year plan to give in concrete 
as far as possible precise and quantitative form the goals 
envisaged by a perspective plan which have to be achieved 
during the period covered by that plan.^ The plan is 
drawn up on two interrelated planes; a "real, physical 
term" version and a monetary one. A five-year foreign 
trade plan elaborated in conformity with the over-all 
economic plan specifies the volume, rates of growth of 
exports and imports and their commodity composition and 
geographical structure. The plan is drawn on three 
interrelated versions;
a) in physical terras for commodities entering so called 
"material balances"
b) in foreign exchange
c) in domestic currency.
The five-year plan is broken down into annual plans where 
the general five-year targets are divided into yearly 
allotments and presented in detailed and much more precise 
fopm.
X
S. Hatt, E. Szymanski, M. Wolski, System planowania 
w Eolsce, p. 88.
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ORGANIZATION OF FOREIGN TRADE
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STATE MONOPOLY OF FOREIGN TRADE
The character of Polish economy has been basically 
shaped by the course of political events during and after 
World War II resulting in its incorporation into the 
sphere of Soviet political and ideological influences.
The post-war government which arose under Soviet auspices, 
has from the very beginning followed very strictly the 
Soviet patterns of running the economy and adopted entire­
ly Marxist-Leninist ideology. Unable to stand on its own, 
it continued to look to the Soviet Union for political 
and social guidance. The United Worker’s Party which 
enjoys the exclusive power in the formation of social 
and economic policy set for itself as the main task to 
build the planned socialist economy. It was understood 
that the road towards a socialist society is "unique" 
and that following Soviet experiences in this respect is 
the most effective way of achieving that goal and an 
integral part of the construction of socialism. Accord­
ingly, Soviet concepts and experiences were transplanted 
on Polish ground and imitated as closely as possible.
Several reforms have been introduced to permit the exten-_ 
sion of the socialized sector and to recast the economic, 
system in the Soviet mold. As Poland was liberated,the 
Polish Committee of National Liberation, which was created in 
July 194,4 at Lublin to become the first government of the 
country, took-over large and medium scale industry in its 
hands.
20
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On January 3, 1946 a formal decree was issued to legalize 
the nationalization of the basic branches of industry, 
mining communications, banks, insurance and trade^.
Thus, the state became authorized by law to operate the 
nationalized enterprises on its own account or to transfer 
them to "People's Councils" (Rady Narodowe) or to 
cooperatives. During the period of 1947-1949 several 
restraints, controls and regulations were imposed on the 
private sector in order to reduce the share of total 
industrial production originating in this sector as much 
as possible.^ All these measures resulted in almost 
complete extinction of the private industrial sector of 
the economy by the end of the 1940's.
Accordingly, the administrative apparatus has been 
established to meet the requirements of highly centrali­
zed, planned economy. The nationalization of the major 
sectors of the economy included the extension of the 
state control over private trade in the country with 
particular stress put on the concentration of the foreign 
trade activity in the hands of the state. A "De facto"
X
Dziennik Ustaw, 1946, No. 3, Item 17.
XX
In 1955, 99 percent of the Polish industrial output
came from state-owned enterprises and state controlled 
cc-pperatives,, Rocznik Statystyczny , 1957 (Statis­
tical Yearbook) Warsaw, T5^T7~pT 5T7
^^^^Land reform was decreed on September 6, 1944. Its prin- 
'cipal aims were to eliminate the opposition of large 
land owners, create new farms for landless peasants and 
form the basis for future collectivization of agriculture. 
See: Dziennik Ustaw, 1945, No. 3, Item 13.
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monopoly of foreign trade was established by Polish 
government at the outset of the post-war period and was 
considered as one of the major steps in the reshaping, 
of Polish economy along new lines. Direct and vigorous 
state control over the movements of imports and exports 
was by no means the "Polish invention" and was establi­
shed as the result of imitation of the Soviet organiza­
tional patterns. The nationalization of foreign trade 
took place in the Soviet Union immediately after the 
Revolution and foreign trade monopoly as such became a 
distinctive feature of the Soviet economic system, 
adopted lately by all the countries of the Soviet bloc.
(It is regarded as a component part of the Soviet-type 
economy.) Thus, the concept of foreign trade monopoly 
has quite a long tradition in the socialist economic 
practice, but during these years its interpretation 
changed significantly. Originally, the state monopoly 
of foreign trade was understood to mean that the foreign 
trade activity, of the economy was concentrated in the 
hands of the state and conducted by state-owned enterprises. 
Its purpose was to protect the economy against "any possible 
capitalist intervention". More recently, however, "the
X
See G. p. Kaliuzhnaia, Prayovye Formy Monopolii Vneshn&i 
Torgovli USSR V ilch is'tori'ckeïïkômn^axv'iti^ (The Yuridi-. 
cal Forms of’ the' Monopoly o7 Foreign trade in their his­
torical Development).
Yzdatel'stvo Alcaderaii Nayle USSR (Publishing House of 
the Academy of Science of the USSR) Moscow 1951, p. 28, 
cited by N, Spulber, The Economics of Communist Europe, 
New York, the Technology Press of Ivlassachusetts InsfiTute 
of Technology and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York 
1957, p. 153.
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term which has been increasingly used to designate a 
specific set of institutions and methods for carrying 
out foreign trade".^ F. L. Pryor calls "the Stalinist 
model of the foreign trade monopoly".^ With the develop­
ment of over-all planning, the foreign trade monopoly 
became the direct instrument of such a plan, having as 1 
its main purpose the synchronization of the volume and 
composition of foreign trade turnovers with the require­
ments of a national economic plan. From this point of 
view, one should expect that the economic theory as well 
%as current policy making, would be directed towards the - 
search for the most effective model of foreign trade - 
monopoly which would be suitable for the purposes of 
planning. In fact, the majority of the discussions in r 
the economy Press of the Bloc is limited mainly to the 
institutional framework of the system and organizational 
structure of the model of foreign. trade monopoly.
The.exp1anati0n of this phenomenon beems to be quite 
simple. For many reasons foreign trade was neglected in.
"7 "ÏT*
the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, the problem was
.j: . . :. T?: ' -
yv .Citation from F. L, Pryor, "The Communist Foreign Trade 
System, Cambridge, Mass. The M.Y.T. Press, P™53'*
xx"":-: u. 
th: Ibid.
XXX .
Discussed by F. L. Pryor, Foreign Trade theory in the 
Communist" Bloc. Soviet Studies, Vol. 14, July 1962, p. 41. 
and by Baykov Soviet Foreign Trade. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 194’6’T !
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hardly touched by Soviet economic literature, it is 
enough to say that in the official Soviet textbook of 
Political Economy, issued in the middle of the 1950's, 
only two pages were devoted to the discussion of problems 
of foreign trade theory, while the book consisted of over 
600 pages.^ Since Stalin's death problems of foreign 
trade have begun to receive increasing attention; but 
what we call "pure foreign trade theory" seems to be still 
neglected. The other weak point in this chain comes 
from the side of planning itself. In spite of numerous 
theoretical examinations and years of experience Soviet 
planning techniques are still very crude and simply 
unoperational.
The existence of a foreign trade monopoly is commonly 
accepted in the economic literature of the Bloc as one 
of the most distinctive features of the socialist, planned 
economy. It is usually motivated as follows:^^^
1) the basic reason for establishing a foreign trade 
monopoly in a socialist economy arises directly from the 
fact that all means of production in this type of economy
Politicheskaya Ekocomlya, (Political Economy) Academy
of Science 6f'"%Ee 'U'.3^ .S.R . Institute of Economics,
Moscow, 1955, cited by J. Wilczynski., The Theory of 
Comparative Costs and Centrally Planned Economics, 
Economic Journal, Vol. 75, March 1965, p. 67.
^  The terms "Soviet Economic Literature" and "Economic 
Literature of the Bloc" are used interchangeably to 
designate economic literature based on Marxian doctrinej
^^See Z. Kamecki, J. Soldaczuk, W. Sier.pinski, Miedzyna- 
rodowe stosunki ekonomiczne, (International Economic 
Relations), Warsaw", "Pahstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 
1964, pp. 498-99.
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are "socially owned" and .the nationalization of foreign 
trade as well as of industries, banks and transportation 
is the necessary condition for the existence Of a Socialist 
economy, - ■
2) the other reason arises directly from the adopted 
model of centrally planned economy. As a state monopoly 
foreign trade constitutes an integral part of the over­
all economic plan of the country. The main advantage 
claimed for this model is the possibility of obtaining 
such a pattern of foreign trade which would be "optimal" 
from the point of view of the fulfillment of a national 
economic plan and the achievement of the highest possible 
rate of growth of the economy.^
X
Both explanations seem to be vague if not tautological 
even from the logical point of view only. But there 
are some elements in this approach which the economist 
will find as not clearly stated and fully explained.
Since the middle 1950's interest in the trade problems 
revived and theoretical examinations of the relationship 
between "foreign trade optimum", plan fulfillment and 
the maximization of the rate at growth began to receive 
more careful attention. However, this theorizing did 
not lead to any satisfactory solution of the problem 
and even the notion of foreign trade optimum itself 
has not been neatly defined. In general, "optimal 
pattern of trade" is a relative concept, its real 
content depends on the economic situation of the coun­
try and the goals which the economy strives to achieve.' 
Basically, there are two kinds of "optimality"; theo­
retical and practical. Both can be analyzed by a 
static or dynamic approach (long-run optimality).
Assuming that the objective which the economy strives to 
achieve in the long-run is the maximization of the rate 
of growth such a pattern of trade will be optimal which 
contributes most effectively in the pursuit of this goal. 
But if the objective is different, as for example maximal 
satisfaction of human wants, (which does not necessarily 
mean that the rate of growth will be set at maximum 
there would be a completely different pattern of trade.
no !^22d.yj
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which could be considered as "optimal" from the point of 
view of the objective which has to be achieved. This is 
the theoretical optimum as it is assumed that the policy 
makers have the perfect knowledge and full command over 
all economic variables in question which can be deter­
mined in conformity with their preferences. In practice 
there are several limitations and constraints imposed; 
the knowledge is not perfect, factors are not fully mobile 
le and several economic variables are determined by 
factors which are beyond the control of policy makers.
In effect, practical optimum- such as optimum which 
takes into account all the constraints and limitations 
will be different from theoretical optimum. Static 
optimum of foreign trade or so-called short-run optimum is 
based on the assumption of constant productive capacities 
of the economy. Again, depending on the objective, the 
economy strives to achieve, it can be,,for example, a 
pattern of trade which will secure equilibrium in the 
balance of payments; full employment of labor force 
or full employment of productive capacities etc. Accor­
dingly there is the theoretical optimum and practical 
optimum - such as optimum which can be achieved in a 
given economic situation of the country and outside the 
country; e.g. on foreign markets.
For extensive analysis see:
Z. Kameki, J. Soldaczuk, W. Sierpinski, op. cit., pp. 506- 
517.
ÜNIVERSIIY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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3) the existence of foreign trade monopoly is regarded as 
an economic necessity in the developing economy where the 
difficulties connected with obtaining the equilibrium in 
the balance of payments are formidable. In these cir­
cumstances a very careful examination of the existing 
export possibilities and evaluation of the "degree of 
necessity" of several imports and finding the "optimal 
pattern of trade" are of enormous importance. This argu­
ment seems to be the strongest one. The majority of 
the countries entering the road of economic development 
do experience a more or less severe deficit on the current 
account of the balance of payments. This situation is 
not wrong in itself providing that this gap is being 
covered by the flow of capital in the form of foreign 
credits, loans, grants, direct investments etc. But the 
real trouble begins when all the above mentioned possibi­
lities of filling that gap do not exist and increased 
imports have to be covered by earned export receipts.
With some not too significant exceptions, this was basi­
cally the situation which Poland's post-war economy had 
to face. The demand for imported goods, expecially of
these designated for investment purposes increased consi-
i
derably in the course of intensive industrialization.
At the same time the country found it extremely difficult 
to increase its exports to the extent that it would 
cover all its import payments. Under the above circum­
stances the state,control over import and export movements 
can be helpful. However, there is still the problem as 
to. how much of the state control would bring the best
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results in a given economic situation. In the communist 
opinion the perfect solution to the problem is the full 
control by the state, expressed in the foreign trade 
monopoly. As Polish experience indicates^in spite 6f the  ^
introduction of the monopoly of foreign trade, the situa­
tion in the country's balance of payment was persistently 
strained during the whole past-war period.^
On the other hand, it is not -difficult to find 
numerous examples testifying that many export possibili­
ties were lost because of the rigidity of the mechanism 
of state monopoly, and several imports were not economi­
cally justified from the point of view of a rational 
policy of saving scarce foreign currency. For example, in 
many instances, domestic substitutes of imported commo­
dities were available or import deliveries were not 
synchronized to match the investment cycle. In effect 
foreign currency resources were "frozen" in these imports 
while their "productive capacity could not be fully 
utilized (especially with respect to imported capital 
goods) etc.
After the second world-war state monopoly of foreign- 
trade^ regarded by Bloc economic literature, as indispen­
sable for a socialist economy,had been introduced in all 
the countries of the Soviet-Bloc, The characteristic
X J. Niegowski W. Rydygier. , Problemy handlu zagra-nicznego 
Problems of Foreign Trade) in Polityka gospodarcza 
Polski Ludowej, op. citl, pp. 9^'4-'599'.'' ' •
A. Zauberraan, Industrial Progress in Poland^ Czechos­
lovakia and East Germahy ,'London "Oxford University ' ,
Press,'1964, pp. BÏÏÏ^TId.
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features of this monopoly are as follows:
1) in all Bloc countries, foreign trade is conducted 
almost exclusively by state-owned enterprises subordina­
ted to the Ministry of Foreign Trade,
2) the Ministry of Foreign Trade*does not carry out foreign 
trade transactions by itself, but guides and supervises
the activity of foreign trade enterprises (PTE's) within 
the framework of the economic plan. The Ministry of 
•Foreign Trade is responsible for formulating the general 
foreign trade policy, concluding'international 'trade and 
payment;- agreements, and cooperating with the Ministry 
of Finance in the management of foreign exchange resources,
3) all foreign trade activity is channeled through 
foreign trade enterprises. Normally, each such enterprise 
is exclusively entitled.to trade with foreign countries
in its particular field of activity and is assigned a 
certain group of commodities in order to eliminate 
competition between countries.
4) foreign and domestic aspects of trade are completely 
separated. FTS concentrate on foreign trade activity, " 
buying domestic goods goods designated for exports from 
domestic producers and being responsible for the purchase 
of foreign goods on behalf of domestic buyers.
5) foreign trade monopoly is supplemented by the state 
monopoly of foreign currency resources.^ " .
See chapter 4.
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THE MINISTRY OP FOREIGN TRADE
When on July 21, 1944 the Polish Committee of 
National Liberation established itself at Lublin to 
function as the government of Poland, the administration 
of foreign trade was- placed under the Department of 
National Economy and Finance,^
On December 31', 1944 the Lublin Committee had been 
transformed into the Provisional Government of Poland 
and the omnibus Department of National Economy and Finance 
was split into 3 ministries; the Treasury, Industry and 
Pood and Trade.
During the period 1945-1950 the activity of the new, 
Soviet-oriented government concentrated on capturing the 
full control over the economy and remaking with accordance 
to the Soviet mold. The organizational changes in the 
administrative apparatus were very frequent and aimed to 
construct a highly centralized economic system adminis­
trated by economic plans. In the course of this reorga­
nization the administration of Foreign Trade rested in 
various Ministries until finally a separate Ministry of 
Foreign trade as a state organ of the Foreign Trade 
monopoly was established. In July 28, 1945 the adminis­
tration of foreign trade was placed under the Ministry of 
Shipping and in 1947 was transfered to the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade. During the period of reconstruction
T. P. Alton, Polish Postwar Economy, New York, Columbia 
University Pre8sT13531" p . ' IT. .
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of the economy the state control over all sectors of 
the economy had been continually extended and the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade expanded enormously. On 
February 10, 1949 the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
was liquidated and succeeded by six new ones, among 
them by the separate Ministry of Foreign Trade.^ Its 
task and activity had been defined by the decree of March 
8, 1949 and included
1) preparation of drafts of the foreign trade plans in 
conformity with the over-all economic plan and the res­
ponsibility for achieving goals'prescribed by that plan.
2) for mulation of the general foreign trade policy, 
conduct of trade negotiations and conclusion of inter­
national trade and payment agreements, and supervision . 
over their execution.
3) regulation of the volume, commodity, composition, 
and geographical structure of foreign trade turnovers
4) direct control and supervision of enterprises which 
actually conduct foreign trade activity.
5) establishment of foreign trade offices and nomination 
of trade representatives abroad
6) organization of fairs and displays; questions con­
cerning the technique of trade, and standards.
Under the regulation of January 1, 1961 issued by the 
Minister of Foreign Trade the organizational structure 
of the Ministry of Foreign Trade was as follows:
^ Dziennik Ustaw, 1949, No. 7, Item 43.
XX
Dziennik Ustaw, 1949, No. 15, Item 96, also see, Alton 
Polish Postwar Economy, p. 263.
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I
1. The Minister's Office
2. Personnel Department
3. legal and Administrative Department
4. Department of Planning
a) Office of Planning Technique and Plan's Coordination
h) Raw materials and Consumption O;oods
c) Machinery and Equipment
d) "Perspective" Planning
5. Department of Control
6. Department of Finance
a) International Finance Office for Socialist 
Countries
b) International Finance Office for Capitalist 
Countries
c) Financing of Foreign Services
d) Accounting Office
7. Department of Foreign Trade and Commodity Turnovers
a) General■Office
■i
b) Coal and Construction Materials
c) Chemical Products and Fuels
d) Agricultural Commodities
e) Light industries, wood and paper
8. Department of Machinery and Equipment
a) General Office
b) Metallurgy
c) Complete industrial establishments (plants)
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d) Light Machinery, Tools and Apparatus
e) Heavy Machinery and Communication Equipment
f) Technical Office
9,. Department of Treaties I (for socialist countries)
10. Department of Treaties'll (Common Market, Scandinavian 
Countries South Europe and Overseas Countries)
11. Department of Treaties III
(Latin America, Near, Middle and Par East, Africa)
12. Administrative Department
13. Institute for Economic Research
II Auxiliary Agencies
1. Central Board of Engineering
2. Central Customs Board
3. Central Board of Transportation and Shipping
4. Central Standardization Board
The Ministry of Foreign Trade is headed by a Minister of 
Foreign Trade who is the member of the Council of Ministers, 
the highest organ of the state's administration. Directly 
subordinated to the Minister of Foreign Trade are; the 
Vice -Ministers, Directors of the Departments of the 
Ministry, Directors of the Central Auxiliary Agencies 
attached to the ministry and the Directors (Presidents) 
of Foreign Trade Enterprises. In very brief terms, the 
tasks and responsibilities of various departments of the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade are as follows;
The Personnel Department is responsible for an employment 
policy within the ministry and supervises Personnel 
Departments in all enterprises and agencies subordinated
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to the ministry , It also supervises the personnel of 
Bureaus of Commercial Attaches and nominates permanent 
trade representatives abroad. Its responsibilities 
embrace problems of education, improvement of skills of 
personnel, training-on-the-job programs etc.
The Department of Planning is one of the most important 
in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and is responsible for 
the construction of Foreign Trade Plans in collaboration 
with the Planning Commission attached to the Council of 
Ministers. Its specialized branch offices are concerned 
with elaboration of foreign trade plans within two broad 
commodity groups; one for raw materials and consumers 
goods, the other for capital goods. The Branch Office of 
"Perspective Planning" is responsible for formulating 
long-run foreign trade plans in conformity with the re­
quirements of the over-all "perspective economic plan of 
the country." Difficult problems of devising the technique 
of planning, achieving the satisfactory degree of consis­
tency and comprehensiveness of the foreign trade as well 
as its coodination with the over-all economic plan are 
handled by the Branch Office of Planning Technique and 
Plan's Coordination.
Department of Control
In the centrally planned economy, the execution of 
Economic Plans, is of enormous importance,. When the 
correct elaboration of the plan can be regarded as a 
preliminary condition, the execution of the plan is the 
necessary condition for smooth operation of the whole 
economic system. Therefore the apparatus of control
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which would enforce economic discipline with respect to 
the execution of plans plays a very important role.
In Poland, the control over execution of planned 
goals is exercised on three administrative levels:
a) by the Supreme Chamber of Control (Najwyzsza izba 
kohtroli) which is t?highest organ of state control
b)'- by the apparatus of control of all ministries. With 
respect to foreign trade the internal control within 
the ministry is effected by the Department of Control. 
The scope of this control includes the organization, 
administration and operation of all the subordinated 
units with respect to legality, veracity, correctness, 
and compliance with the foreign trade plan.
c) by a banking system financial control over the appara­
tus of Foreign trade monopoly is exercised by two 
banks. Narodowy Bank Polski (The Polish National Bank) 
and Bank Handlowy S.A. w ■ Warszawie (Commercial
ISBank of Warsaw).
The Department of Finance is responsible for formulat­
ing the financial policy of the ministry with respect 
to its domestic and foreign sphere of activity.
The Department of Foreign Trade Turnover and The Department
of Machinery and Equipment.
X
It should be noted that financial discipline exercised 
by banks is very effective. The Polish banking system 
has been constructed with a:view toward enforcing vigorous 
financial discipline in the execution of a national 
economic ,plan. Each economic unit is controlled by a 
bank to,which it is obliged to turn for working capital 
and investment funds. Banks also grant credits accor­
ding to a'financial plan of the enterprise and currently 
watch over the use of the credits to make sure that they 
are not diverted to other uses than these specified in 
the plan.
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Direct Supervision over the foreign trade activity of 
enterprises in the conduct of foreign trade, and over 
the flow of exports and imports is exercised by two de­
partments of the Ministry of foreign trade.
The Department of Foreign Trade is responsible for 
trade in raw materials, agricultural commodities and 
consumer’s goods.
The Department of Machinery and Equipment regulates 
the flow of trade of engineering products.
The Department of Treaties
In the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade there are 
three separate Departments of Treaties responsible for the 
conduct of foreign trade negotiations, the conclusion of 
international trade and payment agreements, and supervision 
of their execution according to the assigned countries or 
trade areas.
The Institute for Economic Research
Is responsible for the conduct of economic research 
in the field of foreign trade. The scope of its activity 
includes an examination of theoretical and practical pro­
blems of foreign trade, questions of methods, technique and 
organization of trade, careful study of the trends and 
developments on international markets, movements of 
prices and recently the investigation of problems of the 
"effectiveness" of foreign trade.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade supervises the activity of 
several auxiliary agencies involved in the organization
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of the country's external trade. The Central Customs 
Board establishes tariff classification and the value 
of the duty levied on imported goods. It is responsible 
for the collection of duties and makes investigations 
relating to the manufacture and production of goods pro­
duced in countries which export to Poland.
Two other auxiliary agencies are attached to the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade; the Central Board of Enginee­
ring and the Central Standardzation Board which are 
responsible for setting of technical norms and quality 
requirements for the commodities entering foreign trade 
and supervise the apparatus exercising direct technical 
and quality control over the flow of exports and imports.
Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade
Among several auxiliary agencies subordinated to the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade the Polish Chamber of Foreign 
Trade deserves special attention.
It is a semi-official organization engaged in gene­
ral foreign trade promotion activities. The Polish 
Chamber of Foreign Trade came into, being by the Decree of 
the Council of Ministers on September 28, 1949 to foster 
economic relations with foreign countries, to keep FTE 
advised as to international marketing developments and to 
perform specific international marketing services. The 
members of the Chamber are: foreign trade enterprises,
the Polish National Bank, the Bank of Commerce of Warsaw, 
the Maritime shipping companies, and the leading insurance 
companies.
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The economic activities of the Chamber extend over 
a number of important fields and include:^
1. A careful study of foreign markets as to the concrete 
trade opportunities for the benefit of Polish expor­
ters and importers
2. The performance of several specific services to 
foreign trade companies such as issuing and legalizing 
commercial documents (certificates of origin of the 
merchandise, etc.)
3. The furnishing of information on national and local 
laws and administrative regulations.
4. Legal guidance, appraisal and publication of commercial 
customs
5. Arbitration of trade disputes
6. Organization of fairs and displays
7. Publications of trade journals containing internation­
al trade statistics, information on trade opportunities 
etc.
Foreign Trade Enterprises (PTE’s)
Under the supervision and guidance of the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade the actual trading transactions are carried 
out by special, authorized enterprises.
In the first post war period companies interested in 
the conduct of foreign trade activity were required to 
obtain special licenses issued by the central organ of 
foreign trade monopoly, originally the Foreign Trade 
Committee at the Ministry of Food and Trade, Lately by
Ibid, pp. 306-307.
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the Ministry of Industry and Trade.^ The first state- 
owned foreign trade enterprises were established, from 
the legal point of view,^  as companies limited, as to share­
holders; and acted as state-owned domestic enterprises 
and agencies. Until 1947 private importers and exporters, 
in some cases were permitted to conduct foreign trade 
activity, but under very strict state control.
On January 3, 1947, a special decree was issued 
which formulated principles of establishing socialized 
enterprises and, at the same time, provided new legal base 
for state-owned foreign trade enterprises.^""' PTE’s 
while being the exclusive property of the state, obtained 
full legal identity a certain degree of financial inde­
pendence and autonomy within the limits laid down in 
their statutes. In that period the enterprises empowered 
to conclude trade deals with foreign organizations were :
1) the above mentioned state-owned enterprises organized 
as independent juridicial and financial entities
2) Foreign Trade Bureaus - usually a branch of so called 
"Central Boards of Supply and Sale" (Centrais Zaopatr- 
zenia i zbytu) functioning as an intermediate adminis­
trative body between a respective ministry and its
X
XX
XXX
Ibid, p. 247.
S. Maksymowicz, S.Szczypiorski, Organizacja i technika 
handlu - zagranicznego (Organ!zation and üTeErTnii.que of
Pbr"elgh Tra3!eT^art"T, Warsaw, F.W.N., 1955;.
Ibid, p. 249.
Ibid '
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subordinate production enterprises. ’ In this organiza­
tional schedule the Foreign Trade Bureaus were supervised 
by the ministry in question as well as by the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade.
3) A small number of limited liability companies owned by 
nationalized economic units and cooperatives.
During the period of 1949-1955 the Foreign Trade Bureaus 
and limited liability companies were gradually liquidated 
or converted into independent, state-owned foreign trade 
enterprises. Thus, the management of the foreign trade 
apparatus became centralized in the hands of the central 
organ of state monopoly with almost uniform organizational 
structure for all enterprises empowered to carry out 
foreign trade deals. The tasks and sphere of activity 
of PTE were designated by the regulation which came into 
effect in 1948 and included:^’^
1) "analysis of foreign markets
2) collection of information on competitive sources of 
supply
3) arrangement of appropriate transportation of goods, 
including suitable packaging and insurance
4) setting prices on goods with the objective to maximize 
profits while taking account of the competition of 
other sellers
X
XX
Central Boards were dissolved by the resolution of the 
Council of Ministers on December 23, 1950. Their 
functions were taken over by the respective'departments 
within a ministry. See T.P, Alton, Polish Postwar 
Economy, p. 88.
Ibid, p. 265 quoted from ^andel Zagraniczny (Foreign 
Trade) April 1948 pp. 9-10 (Supplement to "Zycie 
Gospodarcze, April 1-15, 1948.
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5) assuming payments for goods sold as to avoid loss 
while at the same time not making payment conditions
- too onerous
6) liaison with production enterprises to assure that 
the goods dispatched would correspond to the condi­
tions of sale with regard to quality, assortment, 
terms of delivery, packaging and transportation.
The regulation also introduced a uniform organizational 
structure to all foreign trade enterprises.^ It was 
based on following principles:
1) imports and exports were separated, by the establish­
ment of enterprises dealing solely either with export 
or import activities.
2) Bach enterprise was prescribed a particular field of 
activity, being exclusively entitled to trade certain 
commodities or groups of commodities in order to 
prevent an overlap of lists of goods handled and 
eliminate competition on domestic or foreign markets.
The decree fully defining legal structure and principles 
of operation of socialized enterprises was passed on 
October 26, 1950.^^ The emphasis was put on planning as 
the most important and unique principle of carrying out 
the economic activity by all state-owned or controlled 
enterprises.
The organizational structure introduced by the regu­
lation of 1948 had a rather short period of life, Very
^ u . Zieleniewski, 8. Szczypiorski, op. cit., p, 245. 
Ibid, p. 255.
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soon it became obvious that the conception is unattaina­
ble in practice. Its basic shortcoming lay in the sepa­
ration of import and export activities in different 
enterprises which was artificial, costly and difficult 
to maintain in practice. It is not too difficult to see 
why this was so,
1) There vras a considerable shortage of highly trained 
foreign trade personnel and the separation of export 
and import activities was making this shortage more 
acute.
2) It increased the number of enterprises engaged in 
foreign trade and required the establishment of 
several parallel organizational units for exports 
and imports and thus increased the costs of running 
the enterprises and made it impossible to ripen the 
fruits of the economies of scale.
3) The opportunities of thorough penetration of foreign 
markets could be much better in enterprises which would 
combine exports and import activities.
4) It is relatively easier to apply a more effective 
foreign trade policy, at least with respect to certain 
markets when imports and exports are conducted jointly. 
Besides this there is a possibility of considerable 
reduction of operational costs of the enterprise.
5) The same foreign agents and enterprise representatives 
can perform buying and selling functions when exports 
and imports are combined into the same enterprise.^
X For a more extensive analysis of these points see,
Zr, Zieleniewski, S. Szczypiorski, op. cit., pp. 245-
246.
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The work of finding a more operational and effective 
organizational structure of foreign trade enterprises 
was proceeding rather slowly. The task was not an easy 
one as only such a structure could be accepted which 
would fit the highly centralized model of the economy and 
one which could be operated by economic plans. In other 
words, the wanted structure was one for which it would be 
easy to channel the commands and directives emanating 
from the top and make the control over the execution of 
these targets relatively simple and uncomplicated. From 
this point of view the conception which assigned to each 
enterprise the sphere of activity according;to the ,, 
commodity criterion was preferable as it was convenient 
from the point of view of central planning. In 1953 the 
process of reorganization started resulting in the 
recombination of exports and imports in enterprises 
distinguished along the lines of the commodity criterion.
It seems that strict adherence to the commodity criterion 
in assigning the spheres of activity to each enterprise 
in question is by no means the best solution from the 
point of view of the operational efficiency of the organ­
izational structure, 'The system is simply too rigid to 
be efficient but the very method of administrating the 
economy by the stream of commands and directives enlisted 
in central plan is not a bit less rigid than the hierar­
chical structure constructed to transmit the directives 
down the administrative ladder. One can' wonder, for 
example if it would not be better to base the activity 
of foreign trade enterprises on purely commercial principles
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instead of command and directives. To allow the market 
forces to play and to estimate their performance and 
leave the choice of most effective and workable organi­
zational structure to the discretion of the enterprise 
in question. But this possibility is simply incompatible 
with the "modus operand!" of Soviet-type economy. It 
would require to transfer a considerable degree of decision 
making from the top to the bottom of the hierarchical 
structure and thus weaken the power of the monopoly of 
foreign trade. Certainly this solution is too dangerous 
to be taken seriously into consideration by top political 
authorities.
The political events of October 1956 and ones related 
to it by a new drive towards decentralization and reforms 
in the system of state administration brought some orga­
nizational changes into the organ of foreign trade mono­
poly. Eliminated in the late 40's from the sphere of 
foreign trade activity, cooperative organizations and 
hybrid state-cooperative enterprises have been granted the 
permission to carry out foreign trade transactions. The 
decree No, 128158 issued by the Council of Ministers on 
April 18, 1958 put into effect the process of reorganize-
X’tion of the socialized sectors of the economy.
It v/as followed by Recommendation No. 214159 of the Econo­
mic Committee at the Council of Ministers issued on May 
22, 1959.^ This introduced certain modifications in the
X Zasady zmiany struktary organizacyjnej panstwowego 
przemyslu kluczowego, (Changes in the Organizational 
Structure of the socialized key industries), Przeglad 
Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego, No. 6, 1958.
J. Zieleniewski, S. Szczypiorski, op. cit., p, 256.
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organizational structure of foreign trade enterprises.
Most important among them seems to be the recommendation 
to establish separate "Branch Offices" (Biura Branzowe) 
within the enterprise which would specialize in trade 
activity according to a narrower commodity criterion than 
enterprise as a whole, the so-called Branch offices, while 
being the integral part of the enterprise were to enjoy 
a considerable degree of operational and financial inde­
pendence. Establishment of "Branch Offices" in foreign 
trade enterprises was expected to achieve two goals;
1) improve operational ability of the enterprise
2) improve its cooperation with domestic producers.
With respect to the first point the reasoning was following 
the size and scope of activity of the majority of foreign 
trade enterprises which started as small firms grew 
enormously to keep pace with the fast increase of Poland’s 
post war foreign trade. The vaster the enterprise becomes, 
the more difficult are the structural problems of organiza­
tion, management coordination and control. Larger organi­
zations are more bureaucratic, tend to move more slowly 
and to adopt themselves with increasing difficulty.
It seems obvious that the organizational structure which 
fits small firms does not work in the larger ones. But 
foreign trade enterprises which grow into large organiza­
tions were being managed like small ones. The state 
decision making and administration were concentrated in the 
hands of the President of the enterprise who was simply 
unable to handle them. Undoubtedly, many of the duties 
assigned to him could be delegated to lower levels ,of the
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executive staff and the enterprise could benefit from it; 
as its performance would be improved. Many problems could 
probably be solved faster without waiting for the decision 
of the President. Two solutions to the problem were 
suggested. The first one proposed to divide large enterpri­
ses into smaller ones having a more narrow scope of 
activity determined according to the commodity criterion. 
The adherents of Lhis point of view argued that these 
smaller enterprises would be easy to manage and thus would 
be able to operate more efficiently. But at the same time 
it was pointed out that an increased number of enter­
prises would require the establishment of several parallel 
organizational units in all of the enterprises. In effect, 
as opponents to this concept argued, the operational 
costs from the point of view of the whole apparatus of 
foreign trade would increase significantly. As any 
research in this field has not been done it is difficult 
to assess the real value of this proposal. It is quite 
possible for example that the advantages of a better, 
more effective performance would surpass the higher costs 
of operation.^ Finally the proposal was rejected for 
other reasons. During the years of operation, the 
existing companies which established their position on 
foreign markets, were already known to foreign customers 
and had gained their confidence. New companies which 
would replace the old ones would have to start this
J. Zieleniewski, 8. Szczypiorski, op. cit., p. 258.
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difficult task from the very beginning.
The other proposal which was accepted envisaged 
establishment of the Branch Offices which would specialize 
in trade within strictly prescribed and homogenous or 
closely related commodities. They were to enjoy a 
considerable degree of autonomy and could be looked upon 
as smaller enterprises within the big one. This proposal 
had the advantages of the previous one but.at the same, 
time it did not require the dissolution of existing 
enterprises and the replacement of them by entirely new 
ones. (Diagrams No. 1 and No. 2 depict the organization­
al structure with and without "Branch Offices".^) What 
seems to be most important in the new organizational 
structure is the quite pronounced decentralization of the 
policy making and the placement of it on the intermediate 
executive level instead of concentrating it at the top.
By establishing Branch Directors who were in charge of 
"Branch Offices" and granting them more authority, the 
communinational channels were shortened and the process 
of decision making became faster,
' It seems that this reform decreased the degree of 
bureaucracy and inflexibility of the organizational struc­
ture at least to some extent, but the breakthrough 
did not go far enough to bring sweeping changes in the
X
It should be noted that both schemes show the orga­
nizational structure as formulated by Decree No. 10 
issued by the Minister of Foreign Trade in 1961.
Schedule No. 1 was designated for small enterprises and 
those with a too diversified assortment in order to es­
tablish Branch Offices. The old, uniform organizational 
schedule for all foreign trade enterprises was not 
■ exactly the same but its underlying principles were very 
similar, Ibid, pp. 261-262.
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system.
2. The other advantage claimed for this model was the 
possibility of improving the cooperation between foreign 
trade enterprises and domestic productivity. The commo­
dity pattern of Branch offices was determined to corres­
pond as close as possible to the production profile of 
cooperating with the domestic production enterprises.
It was expected that both partners would benefit on 
bringing production and trade closer together. Trading 
enterprises were given the opportunity to become better 
acquainted with production possibilities. Also producers 
were able to be better informed as to the necessary 
requirements of foreign customers. At this point it should 
be noted that the new regulations envisaged also the 
possibility for domestic producers to engage directly in 
foreign trade activity by prescribing the conditions under 
which such a concession could be granted. '
X
Ibid, pp. 270-273.
Also see, S. Polaczek, Zjednoczenia przemyslowe a 
handel zagraniczny (Industrial Associations and Foreign 
Trade) Gospodarka Planowa, No. 10, 1958.
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LINKS BETWEEN FOREIGN TRADE ENTERPRISES AND THEIR DOMESTIC
As it has been already mentioned Foreign Trade 
Enterprises are not empowered by law to engage in domestic 
production or distribution activities. They do buy the 
commodities designated for export from domestic producers 
and sell imported goods to domestic trading organizations. 
All manufacturing and commercial enterprises of the 
socialized sector are subordinated to respective ministries 
in charge of given sectors of the economy. On the inter- 
mediate^adpiinistrative level there are Industrial Associa­
tions (Zjednoczenia PrzemysloweJ which group enterprises 
by industrial types. The enterprises of the socialized 
sectors of the economy possess a full legal identity and 
are regarded as independent financial entities operating 
on commercial principles. The business contacts between 
FTE and their domestic partners have been established on 
a contract basis.. For the first time, the system of 
Contracts of Sale and Purchase has been introduced by the 
decree issued on April 19, 1950 as the legal manner of 
conducting business operations between socialized economic 
units. This was supplemented by a resolution by the 
Chairman of the State Commission of Economic Planning No. 
226 issued on June 1, 1950.^^ This resolution formulated
3C
Ibid, p. 264.
and S. Szczypiorski, Organizacja Handlu hagranicznego 
(Organization of Foreign Trade) second ed, Warsaw, 
P.W.G. 1953, p. 99.
Ibid, p. 265.
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"The General Conditions of Sale and Purchase" binding in
all trade deals between PTE's and their domestic partners. 
The above mentioned general conditions have been conside­
rably extended and modified in order to strengthen the 
discipline of foreign trade deliveries by the Decision 
of the Chairman of the Planning Commission issued on
X
October 16, 1959.
Besides these legal steps, and in order that business 
contacts between PTE's and domestic enterprises may be on 
a more operational basis some organizational changes 
have been introduced. In this respect the most important
XX
seems to be the creation of so-called "Branch Committees." 
These were established as advisory bodies attached to 
foreign trade enterprises. Branch Committees were composed 
of the representatives from both the foreign trade enter­
prises and the Industrial Associations or Enterprises in 
question. Their chief concern was to assure that the 
goods ordered by PTE's from production enterprises and 
designated for exports would correspond to the require­
ments of foreign buyers with reaard to oualitv, assortment,<. . V  L...' K/ t /
packaging and above all that they would be dispatched in 
due time. As the situation on world markets changes 
continually while production is based on annual planning, 
it is not easy to reconcile production with the, current 
requirements of foreign customers. In this respect Branch
X
Ibid.
Ibid; p. 266.
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Committees were to play the role of an intervening body 
devoted to effectively coordinating production v/ith the 
varying foreign market situation. From the practical 
point of view, it seems that the only valid contribution 
which Branch Committees were able to make was to better 
mutual understanding of problems and tasks of industry 
and the trade apparatus. They failed completely in their 
task of trade promotion .i simply because they were not 
furnished with sufficient authority to perform it. In 
order to promote trade successfully it was not enough to 
introduce organizational reforms, as the main hinderance 
was the crude and inadequate method of planning the pro­
duction and trade. Steps which have been taken in order 
to improve the planning process will be examined in 
Chapter 6.
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TECHNIQUE OF PLANNING
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PLAN'S CONSTRUCTION AND COORDINATION
Plan construction is based on a two-way flow of 
information, instruction and coordination and can be 
divided into several stages.
Starting the process of plan elaboration, the Planning 
Commission of the Council of Ministers must have as 
precise as possible a picture of the economy containing 
all the statistical data on all economic variables in 
order to depict the availabilities of productive resources 
and their composition. The objectives and the priority 
of tasks which have to be accomplished during the plan- 
year are formulated by the top political, authority and 
sent to the Planning Commission, This statistical picture 
of the economy together with the scale of preferences 
established by political leaders serves as the basis for 
planners to formulate a preliminary and internally con­
sistent set of aggregate targets. The consistency is 
achieved by drawing a preliminary set of material balan­
ces.^ Material balances relate (link) output targets 
with the factor requirements indispensable to produce that 
output. The clue to material balance construction is the 
system of output coefficients (technical norms). They 
are derived from technological practice and are possibly
H, S, Levine, Soviet Economic Planning (input-Output 
Analysis and Soviet Planning) A.E.R. Papers and Pro- 
ceedings. Vol. 52, 1962, p. 129.
E"." Ames, International Trade without Markets - The 
Soviet Bloc, A.E.R, December, 1954,
52
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connected for technical progress.^ The quantity of 
input materials required is calculated by simple 
multiplication of planned output targets by the appro­
priate input coefficients. The state of the material • 
balances shows import requirement of the economy for a 
period covered by the plan; output targets - domestic 
supply - decreases in inventories = import requirement.
For many years it was a common practice of the Bloc coun­
tries to first construct a preliminary import target 
(a so-called "control figure") and there they adjust the 
export plan to this target. Roughly speaking the preli­
minary export plan (control figures) is drawn up on the 
basis of already concluded trade contracts, from 
commitments arising from annual and long-run international 
trade agreements, and from import needs determined by 
material balances.
In the second stage, the "control figures" are sent 
down through the planning hierarchy. The foreign trade 
targets are sent to the Ministry of Foreign Trade where 
some of the general targets are broken up, some more 
detailed targets added and then passed on to the foreign 
trade enterprises. .
On the base of received directives and recommenda­
tions and after consulting the respective domestic trade 
organizations and manufacturing enterprises FTE’s prepare'
X
XX
XX
A. Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland. Czech- 
roslovakia and East Germany. London, Oxford University 
Fres's, Ï964, p . 4. E ." L'." Pryor, The Communist Foreign 
Trade System, p. 56.
Z. Karnecki, J. Soldaczuk , W. Sierpinski, Miedzynarodowe 
Stosunki ekonomiczne, p. 526.
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the propositions for the foreign trade plan. The draft 
of the foreign trade plan prepared by PTE has to be 
elaborated in a detailed, operational form. Once the 
plan has been approved it becomes binding to the PTE.
The consultation with domestic partners, especially in 
the case of the export plan, is very important for PTE's, 
as it ensures them that the planned goals with regard to 
the volume, commodity composition and terms of delivery 
can be met by domestic suppliers. The drafts of the 
plan prepared by PTE's are passed on to the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade. In this stage the submitted drafts are 
analyzed and estimated, the necessary adjustments and 
alterations are made and the "synthetical" draft of foreign 
trade plan is elaborated and passed to the Planning 
Commission. The drawing of this draft is essentially a 
bargaining process where the Ministry, as a superior 
organ, tries to raise some of the targets and cut out 
the excess while the PTE's try to protect the "safety 
margins" they have set up.
After receiving drafts of all sectoral plans, the 
Planning Commission starts to work out an internally 
consistent, over-all economic plan. As the data pictured 
by sectoral plans differs considerably from the preli­
minary "control figures" the Planning Commission has to 
recalculate the material balances. In planning procedu­
res borrowed from the Sovietè , a balance is not easily 
reached, and usually it does not happen that the supply 
side (listing all sources of supply for all centrally 
allocated products) equals the demand side comprising all
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the uses.of these products in the 1st calculation. In 
most cases it is the supply side which falls short of the 
planned demands. Through a series of successive adjust­
ments the planners try to coordinate all the elements 
of the plan. It can be done in various ways. Consisten­
cy of the plan can be achieved using a so called "iterative 
approach". According to this method the deficit of the 
product in question is made up by the increases in the 
planned outputs of all the products which are the inputs 
to the deficit product, followed by the increases in 
the outputs of the products which are the inputs to the 
input product and so on until the consistency is achieved, 
So far, there is no premise on which to believe that 
this method is currently applied in the planning practice 
of the countries of Soviet bloc. Usually the adjustments 
are made in a completely different way. The producers 
of a deficit product are simply told to increase their 
output without getting any additional inputs and the 
users of a deficit product have to produce the output 
determined by the plan having at their disposal less of 
the deficit product that is normally r e q u i r e d . O n e  can 
wonder how this system works in practice. In a command
X '
This unequality is usually solved (at least partially) 
in accordance with the hierarchy of preferences es­
tablished by top political authority by sacrificing 
when necessary low priority goals to fulfill targets of 
higher priority.
^  The definition of iterative approach as formulated by
H. S. Levine, "Soviet Economic Planning, AER vol. 52 
Papers and Proceedings 1962, p. 131.
xxXy^ S. Levine "The Centralized Planning of Supply in
Soviet Industry" in Joint Economic Committee, Comparison 
of the U .S. and Soviet Economics, Part i, G.P.O. Wa- 
shingtbn, 1959," pp. 164, 167.~
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economy the output goals prescribed by the plan are 
binding to all economic units in question. It is the 
producer of a deficit product who has to worry about how 
to produce the required output using less inputs. Usually 
it is done by lowering the quality of the product, utili­
zing the "safety margins" or securing higher input coe­
fficients from that which are feasibly workable.^ /a.o'-la
Arriving at the internally consistent set of material 
balances is not the only problem which the planners find 
difficult to deal with. The system of material balances 
is set up for a number of centrally allocated products 
of "key industries''.^^ After substracting the requirements 
for material inputs of key industries (covered by the 
system of material balancing) from the output targets 
set out in the directives, the quantities of output left 
over are to be distributed among all other users. It is 
only by pure coincidence that these left over outputs are 
sufficient to satisfy total final demands, as determined 
by the plan. It cannot come out in the normal course of 
planning since the "control figures" serving as the guide 
for drawing the draft-plan are set out in advance of the
X
XX
It is mainly due to the fact that input-coefficients 
are. mostly inaccurate for several reasons. Usually 
they are poorly aggregated even on the level of the 
enterprise mahy of them are out of date because of 
rapid technical progress and above all they are very 
often unrealistically set.
The method of "material balancing" is in concept similar 
to the input-output technique. However, the balances 
are made up separately for each centrally allocated 
commodity and do not prescribe a complete matrix which 
is the case in respect to input-output method. There­
fore, there are troubles with achieving consistency 
between different sets of material balances '
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entire planning process. On the other hand, any kind of 
industry depends directly or indirectly on inputs supplied 
by other industries. And again through a series of succe­
ssive approximations planners strive to hit upon a new 
set of outputs which would cover the desired levels of 
demand.
Finally, it should be noted that no matter how diffi­
cult the planners find it to arrive on the internally 
consistent version of the plan, there is still a problem 
of making provisions for unforeseen changes in final 
demand or in output capacities. It is here where one 
of the basic shortcomings of the centrally planned system 
manifests itself most acutely. Even a perfectly consistent 
and carefully elaborated plan does not secure smooth and 
undisturbed operation of the economy in the period 
covered by the plan. A planner's expectations and 
predictions do not necessarily coincide with the future 
events of real life. If something unexpected happens the 
plan is likely to breakdown creating several bottlenecks 
and strains. On the other hand these events are not easy 
to prevent or overcome as it takes considerable time and 
pains to introduce necessary adjustments and modifications. 
The heavy, bureaucratic machine of central planning is 
almost entirely rigid, constructed to operate in the 
prescribed direction. Any deviation from this strictly 
determined "route" almost immediately calls for far- 
going changes in the whole system and it is an extremely 
difficult and time-absorbing process.
Finally, an internally consistent "draft" of the plan 
is drawn up. By multiplying physical goals by respective
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prices, the monetary version of the plan is reached and 
then consolidated into an over-all financial plan. It 
should be pointed out the operational coordination of the
requirements of a foreign trade plan with the over-all 
national economic plan including several plans for pro- 
duction and investments, has proved troublesome in Polish 
experience as well as in the experience of all other. 
countries of the Bloc. It seems that the main reason 
lays in the inflexibility of the model of economy 
operating under the mechanism of centrally established 
plans. Providing that the plan targets for the domestic 
market are established in the reasonable and not exagge­
rated dimensions from the point of view of a real possi­
bility of achieving them and providing further that the 
state exercises the full control over the economy and 
thus commands must be obeyed; then the carrying out of 
the national plan targets depends on the operational 
ability of all the units of the economy. In such a 
situation the risk of non-fulfillment of the plan could 
be eliminated to great extent. By no means, is this so 
in the case of foreign trade. The contact with the 
wohld market brings in the elements of risks and uncer­
tainty , concerning the future trade turnovers. Foreign 
trade does not lend itself to the rigid planning 
methods applied in a domestic market which is under the 
full control of the state. It requires more elastic and . 
precise operational tools. leaving aside the problems 
of the long-run planning where the probability of the 
"correct guess" with respect to the future trends in the
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world market are minimal, we must admit that even planning 
on the annual basis faces enormous difficulties. While 
the real export possibilities can be set up in conformity 
with the requirements of a national plan with a great 
degree of accuracy (this is a rather theoretical possi­
bility as the actual planning methods are still very 
crude), the conditions in the world market may require 
great modifications of these plans,^ For these reasons, 
export and import plans have to be formulated approximately 
with a certain range left for modifications and adjustments. 
Their fulfillment requires considerable "operational elas­
ticity" of the enterprises conducting foreign trade, and 
several modifications in the technique of plan construction 
as well as certain financial means at the disposal of the 
enterprise in question,
In the last stage of the planning process the final 
version of the draft called "project" of the National 
Economic Plan elaborated by the Planning Commission is 
passed to the Council of Ministers for estimation and 
approval. As H. S, Levine remarks it is not only a
X
The Economic literature of the Bloc seems to realize 
this but the problem is still discussed on the academic 
level only. ,
See: JJ.Nicgowskl, W. Rydygier, Problemy handlu zagrani- 
cznego' (Problems of. Foreign Trade) in "Polityka 
gaspodarcza Polskl Lundowej,, Vol. 1 p'. 64ÔT
XX
There are two types of "reserves" kept for emergency 
purposes. The state reserves of foreign currency, gold 
and important goods serving to fill the gap caused by 
sudden changes in the world market or import irregula­
rities and the foreign trade reserves designated usually 
for sudden buying on the world market or emergency export 
to meet the foreign payments, FTE’s do not keep any 
reserved and can use the state or ministry reserves only 
under special permission. Usually it takes considerable 
time until the permission is granted and the chances of 
profitable purchase or sale can be lost in the meantime.
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formality.^ In spite of the fact that while drafting the 
plan planners try to keep as close as possible to the 
general line determined by political authority, several 
restraints imposed by resource and capacity limitations 
and the requirement to meet the consistency condition made 
the draft deviate in several respects from the line laid 
down by top political authority. The draft does not 
please everyone with political power in the ruling "elite". 
Therefore, several changes have to be made before the 
draft is confirmed by the Council of Ministers,
The Council of Ministers presents the draft of the 
National Economic Plan to the "Sejm" (Parliament) during 
its winter session for final approval and promulgation.^^ 
Once the plan has been confirmed it becomes binding by 
law to all economic units of the country.
APPRAISAL OP THE SYSTEM OF CENTRAL PLANNING
Socialist economic literature usually emphasizes two 
main advantages arising from the application of central 
planning as the operational device for carrying out foreign 
trade activity.
1) it protects "socialist economy" from the influence of 
fluctuations so characteristic to "capitalist markets" 
and thus secures the smooth and undisturbed operation 
of socialist economy run by central plans.
X
XX
H. S. Levine, Soviet Economic Planning, p, 130.
S. Hatt, E. Szymanski, M. Wolski, System olanowania w 
Poisee. p. 123.
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2) the concentration of the decision making in the hands 
of central authority enables adoption of such foreign 
trade policy which will secure the balance of internatio­
nal payments and which is most effective for continuous 
and fast economic growth.^
So far decade long planning experience has not provi­
ded any strong proof to justify these claims. Instead 
it has revealed many shortcomings of the system which , 
seems to disregard them almost completely,
A. To start with, the planning methods currently applied 
are still very crude in spite of the fact that modern 
mathematical methods and techniques especially those which 
come from the "Capitalist West" are finding increasingly- 
extensive application in planning.
We have previously discussed some of the difficulties 
the planners face in their efforts to meet the consistency 
requirements when constructing an over-all economic plan. 
This mainly refers to the wide-spread method of "material 
balancing."
X
XX
The latter is usually referred is "socialist economic 
literature as "fundamental economic law of socialism". 
See J-. V. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in 
the U.8.S.R. "Bolshevik". No. 18, 1952, p. 22.
In Stalin's days they were regarded as an integral part 
of "Bourgeois theory" and for this reason alone unassi- 
lullable into , Soviet economics. vV. A. Zauberman writes 
"the enthusiastic response which the mathematical 
"novelties" have met in Soviet economics is indeed a 
measure of the urgency felt in the task of overhauling 
and modernizing the techniques of Soviet planning".
See A. Zauberman, New Winds in Soviet-Planning, Soviet 
Studies. July I960, p. 1,
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Characterizing this method A. Zauberman v/rites:
"The underlying assumption of the "material balance" 
system is a high degree of comprehensiveness, homogeneity 
and precision. Neither of these premises has proved 
sufficiently realistic...the central planner is engaged 
in a losing battle against time. The whole conception of 
a system of balances depends on the "principle of 
simultaneity." To be consistent it must be homogeneous, 
that is, it must correspond to the same "plan variant". 
This requirement stands little chance of being met in 
actual life. The computational burden of an adequately 
expanded system of balances corresponding to each plan 
variant is so heavy that by the time calculations are 
completed it is already out of date...As technical 
difficulties came to be realized, the range of items 
covered by the system of "material balances" was cut down 
to include only commodities of key importance...Thus the 
premise of comprehensiveness has been dropped. "Material 
balances" have become no more than fragmentary estimates. 
They have failed to form an integral system." x
Since the system of "material balances" which is at the 
core of planning in the countries of Soviet bloc, has 
been so often examined and heavily criticized by Western 
economists as well as by some of the bloc economists 
there is no need to repeat this analysis.
XX
A, Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland. Czecho­
slovakia and East Germany, p. 5.
J. M. Montias, Planning with Material Balances in 
Soviet-type Economics. A.E.R. vol. 49> December 1959,'
E. Ames, International Trade without Markets, The 
Soviet Bloc, A.E.R. December 1954, E. L, Pryor, The 
Commun!at Foreign Trade System, pp. 55-57. 
and~M7''l^aîcôwTklT~~^agadn^^ nowania wieloletniego
w Polsce Tju.~.dowe.i~~TProblems of Long-terms Planning in 
Fëôpîe^’^’pôland) V/arsaw P“.W.G. 1955, p. 35. M. Rakowski 
pointed out that the exclusive reliance on "material 
balances" in planning foreign trade leads to the 
exchange of "surpluses" among socialist countries without 
real benefit to any of the trading countries.
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B,, The other very severe shortcoming of central planning 
is usually discussed in economic literature under the 
heading of "efficiency problem". The term "efficiency" 
is used here to mean three different problems. First, 
there is the operational (functional) efficiency of 
foreign trade concerned with the degree of utilization of 
"economic calculation" for policy making and establishing 
the criteria for estimating the profitability of foreign 
trade from the point of view of the economy as a whole. 
Efficiency in this meaning will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Secondly, there is the concept of the organizational 
efficiency of the foreign trade system, examination of 
which belongs rather to the "sphere of business adminis­
tration" then to economics.
Thirdly, we can speak about the efficiency of 
planning of foreign trade. It is interesting to note 
that the Bloc economists, when discussing the efficiency 
of planning, are chiefly concerned with problems which G. 
Gpossman calls "visible inefficiency" ie. "obvious waste, 
poor quality of products, inertia, hoarding and so 
forth - rather than with the "invisible" purely allocative 
kind."*
It is quite obvious that a consistent plan does not 
necessarily meet the efficiency condition. This means 
that by reallocating the available factors more output can­
not be achieved in one or more sectors or commodity groups
* G. Grossman, Introduction to "Value and Plan", p. 10.
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without sacrificing output elsewhere.*
An efficient export plan would mean such a commodity 
pattern of exports and an allocation to all markets 
available, that would bring maximal revenue in foreign 
exchange. The import plan will be termed efficient when;
1) given the financial means (in foreign exchange) at 
the disposal of foreign trade authority it is alloca­
ted to different markets and commodities so as to 
maximize total output of imports
2) the desired commodity composition of imports is 
allocated to different markets in such a way that 
the cost (in foreign exchange) of its purchase is 
minimal.
However, it seems to be obvious that in real life, a 
central plan can never be fully efficient if the degree 
of efficiency is to be estimated according to the above 
criteria. Construction of an "efficient" plan would 
require channeling to the head planners information on 
all possible alternative processes for producing thousands 
of commodities together with the possibilities of alloca­
ting them to all available markets. Planners do not get 
all this data. Even if they did they would not be able 
to handle it as the computational burden of these calcula­
tions is too heavy to be met even by the most modern
X This is essentially Montias* definition of efficiency 
who writes "assuming that planners seek to maximize a 
bill of net output, a program will be termed efficient 
in terms of the information available to the central 
planners if no other alternative can be found which 
would yield more net output for at least one good with­
out reducing the net output of any other good."
J. M. Montias, On the Consistency and Efficiency of 
Central Plans, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 29, 
October 1962, p. 280.
Also see N. Jasny, A note on Rationally and Efficiency 
in Soviet Economy, Soviet Studies. Vol. 12, April, 1961,
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mathematical techniques. Thus, the resources they have 
to allocate cannot be targeted in a way such that they 
would reach the surface of the production and trade 
possibilities curve in real life. Operationally more 
meaningful would be the assumption that information is 
not perfect - that, the data at the planners disposal is 
necessarily aggregated and incomplete and that the planners 
try to make efficient use of the information they get.
Thus, the practical production-possibility frontier 
would be determined by scarcities of factors planners have 
to allocate efficiently. At this point another formidable 
difficulty arises. In market economies scarcity of fac­
tors finds immediate reflection in prices and thus it is 
relatively easy to trace them. Planned economies replaced 
the market mechanism by a system of commands and direc­
tives, Since economic calculation hardly finds any 
application in this system, prices cannot be used as a 
reliable indicator of factors scarcities. The only 
scarcity indicator planners can obtain are the surpluses 
ana deficits in their material balances. Thus, the 
"vicious circle" closes. Planners, even if aware of the 
short comings of the method of physical balancing on 
which the system of "material balances" is based have no 
way to escape it.
C, The "import first" method of planning and complete 
reliance on physicàl allocation by means of material 
balancing leads to a complete negligence of.profitability 
calculation in carrying out foreign trade operations. It 
determines total exports and imports but is useless in 
allocating trade among different markets and individual 
trading partners.
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D. The method is entirely static. Given the productive ■ 
capacities and produced output-mix and having in mind all 
the above mentioned shortcomings, it determines a country's 
imports and exports but it will not provide an answer to 
planners where investments should be directed to develop 
industries for export and import replacing purposes.
E. Besides this, there is a number of 'houtine obstacles" 
standing in the way of rational planning and accurate 
performance of plans.*
1. All the planning decisions for the year covered by a 
given plan must be made in a relatively short period of 
time as the "draft" of the plan has quite a long route 
through the administrative ladder before being finally 
confirmed. This general "rush" in drawing the planned 
goals finds its reflection in very often unrealistic 
targets setting and the lack of coordination between 
several production and trade goals which later expresses 
'itself , - : in several bottlenecks and shortages.
2. In many instances the plan is not approved till the 
end of the first quarter of the planning-year or later. 
During this time the enterprises operate without a plan, 
rushing to fulfil the planned goals at the end of the 
year which causes uneven distribution of export and import 
deals across the year with concentration of the majority 
of foreign trade deliveries in the last quarter of the
X
See E. L. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade 
pp. 60-63.
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plan-year.
3. Separation of production and trade causes many conflicts 
of interest between manufacture and foreign trade enter­
prises. In many instances manufacturing firms find export 
production very inconvenient and unprofitable. For them
it is always easier to produce for domestic markets where 
the quality requirements are generally lower and the 
chances for fulfillment of high production targets much 
better. On the other hand, in spite of the fact that 
export production is regarded as being of highest priority, 
the manufacturing enterprises seldom find assurance of 
obtaining necessary raw materials and other intermediate 
goods.
4. The rigidity of the foreign trade operated by a cen­
tral plan; its inability to adjust to the current market 
conditions thereby having several bottlenecks and 
shortcomings reveal themselves during the performance of 
the plan are all responsible for the volume of foreign 
trade being considerably below the "potential volume" of 
profitable trade. As Pryor estimates in 1955, none of 
the Bloc countries realized even 50 percent of their 
"potential trade" per capita.*
X
Ibid, p. 27, table 1-2.
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1. FOREIGN CURRENCY STATE MONOPOLY
Poland’s monetary system was defined by the decree 
issued on October 28, 1950,*
According to its provisions, Polish "zloty 
became the official unit of currency; the gold content 
of the zloty was set at 0.222168 grams and the rate of 
exchange at 4 zlotys per 1 U.S. dollar. Although defined 
in terms of gold, the Polish zloty remains an internal 
currency only and cannot be converted into gold or 
foreign exchange at rates equivalent to its declared gold 
parity. Because the function of/the■zloty as the 'official 
currency has been limited to the domestic market; the 
state exercises full control over foreign currency holdings 
of the country** through its exclusive right to buy and 
sell such currency, and . all Vinternatiônal . brade is: .expreshed 
in foreign currency and effected through authorized banks. 
This regulation concerns the transactions carried out by 
state-owned or controlled units of the economy. The basic 
rationale of this policy was to secure planned utiliza­
tion of foreign currency holdings and effective fulfill­
ment of the foreign trade plan. Within that plan, the 
very specific role in a Soviet-type economy is played by 
the rate of exchange. In a market economy ' ■ / ' ■
%
XX
J. Malicki, Reforma systemu pienieznego (Reform of the 
Monetary System) Gospodarka Planowa. November, 1950.
Z. Kamecki, J. Soldaczuk, W, Sierpinski, on. cit. 
pp. 149-151.
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the rate of exchange has a decisive impact on the price 
structure and the level of foreign trade activity. As 
a direct result of the existence of the state monopoly 
of foreign exchange, and ; the .èntirely binterndl-character" of 
Polish currency, the rate of exchange cannot he used as 
a device regulating country's trade with abroad. In 
practice, Poland has a number of different rates of ex­
change. All of these have three characteristic .features ;
a) they are established in an arbitrary way by the state
b) they are rigid
c) they are used for the purposes of internal calcula­
tions and accounting between state owned or controlled 
units of the economy.
The rates of exchange are the main device used to finance, 
control, and estimate the performance of foreign trade, 
enterprises, among which we can distinguish an official 
"gold rate" established at the level of U.S. $1 = 4 zlotys 
(at its par value), an official "trade rate" used for 
financing foreign trade and established at the level 
U.S. $1 = 23.94 zlotys and a whole group of foreign 
exchange coefficients.
Because the official "gold rate" was established 
in a completely arbitrary way, it is unmeaningful 
from the economic point of view and is used only for preparing 
foreign trade statistics. These are usually expressed in
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so-called "exchange zlotys" where four exchange zlotys 
are valued at one U.S. dollar.
The trade rate is used to finance foreign trade 
enterprises and its functions will be examined in the 
next part of this chapter.
The group of foreign exchange coefficients or so- 
called "coefficients of effectiveness of foreign trade" 
are without doubt the most interesting and economically 
meaningful. It is also however, most recent development 
and not always formally accepted. Before proceeding we 
should probably examine the monetary system and rates of 
exchange in order to determine both the reason why these 
rates are rigid and established in the arbitrary way, and 
also the role they are supposed to play in the economy. 
Unfortunately, economic literature of the Soviet Bloc 
countries is virtually silent on these points. Further­
more, there is no indication that the problems of the 
rates of exchange and their role in a "socialist economy" 
have even been touched by economic theoreticians. The 
policy makers while fixing the gold content of Polish 
zloty did not make the slightest effort to explain why 
it has been established at this particular level. It was 
certainly not the purchasing power of Polish zloty which 
served as a base for determining its gold parity because 
the latter was established at unrealistically high levels. 
It seems more probable that Polish policy makers simply 
"borrowed" the gold content for domestic currency from
X
For more detailed elaboration see Chanter 6,
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their Soviet neighbours as the gold parity of Soviet 
roubel in 1950 was also set at 0.222168 grams of pure 
gold,* Even if this rate was economically justified for 
the Soviet Economy (which is also very dubious) it does 
not mean that this rate would fit to the entirely 
different structure of Polish economy.
Several writers argue that the rate of exchange is 
of no importance in a Soviet-type economy and therefore 
the whole problem does not deserve any attention.
Roughly speaking, they explain that there is no direct 
connection between the international and domestic economic 
activities in a Soviet-type economy.
Economic life in the country is regulated by an 
overall plan and hence monetary flows are not permitted 
to influence the allocation of resources or employment to 
any significant degree. Simultaneously, the internal 
character of the currency and stability of prices in the 
domestic markets serve as a built-in stabilizer to pro­
tect the domestic economy from any external disturbances, 
Soviet experts also claim that the government has full 
control over foreign currency holdings which ensures that 
all payments are effected in conformity with the require­
ments of the foreign trade plan. It is the plan and not 
the mechanism of the market which determines the volume 
and structure of foreign trade. Because of this, the 
non-market nature of the trade rate of exchange is of no
X
Ï. Aizenberg, Exchange Rates and the ^rice Level in 
the Socialist Economy, Problems of Economics, November 
1962.
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importance.
In early. 1950‘s E. Ames argued that in fact, there is 
a link between foreign and domestic activities in a Soviet 
type economy and that the rate of exchange can have quite 
an important influence on the stability of the monetary 
system. In his opinion, the relation runs from the 
amount of trade inbalance (which depends on the level of 
the rate of exchange) to the size of the necessary money 
supply. He explains that the rate of exchange determines 
the amount of trade inbalance v/hich must be financed 
either by the Treasury or the Central bank, and therefore 
it affects the money supply (of the economy).
A number of writers found this explanation unsatis­
factory,** They pointed out that the effect which E,
Ames describes is of very limited practical importance 
because it can easily be offset by appropriate monetary 
policy. The logic of this argument seems to be confirmed 
by the experience of Soviet-type economies. Trade in -ba­
lance and budgetary financing not only occur, but 
chronically persist, however they do not influence 
monetary stability or domestic prices to any substantial 
degree. However, this is not a sufficient proof to state 
that the rate of exchange does not play any role in 
Soviet-type economy and can be disregarded by economists.
X
XX
E . Ames, The Exchange Rate in Soviet-type Economies. 
Review of Economics and Statistics, May, 1953.
R. Bird, The Possibility of Fiscal Harmonization in the 
Communist Bloc. Public Finance Vol. 19, 1964.
P. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, op. cit, 
pp. 267-270.
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The exchange still remains as the basic element in 
calculating the profitability of trade. Recent research 
work in the field of effectiveness of foreign trade 
clearly indicates that an economically meaningful rate 
of exchange is absolutely indispensable for this purpose.
DOMESTIC FINANCING OF FOREIGN TRADE
Financing foreign trade in a "socialist economy" has 
specific features which are entirely different from those 
characterizing foreign trade in Western countries. In 
particular, the foreign and domestic aspects of financing 
overseas trade are completely separated. This is a 
consequence of:
1) the existence of a state monopoly over foreign trade 
and the fact that production and trade are separated;
2) the existence of the state monopoly over foreign currency
3) on-account—of the centrally planned nature of the 
economy.
The provisions of the export plan determine amounts of 
foreign currency which each FTE has to obtain from its 
exports. Payments received for goods sold abroad are 
accumulated in special accounts in the "Bank Handlowy w 
Warszawie S. A," (Commercial Bank). However, they do not 
belong to the enterprise which earned them. The state 
is the rightful owner of these accounts, and uses them 
to pay for imports. Imports are established in accordance 
with the provisions of an import plan and each FTE receives 
the required amounts of foreign currency to pay for 
required imports. Nevertheless, FTE's enjoy some econo­
mic independence in that they may buy goods designated 
for exports,from domestic producing enterprises. Under
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these circumstances there must be some mechanism enabling 
them to clear their accounts and secure financial equi­
librium. .Foreign Trade Enterprises use data on the rate 
of exchange (official trade rate), the level of domestic 
prices and the level of foreign trade prices which makes 
financing in their domestic sphere of activity very simple 
and to some extent primitive.
Financial calculations in export
1. Domestic price of the exported
, commodity (in current zlotys) zl. 112
2. Planned profit of PTE zl, 8
3. Total Cost z T n W ”
4. Export price of the commodity
FOB = $3 X 24 (trade rate) = zl. 72
5. Budget difference (negative) zl. 48
Total revenue zl. 120
Total costs to the enterprise in this case are zl, 120 
(including planned profit) while the dollar price of the 
commodity translated into zlotys at the official trade 
rate is only 72. The loss to the enterprise on this 
transaction amounts to zl 48 and is covered by the Budget 
of the State. This is the so-called negative budget 
difference,
FINANCIAL CALCULATION IN IMPORTS "
1. Import price paid by FTE
(cif 87 X 24 (trade rate) = zl, 168
2. Planned profit of FTE :zl. 12
3. Total Cost zTT T8Ü~
4. Domestic price of the commodity zl. 350
5. Budget difference (positive) zl. 170
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The profit made on this transaction or so-called positive 
budget difference amounts to zl. 170. It is a result of 
the difference between the selling price of the commodity 
in the domestic market and the total costs of this 
commodity (import price of the commodity translated into 
zlotys at the official trade rate plus planned profit of 
PTE). The positive budget difference cannot be retained 
by the enterprise and it is transferred to the state.
There are several other points that should be observed 
about these trade calculations:
Profits made by the PTE are secured automatically. The 
rate of these profits is established by the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and profits are directly calculated into the 
costs of operation of the enterprise. Thus, these profits 
cannot be regarded as a significant measure of economic 
effects generated by the activity of the enterprise in 
question. The balance between negative budget differences 
paid to PTE’s and positive budget differences received 
from PTE is passed to the state budget. As has already 
been mentioned, the rate of exchange is not used as; a 
device for regulating the country’s foreign trade.
However, the level at v/hich this rate is established is 
important. The exchange rate directly determines the 
value of balances on the account of budget differences. 
V/lien the trade rate is established at a relatively high 
level, positive budget differences occur for almost all 
imports (import price expressed in domestic currency is 
lower than the domestic price of the commodity) while on 
the other hand, almost all export transactions bring
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negative budget differences (domestic price higher than 
export price).
To sum up, if we hold domestic prices as given, the 
higher the rate of exchange, the higher are the budget 
differences (positive and negative). The fact that there 
are positive budget differences in imports and negative 
differences in exports at the existing trade rate does 
not, of course,mean that all imports are profitable and 
all exports unprofitable. Any change of the trade rate 
would change the whole picture entirely. At the same time 
the method offers no chance to evaluate the activity of 
foreign trade enterprises in any meaningful way. For 
example, if an enterprise pays an unreasonably high price 
for imported commodities, and the rate of exchange is 
high, it will not be reflected on the account of budget 
differences to any significant degree.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DOMESTIC PRICE SETTING PROBLEM-  ^ ;
In the economic'literature of the Bloc there has been 
a great deal of discussion on the role which prices play 
in a centrally planned economy.*
Without making an attempt to review this animated 
debate, a few remarks should be made on the role which 
socialist prices do not play in the economy.
Under the system of physical targeting of planned 
goals and material balancing, prices ceased to be an 
autonomous force determining production, resource allo­
cation and consumption. Prices were not abandoned com­
pletely, as.even in the condition of physical allocation, 
some weights are necessary to combine the yearly produc­
tion of different commodities. Thus, prices began to 
serve as a common measure allowing addition of potatoes 
to tractors and so on. For this purpose, it is convenient.
s. _ ■
to have prices which are stable over a long period of time. 
It seems obvious that these accounting prices that plan­
ners attach to targeted outputs are by no means accurate
X  ■
For a review of the Polish discussion see, o> Lisikiewioz, 
Konferencja poswiecona teorii cen w gospodarce socia- 
listycznej Ekonomlsta, No. 3, 1958. The summary or 
these discussions is also prescribed by J. M. Montias 
"Central Planning in Poland, The problem is also discu­
ssed by M. Bernstein, The Soviet Price System, AER vol.
52, March, 1962.
A. Zauberman, The Soviet Debate on the Law of Value and 
Price Formation in Value and Plan.
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measures of opportunity costs, and cannot.secure effi- 
ciency in the allocation of resources. From 1949 to 1955 
the State Price Commission in Poland made use of two 
different pricing methods.* A system of fixed prices 
was applied to all producer's goods and raw materials 
used in the socialized sectors of the economy. They 
were mainly derived from current 1937-1938 prices with 
some consideration given to the industry's average cost 
of production at the time the prices were put into effect. 
With the passage of time, supply and demand conditions 
in several industries changed significantly. Fixed 
prices could not make any allowance for these changes, 
and soon it became necessary to introduce a system of 
subsidies in order to compensate for losses arising 
from a generally higher level of production costs as 
compared to the selling price of the products. For 
years, subsidizing was a common practice in many branches 
of the econonjÿ, especially in industries such as mining, 
which faced decreasing returns. The effect of these 
policies was widespread waste and uneconomic use of 
resources (especially raw materials and semi-fabricates) 
which were very cheap, even though their supply was per­
sistently falling short of the increased demand resulting
X
. M. Montias, Price-setting Problems in the Polish
Economy. Journal of Political E c onomy, Vol. 65, 
December, T 9 3 7 . . ;
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from high rates of economic growth.*
Underpricing in the socialized sectors was compen­
sated by the high level of prices for consumer goods.
Because of the low priority which this sector received
in the hierarchy of preferences . of . .planners who jyere .con- , . 
cerned mainly with the rapid expansion of the capital 
goods sector, the consumer's demand surpassed by wide 
margins the available supply. A high level of retail 
prices for these goods was established to bring supply 
and demand into equilibrium, while the gap between prices 
and much lower production costs was absorbed by turnover 
taxes. These taxes provided a major part of the financial 
means designated for investments. In 1955 a wide debate 
on the role of prices in the socialist economy, and on 
the methods of setting prices started in the Polish econo­
mic press. As Compared with the discussion on prices 
which took place in almost all of the Bloc countries at 
this time, Polish price debate seems to deserve special 
attention. It was less futile than other Bloc discussions 
and did not limit itself to the issues on the scope and 
forms in which "law of value" still operates in a socia­
list economy. On several points the break away from the tradi-
X
Z, Kamecki, J. Soldaczuk, W. Sierpinski, op. cit., 
p. 202.
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tional orthodoxy was really amazing. Several schools 
of thought have arisen, each expressing different points 
of view. The "revisionists" recommended marginal cost 
pricing and market mechanism as a device to bring about 
the allocation of resources in conformity with consumers 
demand. They believed in consumers sovereignty unhampe­
red by administrative controls and wished the top plann­
ing authority to control the economy through an indirect
XX
For example according to Marxian doctrine no other , 
factor except labor is entitled to a functional remune­
ration, If non labor income exists under socialism 
it is only due to the specific social relations making 
it possible. On those grounds, traditional orthodoxy 
maintained that interest on capital is to have no 
important place in the cost structure of a socialist 
economy.
At this point A. Zauberman refers to Prof. Oscar Lange’s 
statement which^;"pointed but that, the , price, formula 
implied therein may correspond to a useful moaern 
solution if it were assumed that capital accumulation 
has been carried on as far as to reduce marginal net 
productivity of capital to zero as a socialist society 
would tend to do.”
Thus, A. Zauberman remarks "the distance which separa­
tes the mirage of a zero marginal productivity of 
capital from the real economic environment of the 
Soviet Bloc countries - measures the inadequacy of 
Marxist classics" concept of price, as a particular 
principle for the planner, who despite that distance, 
has to refrain from any explicit profit and interest 
charge, A. Zauberman, "The Soviet Debate on the Law 
of Value and Price Formation "In Value a nd Flan, p. 21, 
Polish economists working on probTems ofthe effective­
ness of investment include the remuneration for capital 
in their formulas of the coefficient of effectiveness 
of investment. See; M. Rakov/ski, ed. Efektywnosc in- 
westycji, Warsaw, 1962. K. Laski, Efektywnosc inwesty- 
cji w gospodarce socjalistycznej, (Effectiveness of 
Investments.in a Socialist Economy) in "Polityka 
Gospodarcza, Polski Ludowej, part I.
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monetary and fiscal policy.* The "conservative" group 
lead by Stalinist economist B. Mine, vociferously suppor­
ted Soviet-type administrative planning.
A months-long fierce battle between revisionists and 
conservatives and all the intermediary groups cooled down 
in June 1957 when the Economic Council, an advisory body 
of the Polish Council of Ministers; finally formulated 
and published the principal proposals for the price reform. 
The thesis were less radical in character than were many of 
the voices in discussion. They expressed the compromise 
between the opposing groups and postulated the prices in 
the manufacturing sector to oscillate around the so- 
called "prices of departure". The latter were defined 
as AVC of the relevant group of the "highest cost" enter­
prises in each industry, and a proportional profit was 
designated to cover the desired accumulation. These 
"prices of departure" were in turn to be adjusted by 
adding a positive or negative mark-up in order to secure
The "revisionist" point of view in the discussion was 
most explicitly expressed by S. Kurowski "Model a cela 
gospodarki narodowej" Model and ends of the National 
Economy, Zycie Gospodarcze, No. 7, 1957.
Also W, BrUsl [TroTi prawa wartosci w gospodarce socj-
alistycznej. (On the role of the Law of Value in a 
Socialist Economy) Ekonomista , No. 5, 1956.
W. Brus, Uwagi o proïïTëmïe racnunku marginalnego w gospo­
darce socjalistycznej (Remarks on the role of marginal 
calculus in a Socialist Economy), Ekonomista, No. 3,'1958.
XX For a defence along Marxian lines see article by B. Mine 
in Gospodarka Planowa, No. 8, 1958 also his "Zarys teorii 
kosztow produkcji i cen, Warsaw, 1958.
Tezy rady ekonomicznej w sprawie ksztaltowania sie cen 
(The thesis of the Economic Council on principle of price 
formation) in "Snoroceny" (The price controversy) Warsaw, 
Kiw. 1958, pp. g^2F:
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equilibrium between supply and demand in the market.
Prices derived in this way were intended to serve as ba­
sic indicators for current economic decisions but not 
for investment decisions. The reforms which followed 
discussion were even less radical and of rather limited 
importance. In 1956, fixed prices were abolished and 
replaced by the so-called "transfer prices", established 
on the base of current average costs of production.
They were to serve for the^ purpose of planning and were 
to remain unchanged till I960. As,at the same time, most 
of the previous subsidies v/ere erased, the discrepancy 
between current and transfer prices in effect widened 
instead of closing. Certain improvements were made in 
the pricing of raw materials and semi fabricates. Sub­
sequent increases of prices of key raw materials, fuels and 
semi fabricates significantly narrowed the differential 
between prices and cost of production in these sectors.
The other important feature of these reforms was the ann­
ouncement of the policy of linking the price structure 
of these products with the prices prevailing in the world 
market as advocated by Kalecki and others.* In general,
all these reforms beside removing some of the most stri-
i
king irrationalities in price and costs relations left 
the distorted price structure unchanged.
II PRICING IN FOREIGN TRADE
  Setting prices in foreign trade seems to be an even
X
M. Kalecki, 0 cenach' sunowcow podstaw.owycm (On prices of 
basic raw materials), Ekonomosta No, 3, 1958, U. Kacha- 
riasz. 0 wlasciwa polityEa cen surowcow, (For a correct 
Policy of naw-katerials Prices ; j'inance, I;o. 6, 1956.
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more troublesome problem for both Bloc theoreticians 
and foreign trade practitioners than setting prices, for 
domestic markets. Bloc economic literature on this 
problem usually emphasizes the existence of two separate 
systems of prices : one applicable in trade v/ith non-
Bloc countries or the "capitalistic world" and the other 
for intra-bloc trade. The distinction is being made in 
conformity with Stalin's famous proclamation of the exis­
tence of two world markets,* Ideological or theoretical 
justification of this situation is usually vague and full 
of holes.**
X
XX
It is peculiar that even the very question why Bloc 
countries use the "capitalist prices" in their trade, 
something which stands in open disagreement with the 
two separate world markets proposal, is completely 
avoided. The answer seems to be simple: world market
prices are used because, in spite of all efforts. Bloc 
countries have failed to establish their own price 
base - but Bloc literature does not want to admit this 
"obvious truth".
In 1952 Stalin wrote "the disintegration of the single 
all embracing world market must be regarded as the 
most important sequel of the Second World War and its 
economic cnsequences..........the economic consequen­
ces of the existence of two opposite camps was that 
.........now we have two parallel world markets
also confronting one another."
fr. Stalin. Emblems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.
New York, Int^li^^tfomr'BÜbïi^
After 1956 several Bloc economist questioned the 
validity of this proposal.
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In the trade with non-Bloc countries "capitalistic 
world market prices" are used, simply because market econo­
mics would not accept any others but world market prices. 
Thus, equality of price levels is the first and underlying 
condition of trade relations with the Western world.
There are several other additional reasons. In their 
trade with the , Western v/orld, rBloc countries have' little j if 
any influence on world prices. Their share in world trade 
is rather small: it amounts roughly to about 10 per cent
of international trade^ In any commodity group the 
quantities traded are not large enough to affect prices on 
the world market. By the very nature of the commodities 
exchanged (mainly raw materials and foodstuffs), the 
position of Bloc importers and exporters much closer appro­
ximates the competitive "price taker" than the monopo­
listic or digopolistic "price dictator". Besides this, 
there are other factors working to deteriorate the 
bargaining position. The goods offered by Bloc countries 
are usually below world quality standards and thus are 
not easy to sell. At the same time, the ambitious indus­
trialization programs undertaken by all bloc countries 
require sizeable dimensions of imports to implement these 
programs. In many cases, this demand has to be directed 
to the world market,//regardless of the strained situation 
in a country's balance of payments. All these factors
X
Only lower than world market prices would be accepta­
ble by "capitalistic world" but obviously Bloc countries 
would not be willing to take "less" if they can get 
"more".
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have significantly limited their ability to influence 
import and export prices v/hich have to be adjusted to the 
level prevailing in the world market.
As far as intra-bloc trade is concerned, efforts are 
being made to avoid the employment of world prices and to 
elaborate their own system of prices. There is much 
literature on the problem of finding adequate principles 
for intra-bloc price-setting since different schools of 
thought present various and, in many instances,, contrasting 
arguments and proposals.
Economists of the "old orthodox school of thought" are 
deeply dissatisfied with the use of "world market prices" 
for intra-bloc trade, regarding them as highly unsuitable 
for a socialist economy.* "Capitalist market prices" are 
rejected by them on ideological grounds as not "equivalent" 
and distorted by "irrational capitalistic disturbances"
(of monopolistic, cyclical or speculative character). 
Secondly, there are some practical considerations which 
.make "capitalist market prices" very inconvenient for 
planners. The frequent changes of world prices increase 
the degree of uncertainty in foreign trade planning and
X
XX
Most distinctive representative of this group is Russian 
economist K. Ostrovitianov.
There was a great deal of discussion in Bloc literature 
on "equivalent prices" but the very term of "equiva­
lence" has never been neatly defined and comes to have 
several meanings as used by different authors. Most 
often it is understood that two commodities in two 
different countries are exchanged at equivalent prices 
when they contain equal amounts of domestic labor-hours 
For extensive discussion on theoretical problems of 
"equivalent trade" see P. Pryo2'. Communist Foreign 
Trade Theory, Soviet Studies, July, 1962.
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a plan's performance, and complicates the planning process
itself. Taking into consideration all the efforts of 
Bloc policy makers taken in order to protect their do-
mestic economics from any external disturbances, this
m-" T n n 1: r r> t; n <^m ^argument seems to be very important to them.'
The "new orthodox school" which emerged more recently 
focuses its arguments on a different set of considerations. 
They seem to avoid questions on equivalent trade and place 
less stress on undesirable (harmful) distortion of world 
market prices. In their opinion, demand and supply 
relations in the Bloc are quite different from those'.in 
the Western world. Many Bloc goods are relatively high- 
cost products as, compared with the production cost struc­
ture outside the bloc. In the raw materials sector, there 
is a long-run trend for demand to fall short of available 
supply, which is reflected by a steady decline of prices 
for raw materials on the world market. In contrast to 
this situation there is a persistent shortage in the whole- 
Bloc of many vitally needed raw materials. As the result 
of autarchic policies and a rather limited or undiversi­
fied natural resource supply in all Bloc countries (with 
the only exception of the U.S.S.R.), domestic demand for 
raw materials was increasing much faster than domestic 
production, causing severe deficits for a number of key 
raw materials. This situation encouraged many otherwise
XX
* Z. Kamecki, o. Soldaczuk, W. Sierpinski'..,^  op. cit., p. 205.
XX
As expressed by Prof. 0. Lange "domestic prices are 
effectively insulated from external influences to pro­
tect the economy from "capitalist fluctuations and 
crisis.
0. Lange. Essays on Economic Planning (Calcutta, I960) 
p. 11.
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uneconomical investment projects in the raw material 
sectors, and raised the average production costs in these 
industries significantly above the world market prices.^ 
The principle of comparative advantage would suggest that 
in such a situation it would be more profitable for the 
Bloc countries to import cheaper '’western raw materials" 
than to develop their own more costly ones. There are, 
however^ several reasons why this proposal is unacceptable 
to the Bloc countries. First of all, there are political 
considerations.and the desire of the bloc governments to 
be economically independent of the advanced West. Western 
strategic embargo is usually quoted in support of this - 
argument.Secondly, deficits in the balances of payments 
would not permit them to increase imports of raw materials 
and other commodities from outside the Bloc to the level 
corresponding to their demand.
X
XX
It is also interesting to note that the U.S.S.R.'s 
exports include a very large proportion of raw materials. 
While the U.S.S.R' imports - a  large proportion of 
manufactured goods. The present bloc's problem of 
prices results, therefore,in favourable terms of trade 
for the Soviet Union.
Political tensions and hostility still do exist in more 
or less pronounced form, therefore another embargo can 
be viewed as a possible danger to Bloc countries. How­
ever, the Soviet blocade of Yugoslavia, and later of 
Albania would suggest that the blocade by a bloc 
nation is also a visible possibility.
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Thirdly, there is an "infant industries" argument favo­
ring the development of new industries, despite the high 
initial production costs, which are to be offset by future 
benefits when these industries "grow up" and reach their 
maturity. In addition, some authors stress the relative 
scarcity of capital in the bloc as compared with the abun- 
dancy of capital in advanced Western countries. The use 
of "capitalistic prices" reflecting their factor endown- 
rnent would discourage capital intensive, long maturing 
investments, which because of the capital sdarcity,should 
have very high returns.^
The other commodity group for which demand and supply 
relations are entirely different in the Bloc are food­
stuffs. As a rule, income elasticity of demand for food­
stuffs is relatively low at high levels of income but it 
it may be very high at low levels of income. As a 
consequence the demand for foodstuffs in the advanced 
West usually falls below the availabilities of supply 
and^in effect, there is a long-run tendency for the prices 
of these goods to decline. In contrast, the Bloc countries 
are still in the low income group and their elasticity of 
of,demand for foodstuffs is relatively high. The Bloc
X
It has never been explained how this proposal can be 
brought into agreement with the Marxian labour theory 
of.value where scarcity of capital and high returns
for these production factors are negligible. Besides 
this it is not clear to what extent the high or low 
capital output ratio enter planners' calculations and 
influence their investment decisions.
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countries experience a continuous demand pressure on 
the market. Low "capitalist market prices" would not 
induce production and intra-hloc trade in this commodi­
ty group. These schools of thought advocate establish­
ment of completely separate price systemsfor intra-bloc 
trade. It is worth mentioning, that.in spite of the fact 
that many bloc economists are unhappy about the use ■ 
of "capitalist world market prices" in Bloc trade and 
express a strong belief that sooner or later their own 
system of prices will be elaborated, no tenable proposal 
in this respect has been suggested. In general, it has 
been agreed that intra-bloc foreign trade price setting 
should be based on production costs in the Bloc,
However, the next question, as to how these costs of 
production should be measured, brings a variety of 
proposals, but,in fact.no answer. Shaynin's idea of 
basing prices on a labor-hour of production and his 
complicated system of averaging the different amounts of 
labor embodied in the commodities produced in various 
countries, in order to derive one common price for the 
whole Bloc,is interesting, but certainly unworkable in 
practice?^ Dismissing labor-hour of production as a device 
to measure the value of the commodity, there are only 
the domestic price structures in each Bloc country left
X
Bela Csikos - Nagy.Stworzenie wlasnej bazy can na 
swiatowym nynku socjalistycznym (Elaboration of the 
separate price-base for a socialist world market),
Gospodarka planowa, No. 11, 1962,
B. Shaynin, Proportions of exchange, Economic Journal 
LXX December, 1960^ pp. 769-783.
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to be compared. Taking into consideration the distortion 
of domestic price systems and arbitrary rates of exchange, 
it is hard to believe that any solution to this problem 
can ever be found along these lines.
On the other extreme in this debate, is a group of 
economists who believe that intra-bloc prices should 
approximate as closely as possible the prices in the 
world market."" They argue that the disparities between 
intra-bloc and world market prices would create unequal 
exchange conditions and favor price discrimination. For 
example, if the intra-bloc price for a certain commodity 
is continuously kept above the world market price, 
certainly Bloc importers would prefer to make their 
purchases on the world market. On the other hand, in 
the case where the intra-bloc price is set below world 
market level, Bloc, exporters would not be willing to 
sell their goods to "socialist buyers" when the sale on 
world market is obviously more advantageous. Secondly, 
the "Socialist world market" is a somewhat misleading 
expression. In the situation where bilateral trade 
agreements are being concluded in relatively short 
periods of time by organizations of foreign trade mono­
poly in each country, and supply-demand considerations 
have only limited influence on policy-makers' decisions, 
there is really no market in the traditional meaning
X
See P. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, 
p . loo.
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of this word. This argument speaks in favor of the use 
of world market prices. Thirdly, they point out that 
the discussion on a separate "socialist price system" 
is still in the initial phase, and that there is no 
indication that it can be elaborated in the near 
future. Where the market mechanism is absent, the 
reliability of costs and prices, and economically mean­
ingful rates of exchange are indispensable for any 
economic calculation. The domestic price-setting problem 
has not been solved yet and the rates of exchange are 
not even subject to discussion. In this situation 
world prices are,perhaps.not ideal but still the only 
possible solution. It should be noted that most of the 
adherents to this point of view do not advocate direct 
transplantation of "capitalist world prices" to "socia- 
list ground". What they usually have in mind, are adjus- 
ted world prices which are "purified of elements of 
irrational capitalistic disturbances" (inflationary, 
cyclical, speculative... etc) and kept unchanged for a 
certain period of time. This is basically the idea of 
"stop-prices"^ which have been used in intra-bloc pricing
practices. This approach to the problem of pricing 
has many weaknesses and its adversaries were quick to 
detect them.
A. The major objection has been raised against the 
notion of the "world market prices". In the post-war
X
Stop-prices are the prices derived from average world 
market' prices of a given year and kept frozen for a 
conventionally agreed period of time.
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world they argued - free flow of goods and money has been 
seriously limited by governments of several countries 
by all kind of restrictions; ie. import quotas, foreign 
exchange regulations, custom unions, economic and mone­
tary blocs, foreign exchange agreements...etc. Under the 
above circumstances there are many markets and no such a 
thing as one world market price.
It was then suggested that "world market price" 
refers to the price of the chief market. However, it is 
still open to discussion what criteria should be used for 
the choice of "chief world market". Besides this, the 
notion of the price of "chief world market" is meaningful 
only with respect to a group of staple commodities which 
are almost homogeneous and standardized (raw materials, 
agricultural products). Machinery and other differentiated 
products certainly do not fall into this category. On 
the other hand the share of this group in the internation­
al market is significant and constantly increasing.
B. It has been stressed that prices of the world market 
.should be purified by climimation of irrational capitalis­
tic disturbances which cause the distortion of world 
market prices. What are the principles of this purifica­
tion and how should it be done?
C. It has never been agreed as to what is the proper time 
span for the "stop-prices" to be kept unchanged. In
addition there is still a problem over how long the 
world prices should be averaged to serve as a base 
for deriving a stop-price? Undoubtedly, there are many 
other objections which can be raised against this proposal.
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The problem can be attacked on ideological, theoretical, 
or practical grounds. Without going too far into the 
details of this debate there is still one question which 
has been raised by the critics of the stop-price system.
The question deserves special attention simply because it 
really invalidates the whole idea of stop prices. There 
is no need to repeat that many bloc theoreticians are 
not satisfied with the use of "stop prices", as this 
confession appears in a whole series of writings on the 
subject. Secondly, as a rule they stress that "stop 
prices are used as a temporary solution only until the 
Bloc's own basis for prices is elaborated. But what is 
their merit over the use of current world market prices?
The old argument that they are purified of the "undesirable 
capitalistic disturbances" looses its grounds because 
the criteria for this purification is at least questiona­
ble, if not non-existent. Thus, the "stop-prices" retain 
all the shortcomings of world market prices. Besides this, 
they have additional major weakness. Being frozen over 
a longer period of time, they deviate from the current 
level of world prices and thus cease to reflect actual 
exchange conditions on the world market. They also do 
not reflect cost structure within the Bloc. Between 
these two extremes there is a broad group of contributors, 
or rather several groups as their viewpoints differ
X
See St. Polaczek, Odrebny uklhd cen w handlu zag- 
ranicznym dla krajow socjalistycznych. (A Separate 
Price System in Foreign Trade for a Socialist Country). 
Ekonoinista, Wo. 1, I960, p. 26.
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considerably on several questions. Their common feature 
is that they try to compromise both opposed groups and 
build their proposals on valid contributions of both 
schools of thought. What they postulate is some kind of 
mechanism which would more or less directly link domestic 
price System with the world market prices.
Distinctive in this group seems to be M. Kalecki's 
contribution.^ He advocated that domestic prices of 
raw materials should be based on prices prevailing in 
the world market.. This proposal was strongly supported 
by several other Polish economists and was discussed at 
the ninth Plenum of CEMA (June, 1958).^^ A. Znuberman's 
comment. on M. Kalecki’s proposal was that "this is seen 
as the first short-cut to r a t i o n a l i t y " . It seems that 
this proposal plus Prof. Kalecki’s authority paved the 
way to several price regulations which were introduced in 
Poland in the :late ighO'ey: :It .is interesting to note .that 
on the other hand, in the famous debate on price formation 
Prof. Kalecki was quite explicit in his rejection of 
the "automatism of prices" in the domestic market.
X
M. Kalecki, 0 cenach surowcow podstawowych. (On prices 
of basic raw materials), Ekonomista, No. 3, 1958.
^  The ninth plenum of CEklA made recommendations to use
the average world market prices as basis for the 1958 
intra-bloc prices. Taking into consideration that 
during the period 1951-1957 otop-prices based on 1949- 
1950 average world prices were binding it was a real 
progress.
^^^A. .Zhuberman, The Soviet Debate on the Law of Value and 
Price Formation, p. 33.
I V M. Kalecki, Rady Robotnicze a centralne planowanie. 
(Worker’s Councils and Central Planning) Howe Drohi, No. 
12, 1956, pp. 41-42.
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Another original proposal v/as formulated by St, Polaczek,^ 
Rejecting the complete isolation of domestic and foreign 
trade prices, he postulated indirect interdependence 
between domestic and world market prices. In his model, 
the domestic price for goods entering foreign trade is 
composed of two elements:
a) a domestic equivalent of world market price (it is 
derived by multiplying foreign price by the actual rate 
of exchange)
b) a positive or negative mark-up (custom duty paid or 
premium received)
Duty paid or premium received would serve as the instru­
ment of distribution of national income in conformity with 
the preferences of the state. Domestic equivalent of 
world market price W a s  supposed to guide traders and 
producers and encourage their activities into the most 
profitable directions. The rate of exchange, or rather 
the whole set of differentiated (according to commodity 
and geographical criterion) rates of exchange as well as 
the amount of mark-up were to be established by the 
state. .
The advantages claimed for this model are: the link
between foreign and domestic prices is retained ( element A) 
and at the same time the protection against any undesirable 
external disturbances which would affect domestic economy 
is. secured ( element B). It seems that the model has at
X
Polaczek, op. cit.
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least one basic shortcoming. The rate of exchange or a 
set of rates of exchange is designated here to play a 
very important role as it is the main factor determining 
the amount of the "domestic" price equivalent. It calls 
therefore, for economically meaningful rates of exchange. 
With the rates of exchange which are used now the model 
has no more validity than the very heavily criticized 
system of positive and negative budget differences.
In the light of the theoretical discussion on prin­
ciples of intra-bloc price-setting it seems obvious that 
they have failed to furnish the Bloc policy makers with 
any satisfactory prescription for solving their price- 
setting problem.^ However, the post-war intra-bloc 
trade was growing at rapid rates and the flow of commodi­
ties had to be priced. Actual pricing practices in the 
Bloc seem to indicate the utilization of several more or 
less formal or informal criteria; the demarcation line 
between them being extremely blurred and difficult to 
make. As P. Pryor remarked "the price setting in foreign 
trade between the European communist nations is a boiling
X
To interpret this as a symptom of their inability to 
deal with economic problems of "real life" would be 
an unfair judgment. It should be realized that 
their freedom of creative thinking is rigidly restric- • 
ted by ruling ideology and fundamental Marxism, These 
are the safety lines they are not supposed to pass.
The ideological thaw which followed the Polish "October" 
1956 certainly loosened these ties and this seems to 
explain why Polish contribution to the Bloc price 
discussion can be regarded as most orominent.
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stew of propaganda, ideology, economic forces and self-
delusion/
Formal pricing criteria are usually included into 
bilateral trade agreements and thus are rather easy to 
disentangle. During the period of 1945-1950, the intra- 
bloc prices were based on current world market prices 
(at the time trade agreement had been negotiated).
These prices were kept unchanged during the whole period 
covered by the trade agreement in question, irrespective 
of the movements of prices on the world market which 
occured in the meantime.
In the early 1950's as a result of the Korean War, 
world prices for several commodities and especially the 
so called "strategic raw materials" went up very rapidly, 
Regarding that world market prices had become distorted 
and were deviating from the "real value of the commodi- 
ties", (because of elements of cyclical and speculative 
character) the Bloc countries decided to eliminate these 
"irrational disturbances" from their prices.
XX
F. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, p. 131.
As declared by Zoltarey in 1951 "...in mutual trade 
among all socialist states prices are fixed on the basis 
of world prices...(they) are stable and adjustment (of 
world market prices) excludes the factor of temporary 
price changes which are connected with speculative 
machinations of capitalist monopolies, the military- 
inflationist business cycle and so on...
V. Zoltarev, 'Trade Relations of the USSR with socialist 
countries. Vneshniaia Jorgovlia, Nov. 1957, quoted by 
/. Wszelaki,njoTïEunist Economic Strategy: The Role of
East Central Europe, Washington, D . ITT, National 
FTânnTng Association, 1959, p. 631.
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From 1951 the average world market prices of 1949- 
1950 were being used in intra-bloc trade. These so- 
called "stop-prices" were retained for the period 1951- 
1957.
As the discrepancy between current world market 
prices and "stop-prices" widened,especially in the 
instances where the "stop-prices" were considerably below 
world market prices, several countries began to complain 
that they were discriminated.against. Many Writers began to 
question openly the wisdom of these practices while demanding 
a price revision.^
In effect, the 1958 trade agreements specified that 
average world market prices of 1957 were to be employed 
in 1958 for intra-bloc trade. The 1957 prices were also 
retained for the 1959 agreements. However, the supporters 
of "stop-prices" began to stress again the dangers of 
transmission of "capitalistic disturbances" on "socialist 
economies" through prices. Their position was evidently 
strong enough, as they persuaded the return to "stop- 
prices" which this time were based on 1957 world prices.
As the "stop-prices" had many opponents, something had' 
to be done to quiet the opposition. Thus, arrangements 
were made to adjust these new "stop prices" every few 
years in order to avoid great discrepancies between "stop" 
and current world p r i c e s . F o r  the economist investigat-
X
8. Polaczek, Article in "Hotatnik Agi tatora", No. 17 
(1956).
2. Karaecki,J'. Sotdaczuk, '.7, Sierpinski, 0 0 . cit.
pp. 203-204.
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ting intra-bloc pricing methods, these formal criteria 
seemed too crude to deserve more detailed examination. 
Besides this, it is obvious that they form only the 
cover of the price boiling pan, and the clue to the pro- 
blem must be looked for inside. Several official state- 
ments and declarations^ play on the international 
working class solidarity, but this is only another veil 
to cover the real economic and political practices 
which stand behind the official "harmony of proletarian 
internationalism."
F. Pryor's and H. Menderhausen's^^studies in this 
field have very interesting material on real pricing 
methods and practices. They try to prove that prices are 
not "objectively set" but rather bargained in heated
X
XX
In 1956 Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish
United Workers party declared; "The mutual relations 
between the parties and states of the socialist camp., 
should be shaped on,the principle of international 
working class solidarity... on mutual confidence and 
equality of rights...on rational solution, arising 
from...the spirit of socialism on all controversial 
matters... this is how it should be and - I would say- 
this is how it is beginning to be." Cited by 2 inner 
ed. National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern 
Europe. New York: ' Columbia"University Press,1957, 
pp. '257-8.
F. Pryor,op. cit., Chapter V, 1;. Meindersliausen, Terms 
of Trade between the Soviet Union and Smaller Commu- 
nist Countries, 1955-7. Santa Monica, R'ahd Corporation 
Paper "January"18, 1959 and "The Terms of Soviet- 
Satellite Trade ; A Broadened^AhaTyFTsY^anta lionica, 
Eân3"lTôrporation Paper, P-T) 8Y3Y"1anT 7, I960.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 1
disputes where national interests, threars, questionable 
trade practices, political pressures, discrimination 
are intermingled and the participants employ every possible 
measure to achieve a stronger bargaining position.
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The political thaW which followed W. Gomulka's 
rise to power in October 195& cleared the way for the 
determination of the so-called "Polish route to Socialism" 
and for the Polish model" of a centrally planned economy. 
For the first time the wisdom of blindly imitating the 
Soviet development pattern began to be openly questioned 
and efforts were being directed towards development of 
a system which would be more suitable to the factor 
endowment and economic situation of the country, the 
latter was so strained that reforms were essential. As 
the result of a heavy,investment policy during the Six- 
Year Plan, several disproportions plagued the economy.
The industries created during the Six-Year Plan had been 
too material,intensive and ill-adopted to the resource- 
base of the country. In many instances they could not 
be operated at capacity because they depended heavily 
on imported raw materials which,in turn,were extremely 
difficult to provide because of the difficulty in the 
situation of foreign payments. The policy of "preferen­
tial growth of capital goods industries" began to show 
its effects. The situation in the balance of payments 
was strained and the rate of growth of the economy 
slowed down. In effect, foreign trade began to be the
X .
During the period 1951-1957 the average annual rate 
of growth of the economy was about 8.8 percent. It
fell down to 5 percent in 1958 and remained around
this level during the subsequent years in spite of 
many efforts to accelerate the role of growth of the
economy. A. Bodnar, op. cit., p. 13.
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lagging sector of the economy, and the main bottleneck 
in the economic development of the country.
While theoreticians were working on finding some 
criteria of profitability which would guide those who 
planned foreign trade policy and secure a more profitable 
flow of trade, a new foreign trade policy began to be 
introduced. The reforms which began in the early 1960's 
focused on the organizational side of the system of for­
eign trade. They aimed at-improving the country's situa­
tion in the balance of trade which was to be achieved by 
the policy of export promotion accompanied by the policy 
of "saving foreign currency" on the import side.
POLICY OF EXPORT PROMOTION
The Organizational reforms which took place in the 
early 1960's were designed to make the system of foreign 
trade more flexible and more responsible to the changing 
conditions of the world market. This in turn was expec­
ted to enable the possibility of obtaining a significant 
increase in the country's exports,
QUICK YIELDING INVESTMENTS
 ^ On August 19, i960 the Economic Committee at the 
Council of Ministers issued the decree which formulated 
a new investment policy with respect to foreign trade.^ 
The decree gave priority to investments in those indus-.
X
tP Niegowski, W. Rydygier in Polityka Gospodarcza 
Polski Ludowej, Vol. I, Op. cit., pl 6 3 0 .
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tries which were (or could) producing goods for exports, 
and made the Ministry of Foreign Trade responsible for 
the evaluation of the investment program from the point 
of view of export possibilities. As the Investment 
Program for the Five-Year Plan for I96I-I965 had already 
been formulated in June I960 the investment principles 
could not be fully utilized. Their role had to be 
limited to the révisai of the investment plan, to the 
introduction of changes and modifications where it was 
possible, and to the making of a new schedule for the 
beginning of new investments. Priority was given to 
those investments v/hich were designated to produce for export; 
In February 1962 the Political Bureau of the Polish 
United Worker's Party issued a decree recommending the 
preparation of a special investment program to aid in the 
development of export industries and in the construction 
of special warehouses for storing commodities designated 
for exporting^ Thé 'inveatmèat decisions were to be based 
on long-run export possibilities with the emphasis on 
those export productions which could be directed to 
markets with convertible currencies, and which would be 
based on domestic raw materials and semi-fabricates. 
Improvements in storing facilities, aimed to shorten the 
time needed for export deliveries. These improvements 
would also, make it possible to conclude trade deals 
when the conditions on the world market were most favour-
X
Ibid, p. 637,
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able (buying when prices were low and selling when it 
would be most profitable).
Secondly, in order to promote exports two special 
funds were established to finance the so-called "quick- 
yielding investments". The fund was established with 
foreign currency and was at the disposal of the Minister 
of Foreign Trade. It was designated to finance the 
purchases of foreign, machinery and equipment. More 
specifically, the fund was to be utilized for investments 
in those export industries where the return of the inves- 
ted outlays could take place within two years by export 
receipts or savings on imports. Additionally, it was 
required that undertaken investments should be highly 
profitable (eg. that they had good coefficients of 
efficiency). Priority was given to those investments 
which could produce for "difficult export markets" (mar- 
kets where the deficit in foreign payments was most 
severe). The other fund was established in domestic 
currency and designated to finance the purchase of 
domestic capital goods for investments in export indus­
tries. The appropriate credits were to be granted by two 
banks (Narodowy Bank Polski" and "Bank Inwestycyiny") on 
very favourable conditions but only on the recommendation 
of the foreign trade enterprises in question. The con­
ditions on which credit was granted were as follows:
a) investment had to be .completed) within 18 months
b ) the period of return for the Invested outlays could 
not be longer than three years.
EBSIÏI OF ffiïDSOB IIBLîSî
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IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PLANNING OF EXPORT PRODUCTION
As years of experience of centrally planned economies 
indicate, planning of foreign trade is much more diffi­
cult than planning in domestic sectors of the economy 
which are under the full control of the state.
Foreign trade involves contact with foreign markets 
which are independent of the planning authority but 
which at the same time condition fulfilment of the plan. 
Foreign trade, certainly, does not lend itself to the 
rigid planning methods applied in domestic economy and 
requires more elastic operational tools which permit 
quick and effective adjustment of the foreign trade plan 
to the changing conditions on the world market. For these 
reasons export and import plans had to be formulated with 
some range left for modifications and changes. However, 
the latter was only true with respect to foreign trade 
enterprises which were directly engaged in the conduct 
of foreign trade activity, while domestic enterprises 
producing for exports were subordinated to the discipline 
of internal planning. In the early 1960's, the policy 
makers became aware that in order to promote exports 
successfully the planning methods in industries and 
enterprises producing for exports must also be modified 
accordingly. Several measures have been taken in order 
to improve the planning process in export producing 
enterprises and industries. First of all, a number of 
enterprises or branches producing for exports only, 
have been excluded from the general system of domestic 
planning of production and covered by specially construe-
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ted export production plans. The planned goals in these 
plans were established less rigidly with the provisions 
made for necessary adjustments and modifications which 
could arise in the course of plan execution. Besides, 
special provisions have been made to secure the adequate 
supply of raw materials and semi-fabricates used in 
production. At the same time it has been envisaged that 
the planned wage fund and employment would be adjusted 
according: to the requirements of production processes.
The above mentioned measures however, could not be
fully applicable to enterprises producing for both domes-
tic and foreign markets. As the bulk of production of
these enterprises was directed to the domestic market,
they remained subject to the discipline of domestic
planning. With respect to that part of the production
which was designated for exports, arrangements have been
made to ease financial restrictions concerning surpassing
the planned wage fund and employment, and to secure the
adequate supply of materials used in export production
which were excluded from the normal system of planned
distribution. With respect to the latter it has been
suggested that funds for payments of urgently needed
imported rav/ materials could be drawn from the special
reserve fund established in foreign currency and given
Xto the disposal of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
X
The Decrees No. 106 and 108 of the Council of Ministers 
issued on March 27, 1962, Monitor Polski, No, 29, 1962.
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OTHER CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM OP FOREIGN TRADE
It has been recognized that a significant increase 
in exports could be obtained on the basis of existing 
production capacities, providing that several obstacles 
inherent in the institutional framework of the system of 
foreign trade were removed. The most important of these 
obstacles were:
1) The foreign trade monopoly, operated by a central plan, 
very rigid, and therefore unable to adjust quickly to 
changes in the world market. During the previous years 
attention had been focused on mobilizing a maximal supply 
of potentially exportable commodities. However, this 
meant that only half of the trade task had been performed. 
To promote trade successfully it is not enough to secure 
the supply of exportable commodities, it is also necessary 
to have the ability to sell them. This part of trade 
business was almost completely neglected by enterprises 
engaged in the conduct of foreign trade. There was no • 
market research, no advertisement, and none of the 
measures which form the basis of the contemporary sales 
promotion policy were utilized. In effect, trading en­
terprises had no information on what was going on in the 
world and their products were mostly unknown to their 
potential foreign buyers. Improvements which have been 
made in this respect include:
a) The Institute for Market Research attached to the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade wao established, It's main 
tasks were to conduct intensive market research, prepare 
market surveys and submit reports on concrete trade
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opportunities for the benefit of Polish exporters.
b) Similar tasks were assigned to the Bureau of Commercial 
Attache's attached to Polish Embassies abroad.
c) In cases where it was justifiable, foreign trade 
enterprises were granted the permission to have their 
own permanent representatives abroad. These representa­
tives would keep them informed on recent developments
in the market in question
d) Several steps have been taken in order to develop 
and improve the advertising media.
2) Separation of production and trade caused many conflicts 
of interests between PTE's and domestic manufacturing 
enterprises. The links between PTE's and their domestic 
partners were extremely weak. In many instances, domes­
tic producers found it very inconvenient to produce for 
exports. Their production targets included in economic 
plans, were very often exaggerated. The fulfillment of 
targets was often difficult as the requirements of foreign 
buyers with respect to quality, assortment or packing 
were higher than those of domestic buyers, In addition to 
this, the contact of domestic producers with foreign 
markets which would familiarize them with the most recent 
techniques, and production methods, and quality require­
ments was minimal. Changes in the system of planning of 
export production was the first step on the way of making 
export production better adjusted to current conditions 
prevailing on the world market. The links between PTE's 
domestic producers and the foreign market were strengthe­
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ned to some extent by the establishment of "Branch Commi­
ttees". Their tasks and role were already discussed in 
Chapter 2.. To repeat shortly, they were responsible for 
devising effective cooperation between producing and tra­
ding enterprises and informing the former on recent 
production methods and techniques used by leading foreign 
producers.
3) It has been recognized that some very important 
obstacles in successful trade were: poor quality of
exported commodities; inadequate packing and long 
delivery periods in addition to overdue delivery. Measure: 
which have been made in order to improve the discipline 
of export deliveries are as follows:
1) Decree issued by the Chairman of the Planning Commi­
ssion at the Council of Ministers formulated new General 
Conditions of Sale and Purchase,^ It envisaged that 
trade deals were to be negotiated between PTE’s and their 
domestic partners within the framework of General Condi­
tions of Sale and Purchase. (Once such a contract was 
negotiated it was binding by law).
2) The quality control of cormnodities designated for 
exports was considerably strenghtened and the apparatus 
of control extended. , First of all, two top agencies 
responsible for setting technical norms and quality 
standards, the Central Board of Engineering and the
X
The decree was issued on October 16, 1959 &nd replaced 
one issued on June 1, 1950. See, Monitor Polski, 
ur. 92/1959.
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Central Standarization Board (for staple commodities), 
were required to revise and raise, where necessary,"the 
existing quality standards and norms. Within this formal 
framework, the quality and technical control which was 
being exercised on two levels; namely
a) by experts of the producing enterprise
b ) by the apparatus of control subordinated to the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade ("Polcargo" and Central Stan­
dardization Board) was significantly improved and extended.
INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN TRADE
Besides the reforms which were introduced in order 
to improve the organization and the operational ability 
of the system of Foreign Trade some efforts have been 
made to evoke incentive and material interest of the 
personnel engaged in foreign trade activity. The achieve- 
ments in this field are by no means impressive; however, 
at least something has been done to stimulate the incentive 
of.the management and personnel by letting them share the 
financial benefits of better performance. In I960, in 
addition to the already existing "enterprise-fund"^
(fundusz zaktadowy), a system of bonuses was established 
to reward employees distinguished by achievements at work. 
The amount of bonuses granted depended on the financial 
results of the operation of the enterprise in question; 
the latter were evaluated on the base of fulfillment of
X
The "enterprise-fund" has been established in enter­
prises of the socialized sector from profits which 
they-were permitted to retain and was left at the dis- 
nosal of the enterorise.
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the planned goals and especially on the fulfillment of 
export plan targets.
In order to interest enterprises in undertaking the 
production for export, a price reform for exportable 
commodities was introduced in 1962.^ The reforms enabled 
manufacturing enterprises to set higher prices on export- 
able commodities than on those commodities for the domes­
tic market, in cases where production for export was more 
expensive and more time absorbing because of higher 
standards and quality requirements.
Higher prices received on export production made it 
possible for the enterprise to increase its total amount 
of profits. This, in turn, meant an increased "enterprise- 
fund" and more financial means to be distributed in 
bonuses and premia.
It is extremely difficult to assess to what extent 
the above measures were effective in stimulating incen­
tive and better performance and thus eased the task of 
export promotion. In general, it seems that their 
impact was of minimal significance and failed to bring 
any lasting improvement in exports. Polish literature 
on the subject usually blames the measures which were 
taken in order to stimulate incentives. It is pointed 
out that the criteria for granting premia and bonuses 
were wrong, full ,of gaps and shortcomings that the .-
X
The decree of the Council of ministers No. 55 issued 
on February 13, 1962 Monitor Polskl, No. 22. 1962.
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administrative procedure and legal regulations were 
inadequate and ineffective, it seems, however, that the 
clue to the problem lies somewhere else. The underlying 
principle of the system was to devise some tools which 
would connect financial results of the operation of the 
enterprise with the incentives stimulated by financial 
reward for good results. But, in the situation where 
cost and price structure are distorted, the evaluation 
of economic results of the activity of the enterprise 
can be very misleading and incorrect. This means, in 
turn that the evaluation of incentives leaves also much 
to be desired,
II SAVING FOREIGN CUER2NCY
The policy of export promotion was accompanied by 
the policy of elimination or decreasing of the volume of 
imports which were of lower priority or which could be 
replaced by domestic substitutes, in this way scarce 
amounts of foreign currency were being saved for high 
priority, indispensable imports and the deficit in the 
balance of trade, if not decreased, at least did not grow.
In the early 1960's the attention was focused on 
the revision of planned import demand. For this task 
special committees were established to analyze and esti- 
mate the degree of necessity of imports listed in the 
annual and long-term plans. During I960 these committees 
analyzed over 20,000 import proposals for a total value 
of approximately 1,900 million of exchange zlotys (about 
475 million $). The value of orders directed to domestic
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instead of foreign producers amounted to about 200 
million of exchange zlotys (approximately 50 million
In the course of revision of import requirements 
special emphasis has been placed on the elimination or 
diminishing of imports from those markets to which it 
was extremely difficult or impossible to increase exports 
ie. where the deficit in the balance of trade was most 
severe. At the same time Imports from markets where 
Poland?8 payment position was satisfactory have been 
considerably increased. It should be noted that the 
révisai of import plans was concerned only with re- 
examination of.import requirements for machinery and 
equipment and did not cover other commodity groups listed 
in the import plan. Besides this, the révisai was concer­
ned only with estimating the degree of usefulness or 
necessity of several imports. Many other questions 
important from the point of view of saving foreign 
currency were not taken into account. For example the 
re-examination of import plans did not include proper 
timing of import deliveries to match the investment cycle 
in order to avoid delays and to prevent too early deli­
veries which while not utilized still had to be paid for. 
It caused unnecessary "freezing" of scarce currency and 
incomplete utilization of imported productive capacity.
It has also been nointed out that several industries
J_. Niegowski, W. Rydygier, op. cit. p. 651.
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produced poor quality gooda as compared with their 
foreign competitors in spite of the fact that they were 
working with better quality and more expensive imported 
raw materials. However, domestic producers made every 
possible effort to avoid the utilization of lower quality 
raw materials in their productions. They had a very good
reason for it, as less efficient raw materials used in 
the production process could not be reconciled with 
existing technical norms, productivity requirements, 
planned employment and wage fund. . While the latter were 
not permitted to be overpassed the planned production goals 
had to be fulfilled. It seems clear that under the above 
circumstances the fulfillment of the planned production 
goals could be secured only if all other elements of 
the plan were modified accordingly, but this v/as not ;
always the case. Several attempts to solve the above 
problem have been made on the legislative level,^ To 
some extent they cleared the way for a more rational 
utilization of imported raw materials and set the produc­
tion targets and technical norms on a level more realistic 
and tenable in practice. However they were too limited 
in scope to exhaust all the possibilities which are or 
could be opened in this field.
X
The decrees which regulated these questions were: 
Decree No. 106 and Decree No. lOG issued by the 
Council of Ministers on March 27, 1962. :
See: Monitor Polski, No. 29, 1962.
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THE CONCEPT 0? THE EFFECTIVENESS 0? FOREIGN TRADE IN THE 
CENTRADIY PLANNED ECONOMY
"In the world socialist market, goods are exchanged 
at prices based on international value, there is no place 
for non-equivalent exchange in socialist foreign trade. 
That is why international socialist trade is mutually 
profitable and guarantees a saving of social labor to 
each trading country."^
The relaxation in the political climate which took 
place after Stalin's death, created a much more favourable 
environment for the economists to bring under discussion 
the supposed merits and demerits of the existing economic 
system. The animated re-examination of previously un- 
questionable "socialist economic laws" proceeded in a 
rather particular way. The political changes did not go 
BO far as to permit the economists to question the 
"self righteousness" of Karxist-Ieninist orthodoxy which 
still ruled supreme. However, the economists were given 
some range for more diversified interpretation of these 
rules which began to be twisted in innumerable ways in 
order to make them more applicable to the problems of 
real economic life.
This doctrinal thaw brought the recognition of 
foreign trade as.a vital sector of the economy and raised 
the proDlem of the efficiency of a centrally planned
X
G. Shagalov, The Economic Efficiency of the Socialist 
Countries Foreign Trade,
Problems of_Eçanami&&, December 19o5, Vol. 8, No, 8, 
"p."5U.
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economy and efficiency of foreign trade.
The investigation of foreign trade profitability 
within the overall economic framework was initiated by 
Hungarian economists; J. hiska and A. Harias in the 
journal Kozgazdasagi Szemke in 1954^7 Shortly thereafter 
the problem began to be examined in C8RR and in Poland 
and in 1956-57 was discussed at three all-Bloc conferen- 
ces. Polish contribution to the all-Bloc debates on 
efficiency, seems to deserve special attention because' 
of the relatively higher degree of sophistication of the 
theoretical examinations and as being much freer of Marxian, 
dogmatism.
Since mid-1950's, increasingly the strained situation 
in Poland's balance of payments was calling for "essen­
tial" reforms in the system of foreign trade. The n ew 
political leadership which emerged in 1956 finally 
recognized that the Soviet born method of physical balan­
cing of "material balances" was completely inadequate as 
a criterion for trade and realized that no improvement 
can be expected without basing the system on a "sound 
economic calculation". This raised the problem of the 
profitability of trade.
The theoreticians started by drawing a distinction 
between the profitability of each foreign trade transac-
X
J. Liska, A. Marias, Effectiveness and the Interna- 
tional Division of labour. East European Economics, 
Summer 1963, Vol. 1 No. 4. translation from Kozqaz- 
dasagi Szemle, 1954, No. 1.
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tion and the over-all profitability or "effectiveness" 
of foreign trade. The former was disregarded as irre­
levant for the "socialist economy", where the over-all eco­
nomic considerations must always go before the interests 
of individual enterprise.^
This micro-economic approach to the problem of 
effectiveness caused a great deal of difficulties not 
only in finding some satisfactory yard-stick for measuring 
effectiveness, but first of all made it extremely 
difficult to define the exact meaning of effectiveness.
The usual practice for Bloc economists in such a 
case is to look for guidance in Marxian writings, but the 
Marxian definition expressed in highly abstract terms 
certainly did not help in this particular problem, and 
brought a lot of confusion. According to Marx "effec­
tiveness is a method whereby certain results are achieved 
by minimum allocation of r e s o u r c e s " , A s  hiska and 
harias explain, allocation means the sum of total social 
labour assigned to the commodity, and results mean the 
maximal fulfilment of the needs of society, the most 
important index of which is the constant rise of national 
income.
^ A, Rolow.Rachunek efektywnosci w handlu zagranicznym. 
(ProfitabiTitv Calculation in Foreign Trade)' "Warsaw 
P. W. G., I960; p. 9.
J. Liska and M. Marias, op. cit., quotation from 
Das. Kapital, Hungarian edition vol. Ill, p. 114,
Op. cit., p. 3.
XX
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Effectiveness in foreign trade is thus a relative 
concept: it is a ratio of total expenditure of social
labour assigned to.the exported commodities to the total 
use-value of imports which secures maximal rate of growth 
of national income. Even disregarding Marxian distinction 
between the use-value and value-in-exchange (labour-value), 
the problem involves more than quantitative comparison 
between the costs and the revenue from exports and expen­
ditures on imports. Besides the quantitative effect which 
this ratio would express, there are some qualitative 
aspects of the problem, such as the usefulness of the 
several exports and imports for the national economy, 
its impact on the rate of technical progress, employment pre­
ferred structure and the distribution of national income.
All of them would finally find reflection in the obtained 
rate of growth of national income.% For many of these
XX
elements quantitative assessment is practically impossible. 
Thus, the discussion on effectiveness had to confine 
ifsclf to those elements which could be expressed in 
quantitative terms. Even here, the problem of finding 
the adequate criteria for estimating the degree of effec- ' 
tiveness of different import and export structures proved 
to be very troublesome. To start with, the economists
x; .
Z. Kajfiecki, J. Soldaczuh, It. Sierpinski, op. cit., o. 518.
"It is clear that thereafter we need a whole system of 
indices that could reflect diiferent asoects of economic 
effectiveness and serve as a basis for multi-faceted 
enialysis." V. terelfiov; V. ohcistitko, lnte:?nc.ti.on,al 
Socialist Division of labour (Criteria of Effectiveness) 
hroblem.s o.i Eco.ror:ics, Nov. luck, Vol. VII, No. 7.
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trying to grapple rigorously with the theoretical problems 
of efficiency of foreign trade had no single guide line to 
rely on as the "pure theory of foreign trade for a 
socialist economy" does not exist.
Several efforts to develop the theory of internatio­
nal trade along Marxian lines stopped on the avid 
discussions of "equivalent trade" measured by the amount 
of "simple labour embodied in the exchanged commodities, , 
Marxian distinction between "international and national 
value" brought additional confusion to this theorizing 
and led some economists to the absurd conclusions that 
international trade, while equivalent when expressed in 
terms of international value is not equivalent from the 
point of view of national values. The old economic 
principle of "comparative advantage" expressed by Ricardo 
in the 19th century proving that "non-equivalent" trade 
can also be beneficial for both trading countries, was 
completely forgotten in these discussions. On the other 
hand it seems that "Western economic theory" has nothing 
to offer to the "Bloc economists" working hard to find some 
firm ground for their "effectiveness" research.
I We can easily disregard several statements of the 
economists of the "Stalinist era" of the Prumkin kind, 
describing "western" foreign trade theory as.."vulgar,
X
M. liorovitG, Problème Economics, No. 4, 1958 pp. 10-20. 
quoted by F, Pryor, Foreign Trade theory in the 
Communist Bloc, Soviet Studies, Vol. 14, July 1962,
p. 55
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pseudo-scientific, reactionary foreign trade theory 
disseminated by bourgeois economists...(to) serve as 
theoretical basic for the Western discriminatory foreign 
trade policy towards the socialist countries"" - for the 
same reason of being unscientific. This statement does 
not, of course represent the point of view of all Bloc- 
economists. What is more important, since the middle 
1950*8 , the Ricardian principle of comparative advantage, 
began to be discussed in Bloc economic literature and 
was formally approved. Elaborated by CEMA in 1962 the 
"principles of international socialist division of 
labour" mention the comparative advantage as a criterion 
for the specialization of production and trade within 
CEMA.^^ At the same time, it has been pointed out, that 
the principle has a limited usefulness for foreign-trade 
policy making because of its short-run and static cha­
racter.^^^The criticism seems to be justified but 
certainly this is not the most important point.
X
XX
A. Frumkin, The Insolvency of Bourgeois Foreign Trade 
Theory. Problems of Economics, No. 12, 1959, p. 58.
Zasady Micdzynarodowego socjalistycznego podzialu 
pracy RWPG. (Principles of International Socialist 
Division of Labour), Handel Zagraniczny, Nn. 7, 1962 
p p .  3 I 8 - 3 2 4 .  : ------------------------------------------------------------
2. Kamecki, j. Soldaczuk, W. Sierpinski, op. cit. p. 125, 
p. Mine, Gosrodarka Planov/a, No. 11, 1958.
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As expressed by Y. Wilczynski: "The theory is simply
incompatible with the modus operandi of a centrally 
planned econo m y , T h e  reason for this is that the 
theory in all of its/versions refers to differentials 
in "real" or opportunity costs and these are untraceable 
in economies'where the market mechanism is absent. 
Socialist prices certainly do not reflect economic . 
values on the microlevel and on the macro-level reflect 
the planner's preferences rather than the "value to the 
society". Distorted domestic price system, unreliability 
of the rates of exchange and the lack of vigorous foreign 
trade theory are the main obstacles to the meaningful 
^effectiveness calculation".
In Poland, both economic theoreticians and foreign 
trade practitioners became deeply involved in the exami­
nation of the effectiveness of foreign trade. The problem 
has. been extensively discussed in the economic literature 
while at the same time three economic institutions have 
been preoccupied’ in research in this field. These 
institutions are;
1) The. Commission for the Distribution of Productive 
,Forces vt attached to the Polish Academy of Science .
2i) The Institute for Scientific Research at the 
Planning Commission
3) The Institute for Economic Research - attached to the
X
J, Wilczynski, The Theory of Comparative Costs and 
Centrally Planned Economies, Economic Journal, Vol. 75, 
'March 1965, p, 64.
^  J , Wilczynski, op, cit., p. 69.
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Ministry of Foreign Trade,
Their task was to elaborate a system of indices of econo­
mic effectiveness of foreign trade which would permit 
determination of which commodities can be most profitably 
produced for exchange on foreign markets and which should 
be purchased abroad, , .
The research proceeded along two main lines:
A) Static "analysis of the effectiveness of foreign 
trade which included analysis of
1) the effectiveness of exports
2) the effectiveness of imports
3) the over-all effectiveness of foreign trade
B) Efficiency of investments from the point of view of 
foreign trade. Both approaches to the effectiveness 
probleim will be briefly examined,
II EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN TRADE - STATIC APPROACH
A) Effectiveness of Exports,
' ■/• The analysis in this respect is conducted on the
assumption of the given productive capacities of the
economy, and therefore can be relevant only for a short- 
period of time. It is concerned with finding the guide 
lines for the current operational and planning problems 
of foreign trade. This has been done by constructing 
a number of foreign trade efficiency coefficients, all 
of them designed to measure the relative advantage of 
different exports and imports from the standpoint of the 
economy as a whole rather than from the point of view of
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an individual exporter or importer. So far the greatest 
progress has been made in devising various indices of 
effectiveness of exports. Profitability of exports 
was approached from the cost side and the coefficients 
were devised to measure "the saving of social labour."
However, in the conditions of the distorted domestic 
price system, the estimation of the "social labour costs 
of production" is a difficult problem. Generally speaking 
all the proposed coefficients of export efficiency 
compare domestic costs or prices with foreign prices, and 
differ in the formula for "purification" of domestic 
costs or prices in order to obtain a closer approximation 
to the amount of "social labour" embodied in the commodity 
in question. The first and most crude coefficient of 
export efficiency the so-called "financial coefficient 
of efficiency" (kurs wynikowy finansqwoy-Kwf) was intro- 
duced by foreign trade practitioners in 1952; that is 
before the problem of effectiveness began to be widely 
discussed by economists.
The coefficient compares the export receipts obtained 
with the domestic price of the goods;
where C = domestic wholesale price of the commodity
M - domestic portion of marketing costs
Oz= average export price in foreign currency 
(f.o.b.)
- !
^ Rolow, A,, op. cit., p « 21,
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It indicates how many units of domestic currency must be 
spent to obtain one unit of foreign currency. The lower 
the value of the coefficient, the higher is the profita­
bility of a given export. The compilation of this 
coefficient is very simple, but on the other hand its 
reliability is highly questionable because of the dis­
tortion of the domestic price system.
2) Gross Foreign Exchange Coefficient of Export Efficiency
#*11 i«n.«mi#niii|i| I iiii'n I mil iin«i iMiiiim i    iT i !■      iniim     i^rmrZa iii. n.-.iiiii i w ii.i nni«.»i ■inium n «iwn iinrii ««**«#*»
(kurs wynikowy brutlo)
The coefficient relates domestic costs of production 
of the exportable commodity to foreign exchange receipts:
_ E + M
™  e x " — UT"
where:* K = the average cost of production plus
domestic transportation costs 
M = domestic protion of marketing costs
Replacing the domestic price by the production costs 
Improved to some extent the reliability of, the coeffi­
cient, especially in cases where the mark-up element 
(high turnover taxes in consumer's goods sector etc) was 
significant and caused wide discrepancy between the price 
and production costs. However, the latter is only true 
with respect to the last stage of the production process. 
The cost of production is being calculated on the basis 
of prices of rav/ materials or semi-fabricates used in 
production. If the prices of these factors of production 
are distorted they are transmitted automatically to the 
calculation of production costs in the intermediate stages
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of production.
3) The Net Foreign Exchange Ooefficieht of export Effi- 
clency/ (kurs wynikowy netto) KWN 
In this index account is taken of the import content 
of component materials on which foreign currency has been 
spent.
where: K = cost of production plus domestic transporta-
. tion costs
iM = Value of imported materials used for produc­
tion in domestic currency at domestic prices
ipi M z= Value in foreign currency at world market/-,
• prices of imported materials used in pro­
duction,
M = domestic portion of marketing costs.
The coefficient focuses in determination of "net gain" 
from trade in terms of foreign exchange. By elimination 
of the costs of imported raw materials or semi-fabricates 
from both the numerator and denominator of the ratio, 
the KWN index tries to determine whether from purely 
foreign currency point of view it pays to export commo­
dities of produced materials from imported materials.
More elaborated versions of the coefficient make allowan­
ce for the possible loss of foreign currency where some 
domestic but potentially exportable materials are used in 
the production process. Some try to determine to what 
extent further processing of exportable commodities is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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worthwhile from the point of view of earning additional
Xforeign currency.
This group of coefficients has one positive feature. 
They can reveal some of the most striking irrationalities 
in fdreign trade. For example, they would indicate the 
situations where export is absolutely unprofitable 
because the cost of imported raw materials is not covered 
by foreign currency receipts obtained from exports of 
commodities which include these raw materials, or situa­
tions where it pays better to export raw materials than 
final products. However they are not free of any other :
DOCshortcomings of previously presented coefficients.
' In order to widen the profitability check on exports 
two auxiliary coefficients were introduced;
1) The Coefficient of Material Intensity of Exports 
, This coefficient is the ratio of costs of : materials 
used in production and expressed in foreign currency, to
X
XX
Ibid, pp. 43-51.  ^:
For extensive discussion on the usefulness and short­
comings of these coefficients see;
M. Rakowski, Z problemow badan efektywnosci produkcji 
exportowej (On problems of Examination of the Effec­
tiveness of Export Production) Gospodarka Planowa 
No, 2, 1957.
J. Najnigier, W sprawle urealhienia oraz poglabie- 
nia racaunku 1 metody badanla efeKtyvmosoi wymlany 
towarowej z zagranica (On improvement of Calculations 
and Methods of Examination of Effectiveness of .Commo­
dity Exchange with Abroad) Gospodarka Planowa. No. 1 
1960. " .
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the foreign market price of the commodity.
WMz =
where: Mz - foreign exchange value of all component
, materials used in export production 
Gz - average export price in foreign currency
The coefficient shows the "material cost" of obtaining 
one unit of foreign currency. The value of the coeffi­
cient cannot exceed 1,
0 = WMz = 1
Wtïz ' = 1 is a limit which indicates that a given export 
transaction is already unprofitable as it compensates 
only for the expenditure of the materials used in its 
production, but does not cover other production costs.
2) The Foreign Exchange Coefficient of Labour Intensity.
This index has been devised to show more clearly 
the "value added" by labour over and above the value of 
materials used in production. It determines the amount 
Of "net gain" (in terms of foreign exchange) obtained 
from spending one unit of foreign currency on materials 
used in the production of an exportable commodity.
X
X
For a detailed analysis of this coefficient see 
A, Rolow, Efektywnosc eksportu - metody badania (effec­
tiveness of Exports - Methods of Examination), zycie 
Gospodarcze, uv, 24, 1958.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
where : Mz.= foreign exchange value of materiale used
in production 
Cz - average export price in foreign currency 
M^z ~ value of imported materials used for
production (in foreign currency at world 
market prices) . ,
Poland's natural resources are rather limited (with the 
exception of coal and sulphur) while the rate of growth 
of the population is high. Thus, it would be desirable 
to direct export production to those branches and 
processes which are less material intensive and more 
labor intensive. The employment of the index of labour 
intensity is the first step in this direction.
II IMPORT EFFICIENCY STUDIES
As compared with the investigation of problems of 
export efficiency, the study of the efficiency of imports 
has' been relatively neglected. Besides, these two inter­
related problems were handled in different ways. The latt­
er stems directly from the Marxian theory of value and his 
distinction between value-in-use and value-in-exchange.
The aim of exports is to maximize the value-in-exchange 
while the ultimate goal of imports is the maximization 
of the value-in-use. Accordingly, the effectiveness of 
exports was approached primarily from the supply side 
(production costs side) while the'demand side was decisive 
in the determination of import requirements.
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The second reason for this situation, is found in 
the very system of central planning. In soyeral instances 
import requirements are determined rigidly by the over­
all economic plan and condition, its implementation^or 
are designated to remove some serious bottleneck in the 
economy. When import demand is inelastic, profitability 
considerations are certainly less important.
Thirdly, the calculation of import profitability 
coefficients is much more difficult as several imported 
commodities are not produced at home and therefore no 
comparable costs data are available.
: ,j : ■Generally speaking, the basic coefficients of import 
efficiency have the same (or very similar) formula .as 
export coefficients. Their number is smaller and not 
all versions of export coefficients have corresponding 
import coefficients. .
1) Financial coefficient of import efficiency,
_ The coefficient compares expenditure on purchase of 
foreign commodities (in foreign currency) with its domes­
tic price.
where:
G - domestic wholesale price of the commodity 
M - domestic marketing costs 
Cz- average import price paid expressed in 
foreign currency 
' From the formal point of view, the higher value of
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the coefficient indicates the higher profitability of 
imports. This is not always true, because of the diffe­
rent methods applied in pricing producer ■ and consumer ^ ' 
goods. As a result, the coefficients of import profita­
bility of these two groups are entirely incomparable.
What is more, even within more narrow commodity groups, 
the coefficients are highly misleading. Luxurious or 
low priority commodities usually have a high coefficient 
which would suggest high profitability in these imports; 
while raw materials and machinery have low coefficient of 
profitability, which indicates that they should be eli­
minated from imports,
2) Gross Foreign Exchange Efficiency of Import Substi­
tution
In this index, the domestic costs of production of 
imports substituting commodities are compared with its 
foreign market price
- K V / B . „ p  =  1 ^ 1
where:
K - average costs of production of import substi­
tuting commodity 
Cz^“ average import price (in foreign currency) 
of the commodity (c.i.f)
The coefficient'has a similar character to the Gross 
Foreign Exchange Coefficient of Export Efficiency 
(KWB exp) .presented previously;, and the same short­
comings.
Substituting domestic prices by domestic costs of
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production, causes the price differential between pro­
ducers and consumers goods to be partially eliminated 
but only in the final stage of the production process,
3) Net Foreign Exchange Efficiency of Import Substitution 
The coefficient is designed to determine foreign 
exchange efficiency of imports at different stages of 
processing,
™  imp - Mz =
where; Kp = K - M - cost of processing 
while. K = average cost of production of import
substituting commodity 
M = value of materials used to produce a unit 
of commodity at domestic prices
oDn - "net saving" of foreign currency resulting from a 
given production process of import substituting 
• commodity defined as the difference between:
1Cz' - average impOrt price of the commodity in 
foreign currency 
Mz - value of materials used in production at 
foreign trade prices in foreign currency,
A low value of the coefficient indicates a high "saving 
of foreign currency" obtained on production of an import^ 
substituting commodity and at the same time a low effi­
ciency of import of the commodity in question,^
X
For detailed analysis see A, Rolow, Rachunek -Ekonomi- 
.czmy w handlu zagranieznym, op. cit, pp. 77-84.
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.SOME THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN PROEITA- 
' BILITY.CALCULATION.
The calculation of coefficients of foreign trade 
efficiency presents several difficult problems which 
from the first observation seem to be of technical ^
character but cannot be removed without rigorous analyti­
cal investigation of their theoretical basis. Domestic 
costs of production play a very important role; in several 
formulae or versions of the efficiency coefficients. Most 
often the average production cost is used for these 
purposes. But the average production costs differ in 
various production enterprises.
Therefore, the question arises as to what average 
cost of production should be taken for the effectiveness 
calculation. The weighted average cost of production 
of the industry would be relevant if all enterprises 
within the industry produced for exports. But this is 
rather a exceptional case. The following example will 
help to, illustrate the problem,^ .
x f  h  . . '
„ ,For example, according to the M, Fiszel estimates, 
the average variable cost of production of sulphuric 
- acid in three different plants were ; p.
312,58 zl per ton, 413,36 and 562,80 el per tona 
respectively,
M, Fiszel, Zagadnienia cen i rachunku ekonomicznego 
(Problems of Prices and EconomIc""naTcuIa?r0nT"FWlf, 
Warsaw, 1958, pp. 157-158.
XX It was presented by A, Rolow, op, cit., pp. 89-90,
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Assume that a given commodity is produced by four 
plants only. The Gross Foreign Exchange Coefficient' of 
Export Efficiency for the industry would have the follo­
wing formula;
KWB r = + %3 ^3 + %4 %4 K
ex — -y-—-"-PT"-——-r"""""——ÿT"-''-"—    ~
Cz (q + q H- q 1 q^) Cz
where: K^, Kg, K3 , K. are average costs of production
in these plants.
0 2* 9 3* 94 “ quantities produced
Cz - average import price paid, expressed in 
foreign currency
The data are:
Plant 1 - = 100 zl, p Qj = 1000 units KWB^ = 10 zl/$
Plant 2 - Kg = 90 zl,  ^qg = I5OO units KWB^ = 9 zl/$
Plant 3 - K? = 90 zl,  ^ = 1500 units KWB^ = 9 zl/$
Plant 4 - K, = 80 zl,  ^q^ = 3000 units KWB^ = 8 zl/$
The Foreign trade price of the commodity is 10$.
The average cost of production of the industry is about 
87 ^1,
and D7 «1
KWB. . = = 8i7 zl/$
Thus the average coefficient of effectiveness of exports ' 
of the commodity is 8,7 zl/$.
Assume now that only plant 4 is producing for export, 
while the other plants produce for the domestic market.
In this case the coefficient KV/B^  - 8 zl/$ NS relevant.
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It seems that analysis in marginal cost terms rather
than in average cost terms would be proper for these
X -
purposes.
As F. Pryor remarks - "if only average costs are 
used in the cost calculations for the coefficients, then 
some sort of "scarcity rent" should be added to the basic 
production cost of goods to take demand factors into
XX
account."
!Phe other gap which F. Pryor points out in this ' 
analysis is the absence of any type of interest change 
on capital which should be added to the production costs.
XXX
X
.This approach to the problem would indirectly stem 
from "the theses of Economic Council" in the Polish 
price debate. Go called "prices of departure" were 
based on AVC of the relevant group of "highest cost 
enterprises in the industry. From this position there 
is only one step to marginality.
XX '
F. Pryor, Foreign Trade theory in the Communist Bloc. 
Soviet Studies, Vol. 14, 1962, p. 48. According to 
Pryor ^one notable exception" in this case was the ' 
article by Polish economist F, Drabowski in Gospodarka 
Planowa, ho. 1, p. 79, I did not see the article.
XXX
Ibid, p .  49.
It should be noted that this element is taken into 
account in the "dynamic approach" to the problem of 
effectiveness of foreign trade.
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The scarcity of capital element is missing in this cal­
culation, A similar problem presents the rate of depre­
ciation of capital. This element is Included in the 
calculation of production costs. However the practice 
of establishing the rate of depreciation on an unreaso­
nably low level, put into doubt the reliability of cost 
calculation. It should be recalled here that the entire 
cost calculation leaves much to be desired. The elimina­
tion of some irrational elements which is being done in 
the final stage of production before entering the foreign 
trade profitability "check-up", cleans only' the surface 
of cost structure, leaving the whole inside untouched. 
Obviously, the depreciation element does contribute to 
the distortion of the cost structure, but is not the ; 
most important contributor. As A, Rolow points out, 
during the period 1951-1954 the average share of depre­
ciation in industrial production costs was somewhat about 
3 percent, and the differentials in Gross and Net Foreign 
Exchange Coefficients in many instances ran in the 
hundreds percent,^ This seems to suggest that the filling- 
of the small gaps in the costs calculation does not help 
too much when the whole analysis of effectiveness is 
very questionable,
B, The second building bloc in the coefficient formulas 
is the average foreign trade price. The problem is to
X
Ibid, p. 115.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
138
■ determine what world market price should be used to 
compare with the domestic "social labour cost of produc- 
tion and how this price should be a v e r a g e d " . ^
Prices for the same commodity differ with respect 
to the specific foreign market or currency in which pay­
ment is effected. For example: the unit price for
1 ton of acetylene exported Cf.o.b. in exchange zlotys) 
to Iran was - 261 to Egypt - 286 to Hungary-355, to 
Turkey - 524. Prices obtained from export of colophony 
were: (in exchange zlotys per ton) to Syria - 700,
to England - 763, to Austria - 826.^^ These differences 
are too significant to be neglected. But on the other 
hand, the question arises whether these prices are com-- 
parable:. Judging from the method of their computation 
they are hot compared. . An exchange zloty (or 
accounting money unit) price is derived by multiplying 
the foreign currencies in question by a rigid and arbi­
trary rate of exchange. It seems to be obvious that the 
purchasing power of one exchange zloty obtained from 
export in British market is not equal to the purchasing 
power of one exchange zloty obtained in the Egyptian 
market.*^* Further, as has been pointed out in the Bloc 
discussion on foreign trade price formation for several
The problem was controversial in the Bloc debate on the
principles of foreign trade price formation.
^  Quoted by A. Rolow, op. cit., p. 117.
^*^Froblem was discussed by B. Najniger, op. cit, pp. 28-29,
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individual differentiated commodities (many types of 
machinery and equipment fall into this category), the
world market price does not exist. What price should be 
then applied?
2) Trade with several countries is based on bilateral 
clearing agreements. An absolute differential in prices 
may be somewhat misleading in these circumstances. For 
example, it is possible that export prices obtained in 
trade with a given country are higher than those on 
another market. But at the same time, the prices paid 
for import are also higher. This would suggest that the 
"terms of trade" element should be somehow built into 
the formula of the effectiveness coefficient.^
3. The same difficulties exist in the estimation of
the value of imported raw materials or import substitu­
ting commodities in foreign currency prices. Proper 
calculation of these costs is of enormous importance for 
the calculation of net foreign exchange coefficients of 
effectiveness.
4. There is a statistical problem as to how the movements 
of world market prices should be handled in the compu­
tation of foreign trade profitability coefficients. Thé 
main difficulty is caused here by the separation of domes­
tic and foreign trade prices. For example; the increase 
of export prices for cotton fabrics was caused by the
X
b A, Rolow, Niektore zagadnienia rachunku efektywnosci 
eksportu, (Some problems of calculation of effecti­
veness of exports) Handel Z'agranic.zny, No. 2 / 1957.
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increase of prices for cotton on the world market.
Thus, the import of cotton is now more expensive, however 
this is not reflected in the domestic price of cotton 
which remains unchanged (principle of stability of 
domestic prices). The domestic cost of production of 
cotton fabrics is not affected however, ’the ■higher 
export price of cotton fabrics would indicate that the 
profitability of these exports increased. If the increa­
se in price of cotton was greater than the increase in 
the price of cotton fabrics the profitability of this 
export could in fact decrease instead of being increased.
.Several other theoretical or methodological objec­
tions against the coefficients of efficiency of foreign 
trade may be raised. Without going too far into the 
details of this analysis, some attention should be devo­
ted to another interesting contribution to research on 
effectiveness of foreign trade,
Pf■ Concept of the Limiting the Rate of Foreign Trade
Profitability 
'_*■ As has been mentioned already, the coefficients 
of efficiency have a relative character. They can 
provide answers to some specific questions of choice 
with regard to the commodity structure of foreign trade; 
more specifically they can, for example, indicate that 
the export of commodity "a" is more profitable as compa­
red with the export of commodity "b" but, in general, 
they fail to provide any absolute measure of profitabili^
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iy. This means that they would not indicate that both 
exports are entirely unprofitable for the economy. In 
other words, some additional device is necessary to 
indicate what is the critical value of the coefficient 
beyond which all transactions are unprofitable and should 
not take place. This is the idea of the so-called 
^limiting rate of foreign exchange" introduced by M. 
Ealecki and St. Polaczek.^ The limiting rate of 
foreign exchange was primarily designated as ah/auxi- 
liary device for pricing raw materials. The reasoning 
was as follows: given the price and wage levels, it is 
possible to determine the ceiling for the prices of raw 
materials in relation to their foreign market prices.
This ceiling value of domestic raw material prices defi­
ned las the ratio of these prices:to the world market 
prices was called the "limiting rate".
X . ,
According to A. Rolow some of the coefficients pro­
vide also an absolute measure of profitability.
... He mentions; KWH, WMz, WPz, As he does not explain 
"p 'this I do not exactly understand what is the proof 
for this statement. A. Rolow, op. cit., p.:164.
XX M. Kalecki, St. Polaczek, Uv/agi w sprawie metody 
ustalania cen surowcow podstawowych. (On methods 
of formation of prices of basic raw materials). 
Gospodarka Planowa, No, 4. 1957. For an interesting 
: : .analysis see: P. Glikman, St. Polaczek, Efektywnoso
handlu zagranicznego i kurs .maxymalmy, (Effectiveness 
of Foreign Trade and the Limiting Rate of Foreign 
Exchange) Gospodarka Planowa, No. 5, 1959.
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The formula for the limiting rate of foreign exchange 
is the following:
Kmax = 
where : a=
A p  - increase of that prrfcion of the wage fund 
which is spent on consumption goods (inde­
pendent variable)
A m - increase in the production of consumption 
goods (in value terms) induced by the 
increase in the wage fund (dependent varia­
ble)
S- value of imported or exportable raw materials
contained in each 100 zlotys of increase
of the value of the production of consump­
tion goods.
For practical purposes, the computation of the formulas 
for coefficients "a" and "s" has been simplified.
"A" was defined as the ratio of the wage fund in the
consumers goods sector (F) to the total value of consu­
mers goods at domestic prices (M) or 
F
* = M.
and coefficient "s" according to the formula
8 - § .100
where S - value of imported or exportable materials
used in the production of the consumers goods
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sector at foreign exchange prices.
M - total value of consumer's goods at
domestic prices in domestic currency 
Computed according to this method, the limiting rates of
■V*
foreign exchange were; 
for 1955 - 56 zl/$
1957 - 59 zl/$
1958 - 69 zl/$
The Jifferences in the value of the limiting rate in 
different years were explained by:
a) changes in domestic and foreign trade prices
b) changes in the structure of domestic production and 
wages.
In the light of this analysis, export of a consumer’s 
commodity which in 1955 had the coefficient of efficiency 
higher than 56 zl/$ was absolutely unprofitable and 
could only increase the deficit in the balance of trade
instead of decreasing it. Further research along these
lines seems to be promising and can provide the policy 
makers with a useful yardstick for their foreign trade 
decisions. Major difficulties in this research lie on 
the technical side as the computational burden of these 
calculations is very heavy. It is expected, however, that 
new techniques combined v/ith high-speed mechanized com­
puters would be able to handle the problem.
P. Glikman, St, Polaczek op, cit., p, 33.
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E. OVER-ALL EFFICIENCY OP FOREIGN TRADE
The above outlined methods of measuring the effec­
tiveness of foreign trade have another fundamental short­
coming. There is no link between the efficiency of 
exports and efficiency of imports which are treated sepa­
rately. Further, the elaborated coefficients apply 
only to particular commodities or groups of related 
commodities « In effect, they are detached from the 
general context of the economic life of the country.
On the other hand, the economic efficiency of foreign 
trade.is an integral part of the over-all efficiency of 
the economic system, and the structure of foreign trade 
must fit the structure of the economy. In a centrally 
planned economy, even in the short-run planning, the 
number of decisions which planners have to make number 
in thousands. If planners have a choice of a whole 
variety of commodities which can be exported or imported 
a number of markets where this trade can be directed, and 
in addition many different production processes for many 
different commodities, the problem of determining the 
pattern of trade which would meet the efficiency condi­
tion becomes extremely difficult. The existing coeffi­
cients are hardly useful for these purposes, and with 
the lack of more sophisticated methods, the planners 
have to rely on their intuition. But efficiency resul­
ting from intuition is pure chance. It has been recogniz­
ed! that for the purposes of plan construction, a combined 
and synthetic analysis of exports and imports efficiency 
is indispensable.
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Starting with a given complex of conditions (limi­
ting factors; labour force, lower and upper limits'of 
production and marketing) and taking into account basic 
technological and economic interdependencies, together 
with the consequences of alternative uses of the limited 
factors of production, there is an enormous•Variety of 
possible export, import and production variants relating 
to foreign trade. Among these ample possibilities an 
"optimal pattern of foreign trade is looked for; for 
example, one that ensures maximization of national income 
o'oupled'. of with a balanced state budget. It seems ob­
vious that the large number of variables subject to the 
decision making, produce an immensely involved system 
where the "optimal solution" is practically unattainable 
with present facilities.
Such a "synthetic" model of foreign trade efficiency 
was proposed by a Polish economist W. Trzeciakowski 
The model is constructed with the aid of input-output 
analysis and a linear programming technique.
W. Trzeciakowski, Model optymalizaeji biezloej polityki 
kierunkowej w handlu zagranicznyra (À Model of the 
Current Optimization of the Directions of Foreign 
Trade) Gospodarka Planowa, No. 8-9, I960.
For EngTTsri translation see: W. Trzeciakowski. A
model of optimization of foreigh trade in a Planned 
Economy and its Application). Regional Science Asso­
ciation: Papers vol. 8, 1962. âïïalffT^TiaszczynsloTT*'
W. Trzeciakowski, Efficiency Prices and Economic 
Calculation in Foreign Trade, Structure and Directions 
of Foreign Trade, Regional Science Association: Papers 
X, Lurich C o n g r e s s 2, Vol. 10, 19^31
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Given the limitations of:
1) production factors and constraints arising'from 
policy postulates
2) technological interdependencies (Leont ief's matrix!^
,a syste® of equations and inequalities is constructed.
Solving the system, a number of equilibrium prices are
derived which secure an optimal trade pattern.
Characterizing this model A. Zauberman remarks;
"in perfect and generalized form it brings to 
its ultimate conclusions the logic of the,
Kalecki - Polaczek limiting rate. The price 
of a final good (and the derived prices of the 
intermediate goods) would lie somewhere between 
the celling and a floor. These would be set by 
foreign market prices translated into domestic 
currency at the limiting efficiency rate; 
beyond these critical values competing imports 
and exports would become uneconomical and within 
.them the inter-enterprise bidding, real or on the 
planner’s desk could pinpoint the equilibrium 
price. XX b
The model throws an interesting light on the question 
as to how in the centrally planned economy where automa­
tic market mechanism is absent, the problem of effecti­
veness of foreign trade can be approached on theoretical 
grounds. However, at present, an economic research in 
this field has not passed the phase of creating theoreti-
X
This is basically A. Zauberman interpretation.
See: A; Z.auberraan, The Criterion of Efficiency of 
Foreign Trade in Soviet-type Economies. Economics, 
February 1964, p. 11. -
Ibid.
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cal models and practical applicability of these investi­
gations still belongs to the future.
Ill LONG-RUN EFFICIENCY OP FOREIGN TRADE
In late 1950's the problems of the intensification 
of the international socialist division of labour within 
the framework of coordinated long-run economic plans, ■ 
began to be widely discussed in the Bloc, For the pur­
pose of long-run planning of foreign trade,, it was 
necessary to drop the assumption of constant capacities 
and to introduce the time dimension into the profitability 
calculationir-v . The effectiveness of foreign trade 
began to be investigated in the context of the general 
analysis of investment efficiency. The correlation 
between investment policy and long-run foreign trade 
policy is undoubtedly very close. The investment deci­
sion of today determines the productive capacity of tomo­
rrow. It can be a production for export or a production 
of import substitutes. It has been recognized that an 
investment program cannot be fully efficient without 
taking into account the possibilities opened up;by 
foreign trade and dynamic coefficients of foreign trade 
efficiency began to be built-in into the formulas for the
x;
In 1962 CEMA formulated the principles.of internation- 
.'8l socialist division of labour and made recommenda­
tion for coordination of long-term economic plans of 
its member countries. See; Zasady Mledzynarodowego 
6qcjalistycznego Podzialu Pracy R.W.p.G, (Principles 
of International Socialist Division of Labour in CEMA) 
Handel Zagnaniczny. no. 7, 1962, pp. 318-324.
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effectiveness of investment. It should be noted that 
synthetic analysis of foreign trade efficiency in the ■ 
framework of an over-all investment efficiency is extre­
mely difficult to deal with on theoretical or methodo­
logical grounds. So far, intensive investigations in 
this field did not pass the initial stage and did not 
bring any satisfactory results.
Static analysis of foreign trade efficiency proved to 
be a-f very awkward problem to the Bloc theoreticians and 
policy makers. Dynamic analysis inevitably multiplied 
the formidable theoretical and computational problems 
it encountered in the static approach.
As in the static approach, dynamic analysis of foreign 
trade efficiency concentrated on constructing the formu­
las for coefficients of efficiency. They were devised 
with the purpose of determining .:tb-’ what extent it is 
profitable (in terms of foreign exchange) to expand 
the capacity of export or import substituting industries.
1) the simplest formula is coefficient of foreign ex­
change efficiency of capital investment.^ It relates 
"net" foreign exchange receipts over an annual period 
to the capital outlay necessary to achieve that planned 
increase in the productive capacity, '
WYz = BCz* - EM^z ^ E D %
y y
X
A, Rolow, op. cit., p. 148.
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ED^b = ECgK - EM*g
where - annual "net" foreign exchange.receipts
and EC„^ - amount of foreign exchange obtained during
the year as a result of the investment.
EM^ - Value of imported (or potentially export­
able) materials used for the production , 
during the given year (in foreign exchange 
at world market prices), 
y “ investment outlay indispensable to secure
. the planned increase in productive capaci­
ty (at domestic prices and currency).
More often, in practice, planners make use of the index 
of capital intensity of investment which is reciprocal 
to the presented above coefficient.
YWKz -
It measures the minimal investment outlay (in domestic 
currency) necessary to get one unit of foreign currency. 
Both coefficients are applicable to those investments 
which have the same period of useful life. In a variant 
of this type of coefficient, the factor of time is intro­
duced.
The coefficient of foreign exchange efficiency of 
investments which takes into account the period of 
exploitation of the investment has the formula:
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where m ~ expected number of years of exploitation 
of the capital investment 
- average annual "net foreign exchange receipts
More elaborated versions of the foreign exchange index of 
investment efficiency include allowance for the capital 
invested. One of them is called a "synthetic Index of 
Foreign Exchange".
Efficiency of Investment;
E = KWN + (Wkz 9) 
where KWN - "net foreign exchange coefficient of effi­
ciency of exports (or imports) 
q - coefficient of investment discount 
It should be noted that as with most .of - the, static :,ooeffioients 
of efficiency, coefficient "E" can be utilized for an 
analysis of the effectiveness of capital investment only 
in the final stage of production of the exportable (or 
import substituting) commodity. It does not take into 
account capital'outlays in the connected branches of 
industry. This fact seems to be in disagreement with 
the so strongly stressed complexity of the effectiveness 
research, which should cover the whole economy. However, 
it does not seem to be necessary that in order to build 
rolling-stock factories, the analysis of effectiveness 
should be extended to, 'for-example' iron ore and coal 
mining.
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II APPRAISAL AND PROSPECTS
The intensive research in the field of efficiency 
of foreign trade which started in Bloc countries in, the 
mid-1950's seems to indicate that the "era of material 
balancing" is passing and that Bloc countries try to 
elaborate more precise and operational tools to guide 
their decision making. It has been recognized that the 
economic calculation is by no means less important in 
a centrally planned "socialist" economy than in any other 
economic system. However, as Bloc experience indicates, 
the absence of automatic market mechanism makes it ex­
tremely difficult to assess economic values to all 
variables which should enter economic calculation and 
guide the process of decision making. The basic 
obstacles v/hich made economic calculation impossible or 
unmeaningful lie at the core of the adopted system of 
centrally planned economy and only their removal can 
clear the way for rationality as the underlying principle 
of the "socialist economy". At the present stage of 
economic knowledge, resources cannot be allocated in a 
rational way without a reliable price system v/hich would 
reflect opportunity costs and factor's scarcities. But 
prices in a Soviet-type economy are set in a more or 
less arbitrary way (mainly in accordance with the 
preferences of top political authority), and do not 
neceasarily reflect these costs and scarcities. The 
marginal pricing theory teaches that in equilibrium, 
prices of factors of production should equal their 
marginal products and product prices their marginal costs,
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But the concept of marginality is rejected by the tra­
ditional doctrine in the Bloc,
The distorted price system is accompanied by rigid 
and economically unmeaningful rates of exchange. Adding 
to these the separation of domestic and foreign trade 
prices the picture is complete and it seems clear that 
in this situation planners are deprived of any reliable 
and simple yardstick to measure the extent to which the 
trade is gainful. The Bloc-wide discussion on price- 
setting problem and the preoccupation with devising 
foreign trade profitability coefficients indicate that 
Bloc policy makers and theoreticians are fully aware of 
the numerous inherent weaknesses of the centrally planned 
economy, which cannot provide any simple mechanism to 
ensure rationality in their decision making. Accepting 
the distorted price system and largely arbitrary rates 
of exchange as the "malum necessarium", they are search­
ing'. for other criteria of efficiency which could be 
effective in a centrally planned economy. There is no 
heed to repeat that various coefficients which have been 
devised to measure efficiency of foreign trade are crude., 
full of shortcomings and mostly unreliable. What seems 
to be important here, is the fact that they are not 
completely useless. The breakthrough in the entirely 
irrational material balancing has been done with their 
help and even this crude profitability "check-up" made 
it possible to introduce several improvemenis in the 
composition and prices of exports and imports. In Poland 
the computation of the "effectiveness coefficients", was
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conducted quite extensively. For example, in 1959 the
profitability calculation covered about 7.O percent of
Xthe volume of exports.
Further research in the field, especially research 
utilizing modern econometric methods, combined with high­
speed, high-memory-store computers seems to be very pro­
mising and can furnish planners with very useful tools 
to effect the most gainful flow of trade. However, 
these perspectives should not be over-estimated. It is 
true that efficiency considerations are gaining grounds 
in Soviet type economies, but it does not seem probable 
that new methods can revolutionize economic planning in 
the nearest future. It is still strongly emphasized 
that several non-economic considerations are much more 
important for the Bloc policy makers than economic 
efficiency. As expressed by Soviet economists;
"Economists in socialist countries believe that 
economic efficiency,..is not the only criterion 
for determining the structure and directions 
of foreign trade. The final decision in 
structuring foreign trade takes into conside­
ration non-economic factors which in some 
cases assume fundamental importance,xx
X
XX
R, Bauer V. Czerniansky, The Significance of Indi­
cators of Foreign Trade Profitability for the Inter­
national Socialist Division of Labour, East European 
Economics, Winter 1964-1965, Vol. 14, HoT?T^3^F4T
A. Borisenko and V. Shastitko, Vnpshhaya Torgovlya 
No. 5, 1962, p. 25. Quoted by A. nauberman. The Soviet 
and Polish Quest for Criterion.of Investment Efficiency, 
Economica, Vol. 29, August, 1962, p. 246,
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Speaking to a group of American senators.visiting Moscow,, 
N, Krushchev quite clearly explained what these so 
highly-valued non-economic factors,which go before 
efficiency,are; "we value trade least for economic
Xreasons and most for political reasons,"
New York Times, September 18, 1955, quoted by J. 
, op, cit., p. 65,
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The preceding chapters have considered the underly­
ing assumptions and working principles of the foreign 
trade system in Poland's economy. The attempt has been 
made to present how the system operates, how it is orga­
nized and what are its most.distinctive problems and 
characteristics. However, in order to have the full 
picture of the country’s post-war foreign trade, it seems 
indispensable to include some empirical material which 
would illustrate the tendencies and problems previously 
described. In this chapter, I shall attempt to present ' 
an integrated analysis of Poland’s post-war pattern of 
trade, discuss its successes, problems and achievements 
on the basis of the available statistical information.
In a country with a relatively small domestic 
market and without huge and diversified natural resources, 
foreign trade seems to be an important sector of the 
economy. In addition, if this country makes every 
effort to promote industrialization and speed up the rate 
of economic growth, the role of foreign trade becomes 
even more important.
What the real impact of foreign trade is on the 
process of the country's economic growth: whether it
plays the role of one of the leading sectors or becomes 
one of the difficult bottlenecks, depends mainly on the 
initial, conditions of the country in question and its 
fundamental strategy of developments. On the basis of 
Polish experience it seems safe to conclude that it did 
not facilitate her process of economic development and -
156
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remained as one of.the most severe bottlenecks, Conside- 
Arable neglect of foreign trade and autarchical policies 
which prevailed during the first and post-war decade 
.seem to be the most important factors responsible for 
that situation. Since the rnid-1950’s, some measures 
have been taken to overcome the autarchical drive, and 
problems of foreign trade began to focus; attention of 
the policy-makers. However, the imprint'Which previous 
policies left on the economy proved to be very difficult 
to remove,
- : ! During the post-war period Poland’s industrial 
expansion was proceeding at relatively high rates while 
her share in world trade remained basically on the same 
level as in the pre-war period.
Poland’s share of world trade 1929-1964(percent)
1929 1938 1950 1962 1964
.1.0 1.0 1.05 1.2 ). 1.2
Source:
A. Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslo- 
vakia and East Germany, p. 276, U. N. Statistical.Year­
book, 1965, pp. 390-392.
It is extremely difficult to calculate the proportion of 
dollar estimates in national product absorbed by exports. 
The existing pricing and cost methods together with the 
incomparability of foreign and domestic prices for goods 
subject to imports and exports, makes the computed
Poland’s yearly industrial growth rates claimed were:
19.1 percent during the period of 1951-1955, 9.3 per­
cent for 1956-1959 and 8,3 percent in 1963 respective­
ly, A. Zauberman, op. cit., p. 108.
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proportion of GNP^ expressed in dollars,which is passing 
through foreign trade transactions, highly questionable. 
According to Polish sources about ten percent of GNP 
is being continuously absorbed by exports.
Exports as Percentage of Adjusted GNP, 1957:
Poland France West Germany Italy Norway U.K.
10.1 .17.5 24.1 13 33.0 24.5
Source: B, Wojciechowski in "Gospodarka PlanowaV No. 8
1959 p. 23, quoted by A. Zauberman, p. 279.^
These data reveal a strikingly low share of exports in 
Polish. GNP as compared with other countries of Europe. 
Comparisons between foreign trade per capita in Poland 
and other European countries bring similar results.
Foreign Trade per Capita. 1962: -
Poland West Germany France Italy U.K.
 ^ 482 33ll;. 216 456
Source;, Ibid, p. 278. ,
However, it should be noted that the per capita level of 
foreign trade in post-war Poland increased considerably 
when. compared with the corresponding data for the"-inter=war 
period. '
Zauberman refers also to other assessments yielding 
different results, e.g. 3. Krynicki, Problemy handlu 
.•^zagranicznego (Warsaw 1958) p. 214, It suggest3"™tîmF“ 
exports represented about 8.5 percent of GNP in 1955.
J. Witt and Dorozynska in "Handel Zagranlczny" No. 8, 
1961 arrived at 7.5, 8 and 7 peFcêntiôFT^^bA, 1956 and 
1957 respectively.
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Polish Foreign Trade per capita 1928-1961:
(Comparable (1956) dollar prices)
1928 1938 1950 1961
63 30 62 106
Source: Ibid.
According to the statistical data shown in Table 1 
Poland’s foreign trade has been increasing at relatively 
high rates during the whole post-war period.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE I
POLAND’S FOREIGN TRADE
TURNOVER IMPORTS OIF EXPORTS FOB BALANCE
""""'"I ^ m  p  A n r
MILLION OF DOLLARS AT CURRENT PRICES^**^^
DYNAMICS OF
lATPORTS
EXPORTS
1938 473 248 225 -23
TNDEZiySO
= 100
37 35
1947 694 401 248 -153 60 39
1948 1049 516 533 +17 77 84
1949 1251 632 619 ^43 94 97
1950 1302 668 634 -34 100 100
1951 1785 924 861 -63 138 135
1952 1611 836 775 -6l 123 122
1953 1605 774 831 +57 116 131
1954 1772 803 ,869 -34 135 137
1955 1851 932 919 -13 140 145
1956 2007 1022 985 -37 153 155
1957 2226 1251 975 -276 185 152
1958 2287 1227 1060 -167 177 165
1959 2565 1420 1145 -275 211 180
1960 2821 1495 1326 -169 224 209
1961 3191 1687 1504 -183 252 237
1962 3531 1885 1646 -239 282 259
1963 . 3749 . 1979 1770 -209 295 280
1964 4168 2072 2096 +24 310 330
1965 4426 2130 2296 +166 319 360
1966% 4651 2238 2413 +175 335 379
1966xx 4987 2361 2626 +265 353 414
X
Pre-war boundries
XX : :
According to Plan
Sources: 'Concice Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 1966
Central Statistical Office, Warsaw, 1966, p. 16?
Economic Surveyof Europe in 1965 U.N. New York 
196b, p . 567
U. N. Statistical Yearbook 1965, pp. 390-393.
T. P. Alton, Polish Postwar Economy, p. 272.
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By the end'of 1946 foreign trade began to function under 
national economic plans. The first Polish over-all 
economic plan was elaborated for the period 1947-1949 and 
essentially remained as a plan of reconstruction through­
out its course. The goals for foreign trade as set in 
the Three-Year Plan (1947-1949) were very ambitious. 
Imports were to increase by 190 percent in 1947 and by 
over 250 per cent in 1949 as compared with 1938. The 
expected increase in exports amounted to 50 per cent in 
1947 and to 150 per cent in 1949 as compared with 1938.^ 
The anticipated deficit in the balance of payments 
amounting to 767 million dollars for the period of 
1947-1949 was expected to be covered by foreign aid and 
credits. However, these expectations failed. In early 
1947 Poland was unable to receive a loan of 600 million 
dollars from the World Bank of Reconstruction,and 
Development. At the same time, under Soviet pressure 
Poland refused to participate in the Marshall Plan. As 
the result of these, the Three-Year Plan was underful­
filled by a wide percentage. The realized imports fell 
short of those envisaged by the plan by 45 per cent in 
1947 and by 28 per cent in 1949.
This also had a decisive impact on the implementa­
tion of planned investment goals. Since about 25 per 
cent of total investments were to be covered by imports.
X
T. P. Alton, op. cit., p. 272.
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the investment targets as set out in the 1946 ’’draft" 
of the Three-Year Plan were only 69 per cent fulfilled,^ 
The Six-Year Plan envisaged to "construct the bases of 
socialism" in Poland was elaborated for the period of 
1950-1955. In this plan the law of socialist develop­
ment, or the so called "absolute principle of preferen­
tial growth of capital goods^ industries" found its 
full implementation.
During this period the autarchic tendencies were 
prevailing in the economic policy of all countries of 
the Bloc including Poland. Efforts were directed to ach­
ieve the highest possible degree of economic independence 
of any other nation. As expressed by a German economist:
- Ibid, p. 271.
:
The main stress in this plan has been placed on the 
development of "heavy industry". In 1949 a percen­
tage share of investment outlays in the national 
income amounted to 15,6 percent, and to 27,9 per cent 
in 1953» declining later to 22.2 per cent by 1955. 
Under the Six-Year Plan approximately 77 per cent of 
total investment were designated for the "productive 
purposes" and about 50 per cent for the development 
of capital goods industries,
Dochod harodowy Polski 1954 i 1955 (National Income 
ôî’*"PoIan3^  1954 and 1955) Warsaw, Glowny Urzad'Statys- 
tyczny, 1957, p. 47.
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" a constant task of planning is the reducing of necessary 
.imports,'!^ f.:'" Accordingly, the "Import first" method 
of planning of foreign trade and physical balancing of 
"material balances" dominated trade. To some extent, 
the emphasis on autarchy and neglect of the foreign 
trade was caused by the post-war political tensions 
and the Western embargo on strategic exports to the 
■communist countries. As stated by Hilary Mine, who was 
at this time the Chairman'of the State Commission for 
Economic Planning: "this forced us to develop domestic
production in a number of branches hastily and at high 
c o s t The Six-Year Plan goals for foreign trade have 
been basically fulfilled. By the end of 1955 total im­
ports amounted to 932 million dollars and were more than 
3 times higher than in 1938. During the period of 1950- 
1955 total imports increased by 40 per cent and total 
exports by 45 per cent. In 1955 total exports amounted 
to, $919,000,000 and were more than four times higher than 
those in 1938.
These figures look less impressive when compared 
with the annual rate of growth of industrial production 
in this period, which reached the level of 19.6 per cent
X
Quoted by Zauberman, op, cit., p. 24 from R, Bauer, 
Die Planning der wintschaftlichen Jaetigkeit der 
volkseigenen handelsunternechmeh Deutscher Yhnen-und 
AushenlxancThX in der DDR CUoc'torâr"Dissertation, 
HbcEscEûTê^ur Okononie), p. 44.
^  H. Mine, Speech at the Eight Plenum, October 21, 1956, 
Nowe Drogi, No. 10 (1956), p. 123, cited by'J. M. 
SontTaF~in "Central Planning in Poland, pp. 64-65.
^ iiiiii i n II I II-mill 1,111, I II I I ,- . . —   imi.iii     ■ , i «'     7 X  X
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for .1950-1953 and 15.5 per cent for 1953-1955.^ During 
the period 1950-1955 the annual rate of growth of trade 
per capita was 5.3 per cent and the annual increases in 
industrial production per capita were 14 per cent.
This seems to indicate that increases in foreign trade 
turnovers could be faster, and the "trade potential" 
could be more fully utilized,^ As the result of poli­
tical changes which took place in the Soviet Union after 
Stalin’s death in 1953, several economic reforms were 
introduced in the Soviet Union. Following the \ ead of 
U.S.S.R., Poland modified her economic policies in order 
to slow down the rate of expansion of the capital goods
sector. The autarchic ideas have come under heavy
/
attack and foreign trade has been finally recognized as 
the vital sector of the economy, while problems of
X
A. Bodnar, Gospodarka eurapejskich prajow socjalisty- 
cznych, (Economies of European Socialist CountriesTT 
WSrsa%, K. W., 1962, p. 102.
^  According to E. Pryor’s definition "trade potential" 
means "the volume of trade at the point where it is 
i  impossible to obtain a higher national income by a 
change in volume and/or composition-of foreign trade." 
P. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, p. 26.
It should Be”"'hoîe^!"%TlETïIW'""^^ilrrThat the correlation 
between the rate of growth of industrial production 
and the rate of growth of trade can be a weak one which 
does not mean that the trade potential is not utilized 
fully providing that there is à large domestic market.
Secondly, methods of computation of "trade potential" 
seem still to be controversial, Hov/ever, in the case 
of Poland which does not have a huge domestic market 
and in the light of her autarchical policies this 
comparison seems to be justified.
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specialization of production and advantages of interna­
tional division of labor began to be widely discussed.
The dramatic events of October 1956 which shook-up the 
leadership of the Polish United Worker’s Party, revealed 
the wide-spread discontent with the policy of "blind" 
imitation of Soviet-economic patterns. Very serious 
disproportions in the development of industries created 
by the Implementation of the Six^Year Plan, shortages 
and bottlenecks came to light for the first time and 
were discussed not only in the specialized journals, 
but,also by the daily press. The situation was really 
strained,and called for "essential reforms".
Finally a new policy, based less on "material 
balancing" and giving a wider scope for economic cal­
culation; of the two Five-Year Plans, (1956-1960 and 
1960-1965) was announced, 'It raised postulates translated 
into! to decrees and ordinances with the purpose of 
removing' excessive centralization of decision making and 
defective planning. The two Five-Year Plans seemed to 
be much more consistent internally, with the planned 
goals:set on more "reasonable" levels. The pattern of t 
trade:in this period had undergone deep changes. First . 
of vail ^ the political events of 1956 encouraged the 
reestablishment of closer commercial and financial 
contacts with the Western world. Various credits.granted 
atnthis time to Poland by Western countries,and the most 
Important of which was credit granted by the U.:6.A. on 
very'favourable terms,could considerably help to relax 
thetrather strained situation in the Polish balance of
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payments. At the same time, however, the situation on 
the world market turned out to be very unfavorable to 
Polish exports swallowing almost entirely the positive 
effect of credits. In the early 1950's the overwhelming 
bulk of Polish exports consisted of raw materials and 
foodstuffs, with coal being the principal export item.
After the end of the "Korean boom" and especially 4he 
effect of drastic reduction of prices for coal, the 
position of coal as the major foreign exchange earner 
was weakened. At the same time quantities of coal 
exported were drastically reduced. Simultaneously, foreign 
earnings from exports of foodstuffs shrunk,significantly 
as the result of hazardous agrarian policy of forced 
collectivization leading to the serious collapse of the 
agricultural sector. If we add to this the fact that 
Poland was heavily dependent on imports of raw materials, 
it becomes clear that foreign trade appeared to be one 
of the most severe bottlenecks in Polish economy. The 
pronounced deterioration of Poland's foreign trade 
position can be easily evident from the statistical data. 
During the period of 1958-1961, the value of exports 
increased by 41.9 per cent and value of imports by
37.5 per cent. Simultaneously the volume of exports • 
increased by 151.5 per cent and the volume of imports by -.
139.5 per cent. Thus,the terms of trade considerably
deteriorated, the ratio of the percentage increase of 
value to the percentage increase of volume of exports for
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this period was 93.7 while the same ratio for imports 
98.6.%
It seems safe to remark, that some of the difficul­
ties of this period were also due to the significant 
shifts that occurred in the structure of Polish foreign 
trade. The proportion of raw materials and unprocessed 
products previously dominating in Polish exports was 
continuously diminishing being replaced by a steadily 
increasing share of machinery and other engineering 
products. As a consequence, the 1961-1965 plan heavily 
emphasized the increase in exports, which was indispen­
sable owing not only to the difficult situation in the 
field of foreign trade, and the considerable burden of 
foreign debts which had to be repaid but also the conti­
nuously increasing import demand due to the development 
of the economy. In 1965 total imports amounted to 2130 
million dollars and total exports to 2296 million dollars. 
Thus, the average annual rate of growth of imports in 
this period was 8,4 per cent while that of exports 14,2 
per cent. In the light of these data Polish balance of
J. Niegowski, W. Rydygier, Problemy handlu zagraniez-
nego, pp. 604-605.
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trade should be closed with the surplus of 166 million 
dollars.%
X
This data is from "Economic Survey of Europe in 1965 
U. N. New York, 1966, p., 561
They differ considerably from those quoted by A, Kar™ 
pinski in "The Polish Economy" 1961-1965. Warsaw,
Pelonia Publishing' House !l96^ , p. 99. According to 
Karpinski total exports were expected to reach a 
value of 2055 million dollars in 1965, which gives 
an increase of 55 per cent as compared with I960,
Total value of imports were to reach the amount of 
1902 million dollars which means that imports were 
to go up by 27.2 per cent in the same period.
Accordingly the commodity turnover of Polish foreign 
trade was to close with a favorable balance of 
.$153,000,000, According to.data provided by Niegowski 
and Rydygier-, the favorable balance of trade was to amount 
;.167,5: mill*" dollars in 1965 and total imports 
to increase by 30 per cent as compared with I960 
while total increase in exports by 43 per cent.
See Ibid, pp. 598-599.
It should be noted that all this data can give no 
more than a rather poor reflection of reality, and 
cannot be interpreted liberally.
Besides the usual distortion affected by necessary 
aggregation, changes in the structure and price 
relations, several other factors affect the picture.
First of all the existing pricing and cost methods 
in respect to domestic markets make the domestic and 
foreign prices completely incomparable. Further,
Polish statistics present all the foreign trade data 
in terms of "exchange zlotys" achieving the common 
denominator for all foreign currencies in question 
by multiplying them by a rigid and unrealistically 
set rate of exchange, then lumping it .together into 
aggregate values. .
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II COmiODITY COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN TRADE
• While Polish post-war foreign trade turnovers were 
increasing at relatively high rates trying to keep 
pace with the growth of her industry, far going changes 
took place in the commodity pattern of trade. Analysis 
of the commodity composition of Polish foreign trade is 
rather difficult due to the unavailability of statis­
tical information, especially for the period 1948-1955 
when Polish official sources included total weights of 
imports and exports, the latter being broken down into 
very broad commodity groups. Besides this, trade totals 
in terms of "exchange zlotys" translated into dollars 
at the official rate of exchange, leave much to be desi­
red.
The pre-war and early post-war pattern of Polish 
foreign trade approximated closely so called "coal 
monoculture". Before the war three main items; food 
(37 per cent in 1937), fuel (18 per cent) and timber 
made up almost four-fifths of the export total. Coal 
was the principal export item in trie first post-war 
decade, however its share in exports total was steadily 
declining. In 1945 coal made up 77 per cent of exports 
and-7' in 1949, 46 per cent. Besides coal and coke, the 
other important commodities in 1949 exports were; 
agricultural and food products - 20 per cent of exports, 
raw materials and semi-manufactures - 17,6 per cent, 
industrial goods - 16.2 per cent.%
X
T. P. Alton, Polish Postwar Economy. p. 275.
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STRUCTURE CE IMPORTS AND, EXPORTS BY COMMODITY GROUPS
(in million of U. 8, dollars at current prices and per 
centage distribution) ,•
GROUPS OP MILLIOH $ PmCmiAGE
COMMODITIES 1965 = 100
1956 1960 1964 19651956 1965 1966 196Y
Total imports
clf 1022 2296 +5.1 5.5 100 100 100 100
1. Machinery 
and Equlp- 
, merit 399 770 11.5 3.7 33.2 27.1 30.6 32.8
2. Fuels and raw 
materials 497 1085 2.5 8.4 48.6 51.5 48.7 47.3
3. Unprocessed 
and nrocessed 
food' 123 286 -2.2 11.0 12.1 16.0 15.3 13.2
4, Consumer's
manufactures 63 155 4.7 -11.9 6.1 ' 5.4 5.4 6.7
TOTAL EXPORTS
fob 985 2130 5.4 9.6 100 100 100 100
1. Machinery and 
Equipment 152 762 15.8 16.2 15.6 28.0 33.4 34.4
2, Fuels and raw 
materials 629 732 0.2 4.3 63.8 43.8 35.5 35.1
3. Unprocessed and
processed food 116 357 -18.2 1.1 11.7 18.1 18.7 18.2
4., Consumer's
manufactures 88 
.. . ....... . -
279 20.8 11.0 8.9 10.1 12.4 12.3
Sources: U, N. Statistical Yearbook 1965, pp, 390-393.
Concice StatTstical. YeaVoook of Poland, 1966
pp. 168-170.
Economic Survey of Europe' in 1965 
ÜTN. New York, l^SFTp. STT
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DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN TRADE BY COMMODITY GROUPS
at I960
qppi^T-prnA mrnN r„ .,r
prices index I 9 6 0 =100
OJrijvJLi' _L v A l ±VIM —
1956 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Turnover 65 100 114 127 134 1 4 7 1 6 5
Imports 66 100 1 1 4 128 135 139 1 6 3
1 ,  Machinery and 
Equipment 84 1 0 0 1 2 1 154 164 1 5 6 189
2. Fuels and raw 
materials 62 100 1 1 2 118 1 2 1 132 155
3 .  Unprocessed and 
processed food 51 1 0 0 105 102 120 1 % _ 132
4. Consumer's 
manufactures 71 1 0 0 125 165 161 146 202
EXPORTS - . 63 100 114 1 2 7 1 3 3 ....1 5 7  ' 1 6 8
1 . Ma chi ne ry a nd 
Equipment 4 1 100 1 1 2 132 155 1 9 6 207
2, Fuels and raw 
materials 85 100 102 1 1 5 119 128 1 3 7
3. Unprocessed and 
: processed food 46 1 0 0 1 4 0 139. 103 1 4 0 156
4. Consumer's 
Manufactures 60 1 0 0 129 146 183 202 214
Source: Concice Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 1966,
‘p, 168,
171
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
172
The composition of imports v/as as follov/s; machinery 
and apparatus - 19 per cent;rubber and its substitutes- 
17 per cent;chemicals - 12 per cent.
Starting with the Three-Year Plan, Polish foreign 
trade policy was aimed at the reduction of imports of 
raw materials and semi-manufactured goods. It was 
aimed at obtaining the highest possible share of highly 
processed agricultural product and manufactured consumer 
goods and lately of machinery and equipment in Polish 
exports. At the same time machinery and raw materials 
were still the principal import items due to the increa­
sed demand resulting from high rates of industrial growth. . 
Since the middle 1950's, it became obvious that the era 
of "coal monoculture" was definitely over. Fuels and 
raw materials still dominated Polish exports, contribu­
ting about 63.8 per cent of export earnings (629 million 
dollars) in 1956, and the main items in this group; coal 
and coke accounted for about 46 per cent of the exports 
total,%% But by I960 the share of fuels and raw materials 
fell to 43.8 per cent v/hile export of coal and coke 
contributed only 18.7 per cent to exports. In 1965, this 
commodity group accounted for only 35.1 per cent of exports. 
At the same time there was a truly spectacular rise of 
capital goods into the role of the leading export indus-? 
try. In 1937 machinery and equipment accounted for only
X
Ibid, p. 276, Table 52,
%% Y. Niegowski, -W, Rydygieu, op. cit., p. 608,
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2 per cent of exports. By 1956 the share of this group 
rose to 15,6 per cent and in I960 it contributed.28 per 
cent of exports total.
During the five year period of 1960-1965 exports 
of machinery and equipment rose by 107 per cent reaching 
a value of 762 million dollars in 1965. Within this 
commodity group the export of rolling stocksships, 
machine tools, mining machinery and complete factories 
rose most rapidly. The other fast- growing group of 
exports are chemical products, 'Besideg the traditional ' 
exports of soda ash and caustic soda, coke derivatives7, 
there was a considerable increase in exports of pro'cessed 
chemical..' '7 products like polyvinyl chloride (its 
exports rose between I960 and 1965, 13-fold) polystyrene, 
pharmaceutical products (122 per cent increase) dyestuffs 
(126 per cent increase) and others.%
During the period 1961-1965 Poland appeared for the 
first time as an exporter of sulphur. Agricultural 
products always played a very important role in Polish 
exports. In pre-war Poland, this group contributed 
almost one-third of the exports total. Exports of 
animal products, especially bacon.and tinned meat had an 
established market in Western Europe, After the war, 
substantial surpluses in Polish food trade turned into 
a severe deficit. During almost the v/hole post-war 
period Poland had to rely heavily on the imports of grain,
X
A. Karpinski, The Polish Economy, p. 102,
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The net'grain import depended on the year's harvest 
and played a quite important role in determining her 
import capacity with respect to other commodity groups. 
Agricultural produce still plays a very important role 
in Polish exports. Since about 85 per cent of agricul­
tural produce goes to the countries of Western Europe 
with which Poland has a persistent and remarkable deficit 
in the balance of payments, every possible effort has 
been done to maintain and expand these exports. In 
1956 the export of agricultural products reached the 
value of 116 million dollars and amounted to 11.7 per 
cent of total exports. By 1965 it increased by 56 per 
cent, its share in exports total went up to 18,2 per 
cent. The most important export items were; ham (about 
70,000 tons in 1965), butter (56,000 tons in 1965), 
eggs (third place in the world exports of eggs), liquor 
(220,000 imperial gallons in terms of pure spirits) sugar 
and others. In the group of consumer's manufactured, 
traditional export items are; woolen and cotton fabrics, 
cut glassware, porcelain and crystal.
During the period of 1958-1961 export of manufac­
tured consumer goods increased by II4 per cent amounting 
to 279 million dollars (12,3 per cent of exports).
As far as imports are concerned fuels and raw mate­
rials continue to be leading import items. Their share ' 
in imports total increased rapidly during the Six-Year
X
Ibid, p p . 1 0 2 -1 0 3 .
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Plan, This v/as mainly due to the heavy investment poli­
cy adopted in this plan as well as to the autarchical 
drive’ to develop several industries simultaneously.
Some industries created during the Six-Year Plan have 
been too materially intensive and,what is more important^ 
they were ill-adjusted to the resource-basis of the 
country. Thus, the bulk of input requirements for these 
industries had to be covered by imports.
In 1956 imports of fuels and raw materials reached 
the value of 497 million dollars. Its share in import 
totals amounted to 48,6 per cent. Subsequent economic 
plans took much pain to correct the disproportions 
v/hich arose during the Six-Year Plan and eased partially 
the pressure of import requirements of raw-materials. 
Because of the size of the country and its factor endow­
ment, it is highly improbable that any drastic reduction 
in the volume of these imports can take place in the 
future.
Sgcond in order of importance is the group consis­
ting of machinery and equipment. In 1956 its share amoun­
ted to 33.2 per cent of total imports and changed only 
slightly during the last decade. However, the value of 
imports of machinery and equipment was 127 per cent 
higher in 1965 as compared with 1956 amounting to 770 
million dollars.in 1965, These imports played an enormous 
role in the process of the industrialization of the 
economy.
In the meantime, machinery and equipment established
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
176
itself as the principal export industry. However, this 
should not indicate that imports of this group would be 
diminished if Poland would proceed along the lines of 
specialization of production in these branches,where 
she has comparative advantage, and disregard former em­
phasis on autarchy. Pre-war Poland had a substantial 
surplus in her food trade and depended only on imports 
of some tropical foods and oils. Post-war agricultural 
policy resulting in stagnation -in'agrlculture"' 
turned this surplus into quite a ^severe',.déficit. 7 The 
government inflamed "class war" in the villages aiming 
to eliminate richer peasants and to organize the poorer 
peasants into cooperatives, discriminatory tax policies 
and schedules of compulsory deliveries of farm products 
to the state, movement of the considerable amount of 
agricultural labour force to the cities to meet the 
demand of the expanding industries together with the low 
priority of agricultural investments - all have made 
their own contribution to the collapse of agricultural 
production in the early 1950's. New agricultural poli­
cies adopted by the end of 1953 and aimed at increasing 
agricultural production, did not seem to be really 
effective. In 1956 imports of unprocessed and processed 
food reached the value of 123 million dollars. Its 
share in import total amounted to 12,1 per cent. By 1965 
this share increased to 13.2 per cent, while the value 
of imported foodstuffs rose more than two-fold. Imports 
of grain played the most important part in this group. 
Since the early I960's it has regularly exceeded 6 million 
tons per year.
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Ill GEOGRAPHICAL DIRECTIONS OF TRADE
A. ^TRADE PATTERN WITH BLOC COUNTRIES
The intensity of the political impact on Poland’s 
foreign economic relations is perhaps most striking in 
the case of her new geographical network of trade. In 
1937 only 7 per cent of Polish total trade .was/ directed 
to the Soviet Union and other East European countries 
which after the war formed the so called Soviet Bloc,
In 1948 the share of this group in trade totals increa­
sed to 40 per cent and was continuously growing, reach­
ing 66 per cent in 1965. There is a whole chain of 
events and forces which.lie behind this shift of trade 
channels from West to East and only a surface of this 
change can be mirrored in statistical data. The tradi­
tional Polish trade network was violently disrupted by 
the war. The very incorporation of Poland into the 
Soviet - Bloc favored the develooment of her trade 
contracts with Soviet Union and other satellite countries 
Immediately after the war, due to the disorganization of 
transport facilities in Europe as well as in result of 
commodity credits granted to Poland by the Soviet Union 
with the purpose of re-establishing normal economic life 
in the country seriously destroyed by war, the Soviet 
Union became Poland’s leading trade partner.
In the late 1940's other factors joined to foster 
Eastern orientation of Polish foreign trade patterns.
177
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THE GEOGRAPHICAL STRUCTURE OP POLISH FOREIGN TRADE
IMPORTS BY COUNTRIES
1950 1955 I960. 19%4 1965
In MIL. 
U.8.$
IN
%
IN MIL. U
M m ™
.8. IN
%
IN MIL. 
U.S. $
IN
%
Tbtal-mporW"
cif 668 100 932 1495 2072 100 2130 100
socialist
countries 408 61.1 605 939 1305 63 1408 66.1
advanced
countries % 239 35.8 251 -350 536 25.6 542 25.4
underdeveloped
countries 21 3.1 76 206 231 11.4 180 8.5
U:S;S;R. 192 28.8 413 465 642 31.0 728 31:1
Great Britain 63 9.5 68 89 82 4 96 %. 5
France.'. 20 3 34 26 45 2 35 1.6
Italy 21 3.1 8  ^ 21 32 1.5 49 2.3
Sweden r 32 4.7 15 17 22 1.1^ 28 ' 1.3
West Germany 17 2.5 23 71 74 3.5 84 - .3.9
U.S.A. 5 0.6 2.5 84 113 5.5 30 1.4
Canada 0.07 3.0 15 46 2.1 24 1.1
AustriaBelgium, Denmark, Finland, Prance,'Netherlands, 
WgSt Germany, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Great Bri^ 
tain, Italy, Canada, U.S.A, Australia, New Zeland.
Source : Concice Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 1966,
ppTTTTTTZr"------------------- r
■;- Economic Bulletin for Europe, Nov. 1964, p. 77.
U« N. Statistical Yearbook T96$, pp. 39-393.
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THE GEOGRAPHICAL STRUCTURE OF POLISH FOREIGN TRADE 
EXPORTS BY COUNTRIES
IN
U.
1950 
i MIL. 
8. $
IN
%
1955 
IN MIL 
U.S. $ 
PRICES
I960 1964 
.OF 
CURRENT
1965
IN MIL. 
U.S. $
IN
%
Total Exp. 
fob 634 100 919 1326 2096 2296 100
Socialist
Countries 361 56.9 578 826 1350 1451 63.
Advanced
Western
Countries
242 38.1 187 320 456 582 25.
Underdeve­
loped coun­
tries
31 5.0 154 180 190 263 11.5
U.S.8.R. 154 24.3 280 390 721 781 35
Great Britain 53 78 99 128 128
France 24 13 15 36 30
Italy 16 6,4 30 ' 52 56
Sweden 36 20 18 29 32
West Germany 15 29 75 92 115
U.S.A. 11 23 32 55 69
Canada 0.3 0.6 2 9 11
'Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, 
y/çst Germany, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Great Britain, 
Italy, Canada, U.S.A., Australia, New Zeland.
Source: Ooncice Statistical Yearbook of Poland. 1966,
p. 171 - 172
U. N. Statistical Yearbook. 1965, p. 39-393.
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First, under Soviet pressure Poland refused to participa­
te in the Marshall Plan tightening her trade links with ' 
the Bloc countries. The appearance of the Council of 
Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) in January 1949 sym­
bolized the beginning of forcing Soviet satellites into 
economically harmonized groups.
Secondly, the political tensions of the "cold war" 
policy which reached its peak before and during the 
outbreak of the Korean War, divided the world into two 
hostile camps and somewhat strenghtened the tendency 
for the coehesion.of the Soviet-bloc for security reasons,
Thirdly, the so called "strategic embargo" imposed 
upon the Soviet Union in 1948 and subsequently extended 
to the entire Soviet Bloc gave a new, strong impulse 
to a further tightening of economic relations within the 
Bloc and cutting off existing trade links with the West, 
Besides this, several economic factors have acted to 
encourage Polish trade with her Bloc partners,
1) Trade with the West was becoming increasingly diffi­
cult due to the rapid change in the commodity composi­
tion of Poland’s import demand and export supply.
Her pre-war traditional pattern of trade with Western 
countries consisted of the export of agricultural and 
light industrial products, and the import of machinery 
and consumer goods. Poland began to produce at home, 
some of the previously imported machinery and import of
X
As years long experience indicate CEMA proved to be 
rather ineffective instrument of intra-bloc coordina­
tion of economic systems of its member countries.
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others was restricted by the scarcity of "hard" foreign 
exchange at her disposal. The agricultural exports 
shrunk due to production problems. On the other hand the 
manufactured goods which could fill the gap left by the 
decrease in exports of foodstuffs were not attractive 
to her Western partners because of their poor quality 
and the fact that they were produced in the Y/est in 
sufficient quantities.
2) A great deal of bureaucratism and inflexible trade 
policy adopted by the organ of foreign trade monopoly 
did not encourage ( and rather hampered) the successful 
trade contacts between PTE’s and their Western partners.
3) The terms of trade which Poland received from her 
trade with Bloc countries were more favourable than 
those received from the West almost during the whole 
post-war period,
4) By 1950 the centralization of Polish foreign trade 
under the state monopoly was completed and the system
was subjected to the discipline of central economic planning.
X
As Pryor estimates, in 1958 the Polish terras of 
trade with the West were for the whole trade sample 
152 per cent, for the sample without coal I40 per 
cent, v/hile any percentage over 100 indicate that it 
is more advantageous to trade with the Bloc countries. 
It seems that the most important factors responsible 
for this situation were: differences in the commodity
structure of Poland’s trade with bloc and non-bloc 
countries and differences in the quality of products 
traded which were not always reflected in prices,
P. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, p. 172,
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From this point of view, Polish foreign trade authorities 
found it relatively easier to deal with their Bloc part-; 
ners who had a- similar organizational structure and 
also operated under national economic plans.
Their trade contracts have become based on long­
term trade agreements. These almost purely barter 
arrangements determined the quantities of commodities 
exchanged, and provided a firmer basis for economic 
planning than uncertain trade contracts with Western 
countries, ,
Considerable relaxation in the international politi­
cal climate which took place after Stalin’s death, and 
the new policies announced by N. Khruschev and the 
following political events of the autumn of 1956 in 
Poland, opened up possibilities for the reestablishment 
of former commercial contacts with the Western world.
On the other hand, these new tendencies have been counter­
acted upon by more intensive consolidation of economic 
ties within CEMA. It should be noted that a long period 
of isolation from Western markets, as well as the consi­
derable degree of adjustment of production patterns of 
the Bloc countries, together with the established prac­
tice of arranging bilaterally balanced trade deals, 
gave their trade contacts power of self-perpetuation 
and made the reorientation of trade patterns much more 
difficult than could be expected. It is easily seen 
from the very fact that the partial removal of formal
barriers v/hich previously restricted Poland’s trade with
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the West did not reflect itself in any marked increase 
in the share of this group in Polish foreign trade.
MECHANISM OP INTRA-BLOC TRADE
The mechanism of trade between Bloc countries which 
continued to channel the bulk of Polish post-war foreign 
trade to these markets is very interesting and specific. 
Some of the reasons for which Polish post-war trade was 
increasingly oriented toward the Soviet Union and other 
Bloc countries have been already discussed. ■
The effective consolidation of Bloc countries into 
an economically harmonized group, was the main reason 
for the establishment of the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance on January 21, 1949 in Moscow, of which 
Poland became one of the original members. One of the 
purposes of this organisation as expressed in several 
vague articles and communiques, was to organize and 
foster trade relations between the member-countries. Since 
the purposes and activities of CEMA received a thorough 
going over by numerous economists, giving birth to 
hundreds of articles and books there is no need to repeat 
it here.%
To mention just a few:
R. M. Bird, COMECON and Economic Integration in the ; 
Soviet Bloc, The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Business, Vol."%n7i.nt^ 1'%'4',' 4.--------------
ETTHes~’Economic Integration in the European Soviet 
Bloc, A.E.R, Vol. 49, 1959 Papers and Proceedings.
E. NeuHmrgér, International Division of Labor in CEMA 
Limited Regret Strategy, AER,~ Vol. 54, 1964, Papers and 
Proceedings Eastern source ; ,
A. Bodnar,Gospodarka Eiropeiskich Kraiow socjalistycznych 
Economics of European Socialist Couniries) Warsaw Kiw 
1962 K, Secomski, Problem miedz.ynarodowego podzislu pracy 
na tie tcorii rozmiesauzenia sil wytworczych. Economisea 
No. 4, 1964.
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It seems safe to say that the role of CEMA in shaping- 
foreign trade patterns has been negligible until recently. 
Since the late 1940's, Polish trade relations with other 
Bloc countries were carried out under bilateral clearing 
agreements concluded between the Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Trade with the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the 
country in question. These clearing agreements were in 
reality formalized barter arrangements, determining the 
detailed lists of commodities exchanged v/hile the pro­
visions were made to balance the mutual trade in order 
to minimize the currency transfer. Payments resulting 
from these transactions were also subject to formal 
arrangements under which both countries kept accounts 
in their state banks, recording each commercial delivery. 
These accounts were intended to balance each period 
covered by the agreement in question. Prom the formal 
point of view three methods were envisaged in the case 
of the "failure" of one of the partners to match in 
value the deliveries of the other;
1) supplementary deliveries of goods
2) payment in convertible currency of Western countries 
3,) shipment of gold
Because of severe shortage of "hard" foreign curren­
cy which all the Bloc countries experienced, and rather 
scarce resources of gold in their possession (with the 
only exception of the U.S.S.R.), these accounts were 
usually brought into balance by the first method.
It should be also pointed out, that the character of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
185
these clearing agreements is quite different from that 
used in trade with or between non-Soviet countries.
Concluding a clearing agreement the only obligation 
which the "capitalist" government takes, is to issue 
a certain amount of import or export licences accordingly 
to the mutually agreed list of commodities or import 
quotas*
Obligations of the state resulting from trade agree­
ments concluded by Bloc countries are much heavier.
'Socialist trade agreements express the obligation of 
the state to buy and sell quantities of commodities as 
specified in the agreement.
■ Very soon it became obvious that this physical 
balancing leaves much to be desired, and in effect hampers 
the extension of trade between Bloc countries instead of encou­
raging it. To mention just a few of the most severe 
shortcomings of this method of conducting foreign trade:
1) it requires the exact adjustment of the mutual 
turnovers and in effect limits the exchange to the level 
of the weaker partner
2) it gives no premises as to the evaluation of which 
transaction is profitable for one or both partners or 
along what lines they should specialize their production, 
and thus it -limits the advantages flowing from the inter­
national division of labor.
3) as with :almOst rail, other% methodsi:ef..parrying out foreign 
trade activity adopted by organs of foreign trade mono­
poly, it is highly inflexible and unoperational,%
Bloc economists were completely aware of these short­
comings and a great deal of criticism for this method 
came from their side. See, Z. Kamecki, Soldaczuk,
W. Sierpinski, Mizd;ynarodowe stosunki ekonomiczne, p. 535*
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Since 1954 the problems of the specialization of produc­
tion between CEMA countries and of finding a more ade­
quate basis for their trade relations have begun to 
receive increasing attention by Bloc policy makers.
As the result of many discussions, several steps have 
been taken to reshape the economic cooperation of the 
CEMA member-countries and to improve their foreign trade 
systems. In 1964 members of CEMA agreed to introduce 
the system of multilateral clearing. The agreement 
included balancing of trade turnovers, exchange of 
services and credit facilities on multilateral basis.
To perform this task, the International Bank of Economic 
Cooperation has been established
So far it is too early to judge if these measures 
contributed in practice to the development and improve­
ment of Polish trade relations with other Bloc countries 
and what is more important if they really made them more 
"rational" and advantageous.
Statistical data available on Polish trade with 
Bloc countries is not only incomplete but also inade­
quate to make any qualified judgement as to what extent 
this new geographical mold of Polish foreign trade was 
advantageous or disadvantageous to Poland. Several 
shortcomings of the mechanism of her trade are widely 
known and from this point of view it seems that Poland's 
economy would benefit considerably on their removal.
Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic 
Power, 87 Congress, Second Session, Washington, 19’62”, 
Deb. 10 and 11, p. 34.
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Official statistics are limited to picture .trade 
turnovers with Bloc countries in terms of value of the 
very- broad commodity groups, in physical terms of quan­
tities or in terras of total weights of imports and exports, 
Price information is scarcely available and rather 
useless as a device to measure the profitability of 
Poland's trade.
In the "socialist group", the Soviet Union continued 
to be Poland's leading trade partner. In 1950 exports 
to the Soviet Union reached the value of 154 million 
dollars (24.3 per cent of total exports,) Imports from 
the U.S.S.R. amounted to 192 million dollars and consti­
tuted 28,8 per cent of total imports. By 1965 this si­
tuation changed; the share of imports rose to 31.1 per 
cent respectively. As this data suggests, 
the deficit in balance of trade with the Soviet Union 
which in 1950 amounted to 38 million dollars turned into 
a surplus of 53 million dollars in 1965.
It is interesting to note that an appreciable part 
of Polish exports to the Soviet Union (over one-quarter) 
consists of engineering products, mainly rolling stock, 
ships, transport equipment. On the other hand the majo­
rity of imports are essential raw materials,^ This is 
rather a peculiar situation for the political leader and
X
Poland sells twice as much machinery and equipment in 
terms of value to Soviet Union than she imports from 
Soviet Union,
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its satellite. . •
At the same time it seems very dubious that these 
trade relations have been always based on a so loudly, 
pronounced "principle of equality of rights" and mutual 
advantage of both trading partners. The political 
events of October 1956 revealed some data indicating 
that this was not always the case and that the Soviet 
Union took advantage of her political and economic 
preponderance. The most striking example of these 
policies was the export of Polish coal to the U.S.S.R.
In accordance with the provisions of the agreement of 
August 1945, Poland delivered approximately 65 million 
tons of coal to the Soviet Union until.1954. This coal 
was priced at the mere cost of transportation to the 
Soviet border while the average world price for coal 
in this period was about $14-15 per ton. Thus,' Soviet 
gain on this transaction amounted to 900-950 million 
dollars, ' In 1956 the Soviet Union cancelled the Polish 
debt with the Soviet Union amounting to #542 million 
dollars to compensate for these deliveries,^
. This was one of very few examples were the Soviet 
Union admitted its discriminatory policies and it is 
hard to believe that this was one "exceptional case" 
and not a common practice,
; i :Aa far as Polish trade with other Bloc countries is 
concerned, the relative equality of bargaining power
A. zauberman, industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslo- 
vakia and East Germany, Yô3ïnôTê""ôîripT""^FZT^ ^
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seems to be leas questionable. In 1950 Polish export 
to the Bloc countries (excluding the U.S.S.R.) reached 
the value of 207 million dollars, its share in export 
total amounting to almost 33 per cent. By 1965 these 
exports increased to 670 million dollars, and consbitu- 
ted 28.2 per cent of export totals. Polish imports 
from other satellite countries amounted to 216 million 
dollars in 1950 and increased to 620 million dollars 
in 1965. Correspondingly, its share in import totals 
Was 32.3 per cent in 1950 and rose to 35 per cent by 1965. 
Normally, Poland had a deficit in her commodity trade with 
the Bloc countries which was covered by surplus on her 
service account. However in 1964 and I965 Poland achie­
ved also a ' surplus on her commodity trade with this 
area. In the conditions of barter exchange it caused 
a considerable disturbance in the commodity flows and 
payments. In order to remove this obstacle subsequent 
economic plans provided for a substantial rise in Polish 
imports from CEMA countries. The second most important 
Polish trade partner was Czechoslovakia, which played 
a significant part in Polish machinery imports (in 1953 
her share in Polish foreign trade was over 10 per cent).
By 1957 Pclish-Czechoslovakia trade fell sharply, but 
was reestablished to the previous level in early 1960's. 
Discoveries of rich deposits of sulphur and copper in 
Poland, the development of which is financed to the 
considerable extent by Czechoslovakia, seem to provide 
suitable environment for further extension of trade 
contracts between these two countries. Generally, the
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Polish post-war pattern of trade with Bloc countries 
changed significantly. In the first post-war decade 
Polish imports from this area consisted mainly of 
.machinery and equipment supplemented by some raw mate­
rials and semi-manufactured products. At the turn of 
1950's, almost 90 per cent of Polish exports to this 
area consisted of raw materials (mainly coal, coke and 
unprocessed chemical products). In the 1960's the commo­
dity pattern of trade with the area changed. The share 
of engineering products in Poland's exports increased to 
one-third of total exports, while the share of raw 
materials and foodstuffs relatively declined. Thus 
Poland's commodity pattern of trade with the Bloc area 
markedly approximated those usually regarded as typical 
for industrial areas of the world.
B. TRADE PATTERNS WITH THE ADVANCED COUNTRIES OP THE 
WORDD.
It seems safe to say that political and economic 
factors responsible for the moulding of Polish post­
war geographical pattern of trade worked unquestionably 
towards discouraging Poland's trade relations with the 
economically advanced West, Polish pre-war trade has 
been mainly directed to Western Europe, accounting for 
56 per cent of exports total in 1937 and 72 per cent of 
imports. In 1950 Polish imports from advanced countries
reached the value of 239 million dollars and constituted
35.8 per cent of her imports. At the same time exports 
amounted to 242 million dollars (38.1 per cent of exports
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total). The most important export item in this period 
was coal, making up over one half of total export 
earnings from this area. In 1949, Poland’s export of 
coal to Western Europe reached the peak amount of 11,8 
million tons. An increased supply of British and 
American coal in early 1950's, together with Polish
pricing policy brought these exports to 6.8 million tons
by 1953. Besides coal, Poland supplied considerable
amounts of foodstuffs (meats, eggs), chemicals and
,* '
textiles. On the import side, most important were: 
machinery and equipment, metals, wool, rubber and some 
raw materials. By 1955 exports to this area declined 
to 187 million dollars and their share to 20 per cent of
export totals. Imports showed a slight increase in
absolute terms amounting to 251 million dollars but their 
share fell to 26 per cent.
In her trade with Western countries, Poland still 
maintains the traditional pre-war pattern, where exports 
of agricultural products (mainly meat, eggs, poultry, 
butter and sugar) account for about half of exports 
total.
Poland seems to be very much concerned with the 
reestablishment of her trade relations with the western 
world, however, present perspectives for the expansion 
of this trade do not seem to be too promising. This is 
mainly due to the strengthening of integration processes 
in Western Europe which threatens to irapare her position 
of food supplier to Western markets. The share of Polish 
trade with the Common Market constituted about 9.1 per
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cent of her trade in 1961 and the trade with BETA 
countries about 12,4 per cent respectively. Great 
Britain is Poland's principal partner in this area. Her 
possible access to the Common Market is expected to have 
a negative effect of the future of Polish-British trade.
POLISH TRADE WITH THE UNDERDEVEBOPED COUNTRIES.
Since mid-1950's Polish foreign trade relations 
with the developing non-European countries has been 
increasingly growing in importance. It seems that the 
perspectives of further expansion of this trade are 
rather promising and mutually advantageous for both 
sides.
The new post-war pattern of Polish trade certainly 
deteriorated her old trade links with industrialized 
areas of the world but at the same time it provided a 
firmer base for the development of trade with underdeve­
loped countries. Several factors are important in this 
respect. First of all, there are some similarities in 
the economic position of Poland and her developing coun­
try partners. The Achilles heel of Polish post-war
economy was her foreign payments with the group of
I  -
advanced countries. The majority of the underdeveloped 
countries experienced the same difficulties. Secondly, 
the dissimilarities in the structure of economics, make' 
the commodity exchange very promising. All the Bloc 
countries including Poland are still heavily dependent 
on imports of raw materials. The shortage of raw mate­
rials was critical in many instances. According to the 
estimates of CEMA in I960 planned demand for rolled steel
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in. the Bloc was expected to exceed planned production by 
about 4,500,000 tons; for steel in bars by about 
3 ,500,000 tons.^ Trade with underdeveloped countries 
would certainly help to solve the acute shortage of some 
types of raw materials. On the other hand underdeveloped 
countries would find markets for their products when the 
outlets for selling them to the industrialized West 
,markedly, shrunk. At the same time Poland has chances in 
finding an absorbtive market for her dynamically growing 
exports of machinery and equipment. Directing these 
exports to markets in advanced countries is rather diffi­
cult,if not impossible, because of the strong competition 
and still low quality of her products as compared with 
Western products. On the other hand, these products 
fit much better the technical requirements and factor 
endowment of underdeveloped countries entering the road 
of industrialization. Besides this, the exchange can be 
arranged on a barter base with a minimal flow of foreign 
currency scarce in both partner countries. Of course, 
these possibilities should not be over estimated, as any 
barter arrangement requires a match of corresponding 
demands and supplies on both sides and this can be diffi­
cult to meet in practice. For this reason, Poland's 
ability to sell her products on credit terms would be 
of prime importance. Actually, Poland can hardly afford
F. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, p. 32.
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this, and this situation-can have a negative impact on 
further expansion of her trade with developing areas.
There is an additional advantage which Poland can draw 
from this trade, and a very important one from the point 
of view of making her economic policy less dependent on 
the Soviet Union, During the whole post-war period 
Poland heavily depended on Soviet deliveries of raw 
materials. It seems clear that under such circumstances 
any Soviet refusal to continue these deliveries would 
bring economic crisis to the country. Thus, the threat 
is by no means negligible and must be constantly kept in 
mind by Poland's policy makers.
In 1950, Polish trade with underdeveloped countries 
was of rather marginal importance. Imports reached the 
value of 21 million dollars and constituted about 3 per 
cent of total imports. Export to these countries amounted 
to 31 million dollars and its share in export totals was 
roughly 5 per cent. By 1965 exports to underdeveloped 
countries reached the value of 263 million dollars, or 
more than 8 times higher than in 1950, On the import 
side, the share of underdeveloped countries in Polish, 
imports was about 8,5 per cent. In terms of value, 
imports from this area amounted to 180 million dollars.
The biggest ' trade partners in this area were: 1 Latin',,
America; Brazil and Argentina, in Asia, India, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Ceylon and Iran, in Africa - Egypt and Morocco.
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POLAND'S FOREIGN PAYMENTS POSITION
In the conditions of rapidly increasing foreign 
trade relations which took place in the post-war period, 
Poland was almost continuously experiencing a deficit 
in her balance of payments. This was by no means, a new 
phenomenoh, Poland's inter-war economy suffered from an 
insufficient capital supply and her foreign payments were 
almost entirely dependent on thq commodity trade. A 
systematic analysis of the Polish balance of foreign 
payments is extremely difficult, its conclusions uncer­
tain and questionable as the information on foreign 
exchange and bullion holdings and flow are not published. 
Prom the occasional statements' of political leaders, 
announcements of foreign credits, very scarce information 
on the state of foreign debts it seems to be certain that 
the deficit in foreign payments is continuously a severe 
burden for the economy. It is much easier to observe 
the behavior of her trade balances. The balance of 
commodity trade is shown in Table No. 1.
As these data indicate Poland had a considerable 
deficit in her commodity trade during the period 1947- 
1963. The recent few years brought a marked increase in 
her trade turnovers. Since the raid-1950's the subsequent 
foreign trade plans determined the rate of growth of 
exports on a relatively higher level than that of imports, 
in order to decrease the trade deficit. The faster 
rate of growth of exports than that of imports did not, 
however, bring any radical improvement in her foreign, 
payments position. In 1964, as data indicates, trade
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balance was closed with a moderate surplus. It is, 
however, impossible to estimate to what extent it impro­
ved her overall payments position, as the burden of 
foreign debts seemed to reach considerable dimensions.
As Prof, Kalecki remarked "In the course of work on the 
perspective plan, it appeared time and again that the 
bottleneck in economic development was foreign trade 
balance, that is the difficulty in balancing the nece­
ssary increase in imports by a corresponding one in 
exports."^ Trade deficit which persisted practically 
over the whole post-war period was partly covered by 
foreign credits, and there is no doubt that foreign 
credits played quite an important role in solving many 
of the "key" economic problems of the country, ' Some of 
them (mainly commodity credits) have been granted by the 
countries of the Bloc, In terras of values, the greatest 
financial assistance has been provided by the Soviet 
Union.^ The real economic value of this aid is difficult 
to assess, especially when taking into account the Soviet 
discriminatory policies applied in trade with Poland, It 
is quite probable that on balance, this aid could be 
Completely offset by los'ses ^ brought.;,about ,by '".unfair 
trade". The credit granted to Poland by Czechoslovakia 
and designated for the development of Polish coal, copper 
and sulphur extractions seem to be much more important.
Nowe Drogi, No, 8, 1958 cited by A, Zauberman, 
InHusTrxaT Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East 
■ Germany, p. jib.
^  A very interesting discussion on this problem can be 
found in
M. _J. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, New York, 1967, 
Chapter 1 and 2,
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Since the mid-1950's substantial credits were granted to 
Poland by Western countries. Among them, the biggest 
and most advantageous were American credits. In the 
light of Poland’s actual political orientation, it 
does not seem very probable that Western assistance will 
be continued,
A part of Poland’s trade deficit is covered by 
earnings from shipping and railway services. These 
earnings played an important role in covering Poland’s 
large deficit. Bloc trade was a regular feature in this 
deficit till 1964. By 1964 the Polish payment situation 
with the Bloc impmved significantly and the deficit in 
her commodity trade turned into surplus. The persisting 
deficit in Poland’s trade with Western Countries which 
in 1961 exceeded the amount of 72 million dollars (about 
one half of her total exports to these countries) is 
much more serious and troublesome. It was accompanied 
by the deficit on the service account. Poland's payments 
difficulties with Western countries seem to be of 
structural character and it is mainly for this reason 
that all her efforts to promote trade expansion with 
the advanced Western countries have little chance to be 
successful.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The post-war pattern of Poland's foreign economic 
relations has been enormously conditioned by her new 
political orientation. The political regime which emer­
ged after the second world war as a result of her incor­
poration into the Soviet-bloc set for itself as the main 
task to build the socialist economy. Centralized economic 
planning was introduced in order to speed-up the reconst­
ruction. Having largely eliminated capitalistic forms of 
economic organization through nationalization of the : 
major sectors of the economy the Polish government found 
it necessary to develop an administrative organization ; • :
and schemes of control to-manage the new highly centra­
lized planned economy. • -
In the field of foreign trade it found its immediate 
reflection in the establishment of the state monopoly • 
of foreign trade and subjecting the foreign trade to the 
discipline of centralized economic planning. - : : ;
: I : Concentration of the decision making on the highest
level of the apparatus of foreign trade monopoly and almost 
exclusive reliance on comprehensive economic planning in 
carrying out foreign trade activity had or could have 
some advantages: ' ;t
1) It gave the possibility of selecting such :a pattern"
of foreign trade which would be preferable from the point 
of view of the fulfillment of a national economic plan 
and the achievement of the highest possible rate of growth
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of the economy.
2) It permitted radical changes to be made in the commo­
dity structure and directions of foreign trade in 
relatively short time.
3) In :a country suffering from a .persistently strained, 
situation in the balance of payments,the state control 
over import and export movements seems to be helpful
and justified.
4) In a ruined by war country there was a considerable 
shortage of highly trained foreign trade personnel. Prom 
this point of view the centralization permitted a few 
cadres to conduct large amounts of trade.
On the other hand the establishment of foreign trade 
monopoly and,following it.separation of production and 
trade had many disadvantages. First of all, the adminis­
trative mechanism constructed to transmit commands and 
directives through the several ladders of the hierarchical 
structure proved to be inefficient and unoperational in 
practice. Large organizations are almost always bureau­
cratic, tend to move slowly, to adopt themselves with 
increasing difficulty. In general, the vaster the 
organization becomes,the more difficult are the structural 
problems of management, coordination and control. In 
effect, the consequences are following:
1) the system lacks flexibility to meet day-to-day 
opportunities
2) the costs of transmitting information through admi­
nistrative channels are quite high and the whole process 
becomes time-absorbing.
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Secondly, the separation of production and trade 
caused many conflicts of interest between manufacturing ' 
and trading enterprises, and made the problem of 
coordination of trade and production extremely difficult.
Thirdly, the lack of continuous contact between 
domestic producers and foreign markets made it very 
difficult to adjust their production pattern to the 
changing conditions on the world market, and to familia­
rize them with the most recent techniques, production 
methods and quality requirements.
Very enthusiastic drive towards decentralization and 
reforms in the system of state administration,which took 
place after "October Revolution" of 195§ had a very 
short life and in the long-run brought surprisingly little 
change. The organizational reforms which were introduced 
were too limited in scope and did not go far enough to 
bring any lasting improvements in the system.
Decades long experience of Soviet-type economies 
seems to indicate that centralized planning failed as a 
device to bring rational allocation of the economy's scarce 
resources.
Planning techhiques are still very crude in spite of 
the fact that modern mathematical methods and techniques 
are finding increasingly extensive application in planning. 
Material balancing which is still at the core of planning 
proved to be a completely inadequate tool to meet the 
requireme-nts of consistency and comprehensiveness of the 
central plan. Foreign trade planning and the coordination 
of the foreign trade plan with the requirements of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
201
over-all national economic plan is undoubtedly even more 
troublesome than planning in the domestic sectors of the 
economy which are under the full control of the state. 
Foreign trade involves contacts with foreign markets 
which are independent of the planning authority but, 
which at the same time condition the plan fulfillment.
The heavy bureaucratic machinery of nation-wide economic 
planning is too rigid to secure quick and effective ad­
justment of foreign trade plans to the changing conditions 
oh theâwbrld market.
Besides this, it should be noted that whatever the 
ease or difficulty of framing an internally consistent 
version of the national economic plan there is still a 
problem of meeting the efficiency condition. It is here, 
that the inadequacy of existing planning techniques 
manifests itself most acutely. It seems quite, obvious 
tfcet a plan balanced toa nicety does not necessarily meet 
the efficiency condition.
During the first post-war decade economic calculation 
and profitability considerations were almost completely 
neglected by Polish policy makers.
The doctrinal thaw which followed the .
October 1956 created a much more favourable environment 
for the economists,allowing them to raise the problem of 
the efficiency of a centrally planned economy and of the 
efficiency of foreign trade. Intensive research in the 
field of foreign trade profitability which followed, seems 
to indicate that any simple mechanism which could ensure 
rationality in ; c decision making is extremely difficult
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or impossible to be found.
The basic obstacles which make the economic calcu­
lation impossible or unmeaningful are to be found at the 
core of the adopted system of centrally planned economy. 
The distorted price system, rigid rates of exchange and 
the separation of domestic and foreign trade prices 
deprive the planners of any reliable and satisfactory 
yard-stick to measure the extent to which the trade is 
gainful.
It is interesting to note that in spite of all the 
shortcomings of the planning system adopted in Poland , 
that" her post-war foreign trade was growing at relative­
ly high rates. At the same time radical changes took 
place in the commodity composition and directions of 
foreign trade. In the pre-war Poland agricultural 
products and foodstuffs dominated on the export side while 
the engineering products and machinery were the main 
import items. Poland's post-war commodity composition of 
foreign trade approximated more closely the trade pattern 
of industrialized countries and the machinery and equip­
ment established itself as the principal export industry. 
The geographical network of Poland's post-war trade has 
undergone deep changes. The war violently disrupted her 
traditional trade pattern. The new, post-war trade 
network became more Eastern oriented. The economic 
contacts with the Bloc countries strenghtened while trade 
with the rest of the world relatively decreased. There 
is a whole chain of events and forces which lie behind 
this shift of trade channels from West to East. However,
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it seems that the political factor and the incorporation 
of Poland into the Soviet-bloc had the decisive impact.
As far as the balance of payments is concerned the 
shifts, which occurred in the pattern of trade brought 
surprisingly little change. Pre-war Poland was almost 
continuously experiencing a.deficit in her balance of 
payments. Foreign payments are still the Achilles heel 
of Polish post-war economy.
To sum-up, Poland’s post-war foreign trade policy 
and performance of the apparatus of foreign trade had 
many shortcomings, the removal of which would unquestion­
ably have a favourable effect on the economy. There 
were also many achievements. The development of Poland's 
post-war foreign economic relations was,perhaps.not 
amazing but still very significant. However, there is one 
question which the economist investigating these problems 
would like to answer and for which the answer is very 
difficult to find. The question is, what was the cost 
to the economy and society of these achievements and short­
comings'. • .
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